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NOTES AND COMMENTS
Administrative Law-Expansi6n of "Public Interest" Standing
The Federal Administrative agencies, regarded by New Dealers
as the most effective political instrument for social and economic
reform, have long since lost their progressive aura. The quest for
revitalization has been carried on in the legislature and the law
reviews for a generation.' Meanwhile, the federal judiciary has
steadily widened public access to these centers of power. Judges
have expanded the procedural law of "standing to sue" to urge upon
the agencies broader value considerations and an affirmative burden
of inquiry ever since the Supreme Court decided the "watershed
case,"2 FCC v. Sanders Bros. Radio Station.3 Development of
standing is particularly evident in court review of Federal Power
Commission and Federal Communications Commission proceed-
ings,4 for these agencies have been the most criticized by courts and
commentators.5 Two recent cases,6 setting aside FPC and FCC
orders, have significantly broadened the right of standing. In re-
manding the records, the Courts of Appeals for the District of
Columbia and Second Circuit made explicit the relationship between
the public's right to participate in and appeal from agency action
and the agencies' duty to plan in the public interest.
When it established a number of new agencies during the De-
pression, Congress typically provided that persons "aggrieved" by
administrative action could initiate review by the courts.' In the
'See Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB. 340 U.S. 474 (1951); Jaffe,
The Effective Limits of the Administrative Process: A Reevaluation, 67
HARV. L. REv. 1105 (1954); BERNSTEIN, REGULATING BUSINESS BY INDE-
PENDENT COMMISSION (1955); Friendly, A Look at the Federal Adminis-
trative Agencies, 60 CoLUm. L. REv. 429 (1960).
'JAFFE, JUDICIAL CONTROL OF ADMINISTRATIVE AcrioN 503 (1965)
[hereinafter cited as JAFFE].
'FCC v. Sanders Bros. Radio Station, 309 U.S. 470 (1940).
' JAFFE 517.
'See Friendly, The Federal Administrative Agencies: The Need for a
Better Definition of Standards, 75 HARV. L. REv. 863, 1055 (1962).
'Scenic Hudson Preservation Conference v. FPC, 354 F.2d 608 (2d Cir.
1965), cert. denied, 384 U.S. 941 (1966); Office of Communications of
United Church of Christ v. FCC, 359 F.2d 994 (D.C. Cir. 1966).
'E.g., Securities and Exchange Act § 9 (a), 48 Stat. 80 (1933), as
amended 15 U.S.C. § 77i (1964); Federal Communications Act § 402(b)
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absence of such statutes, the Supreme Court had not granted stand-
ing to parties who had not suffered a "legal wrong." This meant in
practice that the petitioner was required to be a member of the class
whose "interests" were protected by the challenged agency. For in-
stance, in the Chicago Junction Case,' a railroad was allowed to
challenge an Interstate Commerce Commission order allowing a com-
peting railroad to control a station used by both. But in L. Singer
& Sons v. Union Pacific Ry. Co.,' non-members of the transporta-
tion industry had no standing to complain of ICC action permitting
an extension of trackage that favored their competitor.
The Supreme Court did not follow the traditional theory of
standing when faced with a suit brought under a "person ag-
grieved" statute. In FCC v. Sanders Bros. Radio Station' it held
that petitioner had no right to complain that it would suffer severe
economic injury if the FCC licensed a competitor, because the act
was not designed to protect existing licensees." Yet petitioner did
have standing to sue, since it was definitely "aggrieved" by the
licensing order. 2 It could raise issues of law, and attempt to prove
that the license grant was not in the "public interest." This was
what Congress had intended by the review provision; if not, then
such actions would be unreviewable and the section would be mean-
ingless.13
The distinction thus drawn between the basis for standing and
the issues presentable on appeal greatly increased the opportunity
for review. Since access to the courts now depended only on allega-
tion of some adverse effect suffered, judicial review would no longer
be a province wholly occupied by members of the regulated indus-
try. The concept of "interest" was now poured into a new mold:
(6), 48 Stat. 926 (1934, 47 U.S.C. § 402(b) (6) (1964); Federal Power Act
§ 313 (b), 49 Stat. 860 (1935), 16 U.S.C. § 825(1)(b) (1964); Food,
Drug, and Cosmetic Act § 701 (f) 52 Stat. 1055 (1938), 21 U.S.C. § 371 (f)(1964) ("adversely affected"); Administrative procedure Act § 10(a), 60
Stat. 237 (1964), 5 U.S.C. § 1009(a) (1964).
8The Chicago Junction Case, 264 U.S. 258 (1964).
'L. Singer and Sons v. Union Pacific Ry. Co., 311 U.S. 295 (1940). The
Court said petitioners must show a greater interest than "a common con-
cern for obedience to law," id. at 302. Review was allowed to a "party
in interest" under the Transportation Act, 24 Stat. 379 (1887), 49 U.S.C.
§ 1(20) (1964).
10309 U.S. 470 (1940).
'lId. at 475.
'
2 Id. at 477.
13 Ibid.
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that of "private Attorney General."14 Since "public interest" was
to be the focus of the reviewing court's attention, the judges were
encouraged to urge the agencies away from "industry orientation"
and toward "consumer orientation."'I5
In developing the theory of standing suggested in Sanders, the
federal courts decided that aggrievement need not be financial, and
allowed consumers as well as competitors to assert their view of the
"public interest." The Court of Appeals for the District of Colum-
bia, for example, thought that radio station KOA was aggrieved by
a license grant to another station, which would interfere with KOA's
signal. The Supreme Court affirmed, FCC v. NBC (KOA), 8 on
the narrower ground that KOA's license had been modified by the
order, so it was a member of a class given a specific right of review
by the statute." The FCC took advantage of this holding by argu-
ing until recently that only those showing personal economic injury
or electronic interference could appeal its orders. But the broad
interpretation of "aggrieved" proposed in the court of appeals' opin-
ion' s was reasserted by the same court in Office of Communications
of United Church of Christ v. FCC.19 The implications that circuit
had seen in Sanders in 1942 were fully realized in 1966, when it
held that the FCC must allow "audience participation" in licensing
proceedings.20
An opinion by Judge Frank of the second circuit was important
and influential in the process. Associated Industries v. Ickes"' held
that a consumer's group threatened with financial loss by an order
raising the fixed price of coal could challenge the order in court.
"' judge Frank's term in Associated Indus. v. Ickes, 134 F.2d 694 (2nd
Cir. 1943), vacated as moot, 320 U.S. 707 (1943).
"= See Office of Communications of United Church of Christ v. FCC,
359 F.2d 994, 1004-05 (D.C. Cir. 1966); for a theory of "industry orienta-
tion" in federal regulation agencies, see JArFE 10-16.
10319 U.S. 239 (1943), affirming 132 F.2d 545 (D.C. Cir. 1942).
"
T FCC v. NBC (KOA), 319 U.S. 239 (1943).
8 It stated that non-economic injury was recognized by the term "ag-
grieved," since otherwise non-profit radio stations could not appeal. NBC v.
FCC, 132 F.2d 545, 547 (D.C. Cir. 1942). This court subsequently allowed
users of a mass transit system to protest an agency action allowing use of
radio broadcasts on buses, and the Supreme Court apparently agreed on the
standing question. Pollak v. Public Utilities Comm'n, 191 F.2d 450 (D.C.
Cir. 1951), rev/d on other grounds, 343 U.S. 451 (1952).
10 359 F.2d 994, 1001 (1966).
20 Id. at 1005.
" Associated Indus. v. Ickes, 134 F.2d 694 (2d Cir. 1943), vacated as
vtoot, 320 U.S. 707 (1943).
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In his opinion Judge Frank pointed out the revolutionary effect of
Sanders' statement that Congress had conferred standing on parties
who could not otherwise be heard. He dealt at length with the "case
or controversy" requirement of the federal constitution.2 2 The re-
quired controversy existed, he said, when a public officer's action
was attacked as a violation of his statutory powers. Since the
Attorney General had always had constitutional authority to sue the
officer, the problem was not whether a case existed, but rather who
could bring it to court. Massachusetts v. Mello. 2 3 disallowed federal
taxpayer suits, so a private citizen could not sue a governmental
officer on his own. Congress had the power to confer on him the
standing of a "private Attorney General,"' however, and this is the
meaning of the "persons aggrieved" statutes. Apparently this doc-
trine has been accepted by the Supreme Court, for the constitutional
objections to a liberal standing policy voiced in some early cases
have not been heard since.2 5
Though we may regard the constitutional question as settled,
the policy questions are not. If Congress has the power to grant
standing to members of the public, how far has it exercised this
power? And is there any basis outside the review statutes on which
the right to standing may rest? The Supreme Court cited Asso-
ciated Industries with approval in granting standing to a sharehold-
er of a corporation affected by an SEC order.2 6 In two later cases,
it again found standing despite the speculative or minimal nature of
the injury.2" But the lack of a consistent theory was evident in one
case that it heard without telling why. When the Secretary of the
Interior and several electric cooperatives challenged an FPC order
licensing a private power dam on the Roanoke River, Justice Frank-
furter, speaking for the Court, said:
"U.S. Cow¢sT. Art. III, § 2.
23262 U.S. 447 (1923).
"Associated Indus. v. Ickes, 134 F.2d 694, 704 (2d Cir. 1943). "It is
within the power of Congress to confer such standing to prosecute an ap-
peal." FCC v. Sanders Bros. Radio Station, 309 U.S. 470, 477 (1940).
2" Compare Justice Douglas' dissents in FCC v. NBC (KOA), 319 U.S.
239, 265 (1943), and United States ex rel. Chapman v. FPC, 345 U.S. 153,
175 (1953).
"
0American Power & Light Co. v. SEC, 325 U.S. 385 (1945).
-' Parker v. Fleming, 329 U.S. 531 (1947) (tenant's protest against evic-
tion of Office of Price Administration); Oklahoma v. Civil Service Commis-
sion, 330 U.S. 127 (1947) (State required to fire employee or lose certain
highway funds allowed to challenge Hatch Act).
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We hold that the petitioners have standing. Differences of view,
however, preclude a single opinion of the Court as to both petition-
ers. It would not further clarification of this complicated special-
ty of federal jurisdiction, the solution of whose problems is in any
event more or less determined by the specific circumstances of
individual situations, to set out the divergent grounds in support
of standing in these cases.28
Consumer standing has been approved often, in recent years,
where petitioners challenged rate fixing or natural gas licensing by
the FPC.2' The interest in these cases is usually economic, but some-
times not. 0 Members of the regulated group have been able to
assert non-economic injury to gain standing before the FCC."' An
important step was taken when a competitor who was not a broad-
caster was allowed to protest the manner in which a license was
used. 2 However, there had been no consumer standing before the
FCC prior to 1966. And although the FPC had been challenged by
conservation groups before,3 their right to standing had not been
"8United States ex rel. Chapman v. FPC, 345 U.S. 153, 156 (1953).
Congress had adopted a plan for development of the Roanoke River Basin.
The Secretary of the Interior, who would have control over allocation of
excess power produced by a Government dam, and the cooperatives, who
were interested in purchasing cheap power, argued that the plan did not
permit private operations within its territory. The lower court had denied
standing, United States ex rel. Chapman v. FPC, 191 F.2d 796 (4th Cir.
1951).
"' California v. FPC, 353 F.2d 16 (9th Cir. 1965); City of Pittsburgh
v. FPC, 237 F.2d 741 (D.C. Cir. 1956); Natural Gas Pipeline Co. of
America v. FPC, 253 F.2d 3 (3rd Cir. 1958), cert. denied, 357 U.S. 927
(1958) (gas company which passed on rate increases to customers repre-
sented their interests as a matter of ethics and good business). "Essential-
ly, the petitioners represent the ultimate consumers of the ,gas." Public
Serv. Comm'n. v. FPC, 257 F.2d 717, 720 (3rd Cir. 1958), aff'd sub nom.
Atlantic Ref. Co. v. Public Serv. Comm., 360 U.S. 378 (1959).
"oLynchburg Gas Co. v. FPC, 336 F.2d 942 (D.C. Cir. 1964) (under
new rates petitioners would have to change suppliers).
"Lafayette Radio Electronics Corp. v. United States, 345 F.2d 278 (2d
Cir. 1965) (holder of citizen's license could challenge FCC regulation pro-
hibiting use of license for hobby).
"2 Philco Corp. v. FCC, 257 F.2d 656 (D.C. Cir. 1958), cert. denied, 358
U.S. 946 (1959) (unfair advertising).
"' National Hells Canyon Ass'n. v. FPC, 237 F.2d 777 (D.C. Cir. 1956),
cert. denied, 353 U.S. 924 (1957); Washington Dep't. of Game v. FPC, 207
F.2d 391 (9th Cir. 1953), cert. denied, 347 U.S. 936 (1954). The right of
associations to represent their members has long been recognized, and was
specifically approved in National Motor Freight Traffic Ass'n. v. United
States, 372 U.S. 246 (1963)) (per curiam).
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made explicit or effective until Scenic Hudson Preservation Confer-
ence v. FPC.s4
One month before deciding United Church of Christ, the Dis-
trict of Columbia Court of Appeals heard a musicians' organization
claim standing to represent the public's interest in live music pro-
grams, and to represent musicians aggrieved by a radio station's
failure to present a promised amount of such programming. 5
Though the issue was "well briefed! and presented "interesting and
intriguing questions,""6 it was not decided. The court may have
thought United Church of Christ presented a more clear-cut case
for audience standing. Petitioners were religious and civil-rights
groups claiming that television station WLBT in Jackson, Missis-
sippi, unfairly discriminated against Negroes and Catholics in its
programs, and carried excessive commercials. The FCC had heard
complaints about WLBT before 37 but had continued to renew the
station's license, an action in keeping with the agency's traditional
reluctance to criticize program content.38 Faced with these circum-
stances, the court found that a grant of standing was "essential to
insure that the holders of broadcasting licenses be responsive to the
needs of the audience .... ,,31 It said "the concept of standing is a
practical and functional one,"4° and has not remained static.
Similarly, in Scenic Hudson the court criticized the FPC's
"narrow view" of standing.4" That case involved Consolidated Edi-
son's application to build a hydroelectric plant at Storm King Moun-
" 354 F.2d 608 (2d Cir. 1965). The FPC argued that parties must show
"personal economic injury resulting from the Commission's action" in order
to obtain review. Id. at 615.
" American Federation of Musicians v. FCC, 356 F.2d 827 (D.C. Cir.
1966).
'o Id. at 830. The case was decided on other grounds.
3' Office of Communications of United Church of Christ v. FCC, 359
F.2d 994, 998 (D.C. Cir. 1966) ; Note, 77 HARv. L. REv. 701, 710 (1964).
" Note, 77 HARV. L. REv. 701 (1964); Note, 68 YALE L.J. 783 (1959).
Private-TV, because it receives huge public grants from the nation
in the form of licenses, should have a large dedication to the public
service. But it has never paid more than lip service to the concept
and the Federal Communications Commission has never made any
sustained effort to force a shift in programming-for various reasons,
the most important being the influence of the TV lobby in Congress.
Markel, A Program for Public-TV, N.Y. Times, March 12, 1967, § 6
(Magazine), Part 1, 25, 126.
39 359 F.2d at 1002.
,o Ibid.
1 Scenic Hudson Preservation Conference v. FPC, 354 F.2d 608, 615
(1965).
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tain in New York, "an area of unique beauty and historical signifi-
cance." The complaining petitioners were an association composed
of several non-profit conservation groups, and three municipalities
in the area. They charged that the Commission had failed to give
adequate consideration to non-economic values in its proceedings.
The court discussed the congressional mandate for agency foster-
ing of these interests, and said:
In order to insure that the Federal Power Commission will ade-
quately protect the public interest in the aesthetic, conservational,
and recreational aspects of power development, those who by
their activities and conduct have exhibited a special interest in
such areas, must be held to be "aggrieved" parties .... 42
Both courts rejected the objections that the Commissions could
adequately represent the public interest, and that a broadening of
standing would encourage participation by so many parties that pro-
ceedings would be unworkable.4" The District of Columbia court
thought that FCC representation of the listener's interest was "no
longer a valid assumption."4 4 And, the second circuit dismissed the
FPC's fear that "literally thousands" would intervene and appeal by
saying, "Our experience with public actions confirms the view that
the expense and vexation of legal proceedings is not lightly under-
taken."' 45 The courts suggested that formation of groups represent-
"1I d. at 616. Petitioners were said to have some economic interest, in
addition, but this was not seen as an important factor. Ibid.
"' The courts have decided that the right of intervention should be tested
by the same standards applied to the right of appeal, so the benefits ex-
tended by the instant cases can be taken advantage of by those seeking to
participate in agency proceedings. See, e.g., American Communications
Ass'n v. United States, 298 F.2d 648 (2d Cir. 1962); Public Serv. Comm'n
v. FPC, 284 F.2d 200 (D.C. Cir. 1960); National Coal Ass'n v. FPC, 191
F.2d 462 (D.C. Cir. 1951). But cf. Local 282, Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters v.
NLRB, 339 F.2d 795 (2d Cir. 1964); contra, Marine Engineers' Beneficial
Ass'n v. NLRB, 202 F.2d 546 (3d Cir.), cert denied, 346 U.S. 819 (1953).
Professor Davis thinks there should be a distinction between rules govern-
ing intervention and those controlling standing to appeal. DAvis, ADniNis-
TRATiVE LAW TREATISE §§ 8.11, 22.08 (1964). The primary reason for
limiting intervention is the fear that some parties seek only to delay the
proceedings; but this objection would seem less forceful where the parties
will not reap financial gain from delay.
" 359 F.2d at 1003. See 354 F.2d at 620. Cf. UAW v. Scofield, 382 U.S.
205 (1965); NLRB v. Local 2, United Ass'n of Journeymen, 360 F.2d 428(2d Cir. 1966). These cases held that parties who brought or defended
charges before the NLRB could intervene to assert their interest in court
review of action taken by the Board.
" 354 F.2d at 617. The same language is found in JA-FFE at 523. It has
been said that the cost of taking a case of average complexity "adequately"
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ing common interests would limit the number of participants."
The courts clearly indicated in these two cases that their exten-
sion of standing was meant to provide effective participation by
representatives of non-economic public interests. They criticized the
agencies for not realizing the duty to affirmatively pursue the good
of the public as a whole, rather than that of the regulated industry,
and to carefully consider alternative proposals put forth by the
parties.4 The federal judiciary has not always been so forceful in
encouraging agency planning. In early cases it was assumed that
administrative bodies were vigorously reformist, and the courts left
procedure to the agencies' discretion so long as private rights were
given some protection.4" With the passage of the Administrative
Procedure Act,4" however, Congress urged the courts to be more
critical in examining agency action."0 The courts continue to ap-
prove agency planning and exercise of administrative discretion
when directed toward broad policies." But they are more eager to
remand records for further consideration where the agency has not
adequately studied alternative proposals that appear prima facie to
have merit." If the parties do not present alternatives, the agencies
to the courts is "upwards of $5000." Gardner, The Administrative Process,
in LEGAL INSTITUTIONS TODAY AND Tomoow 108, 140 (Paulsen ed. 1959).
6 "359 F.2d at 1005; 354 F.2d at 617.
" The Second Circuit said that the FPC's "role does not permit it to
act as an umpire blandly calling balls and strikes for adversaries appearing
before it.. ." 354 F.2d at 620. See 359 F.2d at 1008.
48 See FCC v. Pottsville Broadcasting Co., 309 U.S. 134 (1940); NBC
v. United States, 319 U.S. 190 (1943); FPC v. Hope Natural Gas Co., 320
U.S. 591 (1944).
4860 Stat. 237 (1946), as amended 5 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1011 (1964).
50 See Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474, 487 (1951).
"
1 See Namekagen Hydro Co. v. FPC, 216 F.2d 509 (7th Cir. 1954)(approving denial of license to build dam on river with special recreational
qualities); FPC v. Transcontinental Gas Pipe Line Corp., 365 U.S. 1 (1961)
(approving consideration of end-use of gas and conservation of resources) ;
Goodwill Stations, Inc. v. FCC, 325 F.2d 637 (D.C. Cir. 1963) (FCC
within power in modifying "clear channel" stations after expiration of
license term); FPC v. Union Elec. Co., 381 U.S. 90 (1965) (FPC hasjurisdiction over dams in non-navigable streams, under Commerce power).
This last case appears to adopt the view of Justice Jackson, whose dissent
in FPC v. Hope Natural Gas Co., 320 U.S. 591, 628 (1944), urged more
comprehensive planning in rate-fixing cases, including a consideration of
conservation policies.
2 Isbrandtsen Co. v. United States, 96 F. Supp. 883 (S.D.N.Y. 1951)
(Frank, J.), aff'd by an equally divided court sub nom. Rederi v. Isbrandtsen
Co., 342 U.S. 950 (1952); City of Pittsburgh v. FPC, 237 F.2d 741 (D.C.
Cir. 1965); Michigan Consol. Gas Co. v. FPC, 283 F.2d 204 (D.C. Cir.
1960), cert. denied, 364 U.S. 913 (1960).
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are expected to seek them." In the instant cases, the courts further
extended this liberal review policy. Alternatives to the hydroelectric
plant on Storm King were discussed at some length by the second
circuit, 4 which found that they had such merit that the FPC ex-
hibited a "disregard of the statute" by not receiving them. 5 And
the court in United Church of Christ mentioned several advantages
to be found in refusing to license WLBT at all.56 By devoting such
attention to alternatives, the courts stressed that the public interest
requires affirmative planning rather than passive acceptance of the
regulated industry's point of view. 7
As Professor Jaffe has pointed out, "the law of standing raises
acute questions concerning the role of judicial review, or, more
broadly, judicial control of public officers." ' Jaffe and other critics
agree that agency practice badly needs changing. They point to
"industry orientation," lack of political responsibility, failure to
define policies, and stagnation in case-by-case nearsightedness.59
However, they differ on the function of the courts in bringing
about reform;" and the judges have not developed a consistent
"See Great Lakes Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 289 F.2d 754, 755 n.1(D.C. Cir. 1960); Scenic Hudson Preservation Conference v. FPC, 354
F.2d 608, 620 (1965); Office of Communications of United Church of
Christ v. FCC, 359 F.2d 994, 1009 (1966).
"354 F.2d at 618-24.
' Id. at 620.
359 F.2d at 1009.
"In these circumstances a pious hope on the Commission's part for
better things from WLBT is not a substitute for evidence and findings."
359 F.2d at 1008. "The Commission's reviewed proceedings must include as
a basic concern the preservation of natural beauty and of national historical
shrines, keeping in mind that, in our affluent society, the cost of a project
is only one of several factors to be considered." 354 F.2d at 624. Compare
Public Serv. Comm'n. v. FPC, 257 F.2d 717 (3d Cir. 1958), aff'd sub nor.
Atlantic Ref. Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 360 U.S. 378 (1959). In that
case the FPC had twice refused to grant a license to an oil producer at an
unusually high rate; when the producer threatened to keep the oil out of
the interstate market, the FPC capitulated. The court reversed, since there
was no evidence that the high rate was in the public interest.
8 JAFFE 459.
" See, e.g., BERNSTEIN, REGULATING BusINESS BY INDEPENDENT CoM-
MIssIoN 291-95 (1955) [hereinafter cited as BERNSTEIN]; JAFFE 10-25;
Friendly, The Federal Administrative Agencies: The Need for Better Defini-
tion of Standards, 75 HARv. L. REv. 863 (1962) [hereinafter cited as
FRIENDLY]; Reich, The Law of the Planned Society, 75 YALE L.J. 1227
(1966) [hereinafter cited as REIcH]; Shapiro, The Supreme Court and
Government Planning: Judicial Review and Policy Formulation, 35 GEO.
WASH. L. REV. 329 (1966) [hereinafter cited as SHAPIRO].
" Bernstein, Friendly and Shapiro counsel judicial restraint. BERNSTEIN
1006 [Vol. 45
1967] "PUBLIC INTEREST" STANDING 1007
theory either.61 The courts have been content to rely on the vague
language of the review statutes in overcoming agency opposition to
broader standing."s In the instant cases, though, are found the most
explicit statements yet of the substantive reasons for procedural de-
velopment: to make the agencies more responsive to the needs of
the people." This underlying policy would seem inherent in the
democratic form of government. The right which implements that
policy, therefore, should be recognized as being derived from a more
fundamental source than a statute. It is submitted that Congress
in writing the review statutes, and the judiciary in interpreting them,
have been, in effect, applying constitutional theory to the "fourth
branch" of government. The checks on agency power provided by
legislative limitation of duties, executive appointment of officers, and
judicial review of actions, should be complemented by participation
of interested parties in decision making. Perhaps the next step in
the development traced in this note will be judicial recognition of a
constitutional right to be heard in the administrative process,
founded on the first amendment. As the late Professor Meiklejohn
96-97; FRIENDLY 1293; SHAPIRo 334-39. Jaffe also expresses caution, but
argues for a "public action" open to all citizens with vigorous use of judicial
discretion to limit appeals. JAFFE 523-24. Professor Davis disagrees, and
would allow standing only to one "adversely affected in fact"; quaere
whether he would extend that concept as far as the instant cases, and whether
the general satisfaction he expresses for current review practice will con-
tinue. DAvIs, ADMINISTRATIvE LAW TREATIsE §§ 23-01 (1958), 22.10
(Supp. 1965). Reich is most enthusiastic about instances of judicial aggres-
siveness. Particularly, he regards United Church of Christ as revolutionary,
and he praises both cases noted here. REicH 1248-55.
"1 See text accompanying note 28 supra.
02359 F.2d at 1001-02; 354 F.2d at 616. For an opinion sharply critical
of efforts by the government to restrict standing, see United States v. Public
Util. Comm., 151 F.2d 609 (D.C. Cir. 1945), cert. denied, 331 U.S. 816
(1947).
"' The movement of the case law toward "audience participation" sug-
gests a striking similarity to the aim of "participatory democracy" espoused
by "New Left" groups:
As a social system we seek the establishment of a democracy of
individual participation, governed by two central aims: that the in-
dividual share in those social decisions determining the quality and di-
rection of his life; that society be organized to encourage indepen-
dence in men and provide the media for their common participation.
STUDENTS FOR A DEMOcRATIC SOcIETY, PORT HURON STATEMENT 7 (1964).
" It has been argued that the constitution guarantees the right to court
review of arbitrary administrative action. Berger, Administrative Arbi-
trariness and Judicial Review, 65 COLUm. L. REV. 55 (1965).
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has said, that amendment is concerned, "not with a private right,
but with a public power, a governmental responsibility. 0 5
HUGH B. ROGERS, JR.
Admission to the Bar-"Good Moral Character"-
Constitutional Protections
Traditionally, states have been free to set up bar admission stan-
dards as rigorous or as lenient as desired.' Thus, it is permissible
to require that the applicant for admission have graduated from law
school,2 that he swear to uphold state and federal constitutions8 , and
that he does not advocate violent overthrow of the government. 4
Perhaps the most important requirement established by every state
is that the applicant have "good moral character." 5 This require-
ment allows the states a great deal of discretion in determining who
will be admitted to the bar since the function of this requirement is
to insure that only those who have sufficiently high moral character
are allowed to practice law.' Any determination of character is clear-
ly a discretionary determination.' Since the state impliedly warrants
" Meiklejohn, The First Amendment is an Absolute, 1961 Sup. CT. REv.
245.
.See Note, 106 U. PA. L. Rnv. 753, 755 (1958).
'E.g., Ex parte Florida State Bar Ass'n, 148 Fla. 725, 5 So. 2d 1 (1941).
'In re Summers, 325 U.S. 561 (1945).
' Konigsberg v. State Bar, 353 U.S. 252 (1957) (by implication). All
fifty states require the applicant to show nonadvocacy of violent overthrow
of the government. See RULES FOR ADmISSION TO THE BAR (West 38th ed.
1963).
'See RULES FOR ADMISSION TO THE BAR (West 38th ed. 1963); 64
A.L.R.2d 301 (1959); Jackson, Character Requirements for Admission to
the Bar, 20 FoRDHAm L. REv. 305 (1951). Besides use of the term "good
moral character," courts draw analogy and support from the term "moral
turpitude," i.e., if there is "moral turpitude," there is a lack of "good moral
character." See Bradway, Moral Turpitude as the Criterion of Offenses
that Justify Disbarment, 24 CALIF. L. REv. 9 (1935).
' See Comment, 15 STAN. L. REv. 500, 511 (1963) to the effect that
the high moral character required is one that would enable the attorney to
decide what is "right" for professional conduct as distinguished from private
conduct.
I As to what considerations should be taken into account in deciding
this question, see Starrs, Considerations on Determination of Good Moral
Character, 2 CATHOLIC LAW. 161 (1956). As to whether a judge or other
decision maker should follow his own convictions or that of the public in
determining "good moral character," see Cahn, Authority and Responsi-
bility, 51 COLUm. L. REv. 838 (1951).
[Vol. 451008
ADMISSION TO THE BAR
to its citizens that they can place their trust in the profession, this
requirement allows the state to fulfill this function.' Further, it has
been noted that while one can acquire legal learning through experi-
ence, a person admitted to the bar who has poor moral character will
likely remain soY
Notwithstanding the state's interest in the protection of the pub-
lic, the interests of the individual applicant have been recognized.
In two 1957 cases the United States Supreme Court for the first
time reversed bar admission denials. In Konigsberg v. State Bar0
the Court recognized the usefulness of the requirement of "good
moral character" but noted that "[s] uch a vague qualification, which
is easily adapted to fit personal views and predilections, can be a
dangerous instrument for arbitrary and discriminatory denial of the
right to practice law."" In the companion case of Schware v. Board
of Bar Examiners" the Court held:
A State can require high standards of qualification, such as good
moral character or proficiency in its law, before it admits an ap-
plicant to the bar, but any qualification must have a rational con-
nection with the applicant's fitness or capacity to practice law....
Even in applying permissible standards, officers of a State cannot
exclude an applicant when there is no basis for their finding that
he fails to meet these standards, or when their action is invidious-
ly discriminatory. 18
In Schware, evidence that Schware had been a member of the com-
munist Party, had been arrested but never indicted for "suspicion
of criminal syndicalism" because of his participation in the 1934
labor disputes at California shipyards, and had used aliases was not
sufficient to justify a finding that Schware was unfit to practice law.
And in Konigsberg, evidence of alleged past membership in the
Communist Party, together with Konigsberg's refusal to answer
questions about this, did not warrant the committee in concluding
that Konigsberg was not of sufficient moral character and was dis-
loyal to state and federal governments in light of the fact that
Konigsberg repeatedly denied that he ever espoused violent over-
' See Comment, 15 STAN. L. REv. 500, 511 (1963).
'In re Farmer, 191 N.C. 235, 238-40, 131 S.E. 661, 663-64 (1926),
citing In re Applicants for License, 143 N.C. 1, 55 S.E. 635 (1906).
10353 U.S. 252 (1957).
1 Id. at 263.
12353 U.S. 232 (1957).8Id. at 239.
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throw of the government and in good faith based his refusal to an-
swer the questions of whether he had ever been in the Party on the
fifth amendment.
A recent case applied the Schware holding. In Hallinan v. Com-
mittee of Bar Examiners4 the California Supreme Court reversed
a finding of the committee below that the applicant was not of suffi-
cient moral character to practice law. The applicant had been denied
admission because of his participation in civil rights demonstrations,
with subsequent convictions for unlawful assembly, disturbing the
peace, trespass to obstruct dawful business, and unlawful entry.15
The committee of examiners thought the applicant had "shown a
disrespect for the law and judicial officers, which exceeds the bounds
of his acknowledged right to hold and espouse, to advocate, adver-
tise, and to participate in mass demonstrations to achieve the accept-
ance of any social, political or philosophical views of beliefs in a
peaceful and non-violent manner."' 6
The California Supreme Court reversed because it felt a "clear
analogy" existed between the facts in Schware and Hallinan. In
Schware the applicant was arrested for, but never convicted of a
violation of the Neutrality Act of 1917 which made it unlawful for
a person within the United States to join or to hire others to join
the army of any foreign state. The Court in Schware reasoned that
even if Schware had violated the Neutrality Act of 1917, this would
not indicate a lack of good moral character since "[in] any persons
in this country actively supported the Spanish Loyalist Govern-
ment... many idealistic young men volunteered to help causes they
believed right."' 7 Likewise, the court in Hallinan reasoned that
since many legal scholars and other eminent people, as well as ideal-
" 55 Cal. Rptr. 228, 421 P.2d 76 (1966).
1" The committee listed other grounds, the gist of which was that the
applicant had shown a tendency "to employ against the persons and property
of others unreasonable physical force and the threat thereof." Id. at 231, 421
P.2d at 79 n.2. The California Supreme Court examined the applicant's
prior history of fist fights and concluded this was insufficient to deny ad-
mission because such acts could be classified as "adolescent behavior" and
had no direct relationship to the practice of law. Id. at 245, 421 P.2d at 93.
The court also regarded petitioner's failure to mention his participation in
a will contest and conviction in England for blocking a footpath as de
minhns "[iln view of the extensive list of arrests which petitioner did
include in his bar application. . . ." Id. at 247, 421 P.2d at 95.
'aId. at 231, 421 P.2d at 79 n.2.
T Id. at 238, 421 P.2d at 86, citing Schware v. Board of Bar Examiners,
353 U.S. 232, 242 (1957).
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istic youth, shared the applicant's belief, it could not be said that the
applicant lacked "good moral character."'" Criminal prosecution,
not exclusion from the bar, was the manner of punishment appro-
priate here. 9 The court felt that the applicant would not "obstruct
the administration of justice or otherwise act unscrupulously in his
capacity as an officer of the court."2
Although Hallinan did not involve the situation where the appli-
cant refuses to answer committee inquiries, cases dealing with this
problem have clearly shown that the applicant's protections are not
based on any clearly defined right, but are the result of a balancing
of interests. In the second Konigsberg case, 1 it was held that since
Konigsberg was warned of possible exclusion if he did not answer
the questions from the committee about his alleged past Communist
Party membership, it did not violate the fourteenth amendment
when he was excluded because of his silence since the question was
material and there would be "no likelihood that deterrence of asso-
ciation may result .. *"22 The Court reached the same result in
In re Anastaplo.2 8 Analagously, the Court in a disbarment proceed-
ing held that the due process clause was not violated when the at-
torney was disbarred on the basis of his refusal to answer inquir-
ies.24 These cases did not overrule Schware and the first Konigs-
berg case because neither committee drew unfavorable inferences
from the silence, as had happened in the first Konigsberg case, but
denied admission on the ground that the applicant was non-coopera-
tive in refusing to answer questions put to him.25
Is Id. at 238-39, 431 P.2d at 86-87.
1Id. at 239, 421 P.2d at 87.20 Id. at 239, 421 P.2d at 87.
" Konigsberg v. State Bar, 366 U.S. 36 (1961).
22 Id. at 52.
23 366 U.S. 82 (1961). Anastaplo also refused to answer questions about
his alleged past membership in the Communist Party. Although there was
"substantial character evidence altogether favorable to Anastaplo, there is
nothing in the Federal Constitution which required the Committee to draw
the curtain upon its investigation at that point." Id. at 95. The rationale
of the court seemed to be that the applicant was best "circumstanced to
supply" information about his past. Id. at 90. For a complete discussion
of the problem of loyalty, see Brown & Fassett, Loyalty Tests for Admission,
to the Bar, 20 U. CHI. L. REv. 480 (1953).
2 Cohen v. Hurley, 366 U.S. 117 (1961). See note 32 infra.
"But justice Black's dissent in Konigsberg points out the inconsistency
between the first Konigsberg case and the second one:
The majority avoids the otherwise unavoidable necessity of revers-
ing the judgment below on that ground [the test of the 1957 cases]
by simply refusing to look beyond the reason given by the Commit-
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
Some writers maintain that these cases mean only that the Court
was unwilling to find an arbitrary or discriminatory exclusion.2"
Nevertheless, the state's power to exclude because of the applicant's
refusal to answer questions actually gives the state a technique of
exclusion for any undisclosed reason since in any given case applica-
tion of the rule is still discretionary. Take the case of two silent
applicants. If the committee wanted to exclude both, it could; but
if only one were excluded, then it is apparent that considerations
other than just the silence of the applicant come into play. And
under the 1961 cases the real reason for exclusion could not be
detrmined2
Others have suggested that the Court feared the unique oppor-
tunity that the legal profession presents to the Communist Party,2"
but the more sensible view is that the Court was balancing the inter-
ests of state regulation verses individual freedom.29 To accept the
argument of the applicant that he should be allowed to remain silent
would in effect shift the burden of proof from the applicant to the
committee which is ill-equipped to investigate the applicant's past."0
tee to justify Konigsberg's rejection. In this way, the majority
reaches the question as to whether the Committee can constitutionally
reject Konigsberg for refusing to answer questions growing out of
his conjectured past membership in the Communist Party even though
it could not constitutionally reject him if he did answer those ques-
tions and his answers happened to be affirmative.
Konigsberg v. State Bar, 366 U.S. 36, 60 (1961).
" See Comment, 47 IowA L. REv. 507, 513 (1962).
" See Note, 64 W. VA. L. R. v. 70, 74 (1961).
" See Comment, 47 IowA L. REv. 507, 513 (1962).
" Justice Harlan, speaking for the Court, said: "Whenever, in such a
context, these constitutional protections are asserted against the exercise of
valid governmental powers a reconciliation must be effected, and that per-
force requires an appropriate weighing of the respective interests involved."
Konigsberg v. State Bar, 366 U.S. 36, 51 (1961).
See Note, 15 VAND. L. REv. 634, 634-37 (1962) in which it was sug-
gested that in such a context, that is, in the area of state investigations for
a public job, or some license, or benefit, two groups of cases appear: (1)
Where the question asked is justified to protect the state's interest but the
answers are of so little probative value in regard to determining fitness
that exclusion here is arbitrary and unreasonable, e.g., Schware v. Board
of Bar Examiners, 353 U.S. 252 (1957). (2) Where the question itself is
so unrelated to any state interest that it is arbitrary to ask the question,
e.g., Bates v. Little Rock, 361 U.S. 516 (1960) (compulsory disclosure of
NAACP membership lists under city occupational license tax held uncon-
stitutional); NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449 (1958)(membership lists of NAACP not relevant to a determination of fitness to
conduct intrastate business).
"oHowever, it is at least questionable whether the ultimate burden of
persuasion is shifted to the committee. The court in Konigsberg distin-
1012 [voi. 45
ADMISSION TO THE BAR
Furthermore, the Court appeared to fear that the Supreme Court
would become a "super state supreme court of appeals.""
This balancing of interests in regard to the fifth amendment is
now subject to question since the recent case of Spevack v. Klein32
overruled Cohen. Although Spevack held only that the self-incrimi-
nation clause of the fifth amendment applied to state disbarment
proceedings through the fourteenth amendment, disbarment is not
so dissimilar from admission proceedings that Spevack could not
be used analogously to overrule the second Konigsberg case and In
re Anastaplo.3 3 Furthermore, if one assumes that the state policy
behind either proceeding is the same-to maintain high ethical
standards in the profession for the protection of the public-it would
likewise appear that the issue of whether the first and fifth amend-
ments should apply to admission proceedings is basically the same.
guished Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513 (1958), which held that it was a
violation of due process to require taxpayers to prove their nonadvocacy
of violent overthrow of the government in order to receive tax exemptions,
from the burden of proof required for bar admission. While in Speiser the
taxpayer had the ultimate burden of persuasion, the applicant for bar ad-
mission had only the burden of coming forward with the evidence; thus,
there was a greater threat to the individual in Speiser since the taxpayer
would have to disclose more information than the applicant would have to
give in the Konigsberg situation. But if this is so, only the burden of
coming forward is shifted to the committee. Thus, it appears to be less of
a handicap to the committee, assuming it already has the ultimate burden of
persuasion.
It is also questionable whether the Court, speaking through Justice Har-
lan, was correct in implying that the committee has the ultimate burden
of proof. Most states place the burden of proof on the applicant, See Note,
106 U. PA. L. REv. 753 n.4 (1958). Even if the applicant still has it,
California Supreme Court Justice Traynor suggests that the exclusionary
rule should be applied only where there is a prima facie espousal of com-
munist theory, or for that matter any question of fact in issue. Konigsberg
v. State Bar, 52 Cal. 2d 769, 774-78, 344 P.2d 777, 780-83 (1959) (dissent-
ing opinion). This would mean that the applicant could be silent about
certain matters if he has already put in evidence sufficient to rebut any prima
facie case made by the committee.
But see Sprecher, Bar Admission Agencies: Their Right to be Informed,
51 A.B.AJ. 248 (1965).
"I "[O]ur function here is solely one of constitutional adjudication, not
to pass on what has been done as if we were another state court of review,
still less to express any view upon the wisdom of the State's action." It re
Anastaplo, 366 U.S. 82, 97 (1961). See Comment, 56 Micir. L. REv. 415,
424-25 (1958).
"87 S. Ct. 625 (1967).
The court in Spevack said: "In this context [disbarment proceedings]
'penalty' is not restricted to fine or imprisonment. It means . . . the imposi-
tion of any sanction which makes assertion of the Fifth Amendment privi-
lege 'costly."' Id. at 628. The argument would be that exclusion is as
"costly" as disbarment.
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The Court has had less trouble in sustaining procedural protec-
tions for the applicant. In Willner v. Committee on Ctaracter &
Fitness34 the applicant was denied admission on the basis of an ad-
verse and confidential trial report from a committee of lawyers.
Willner was not allowed to examine this report nor was he told of
the charges it contained. The New York State Court of Appeals
denied Willner's petition for a hearing on the charges. On certiorari
to the United States Supreme Court, it was held: "petitioner was de-
nied procedural due process when he was denied admission to the Bar
by the Appellate Division without a hearing on the charges filed
against him before either the Committee or the Appellate Division." 5
Although it might appear somewhat unclear whether a right to a
hearing includes the right of confrontation and cross-examination, a
recent case had no trouble in finding that this was a part of the Will-
ner case."0 State courts have also insisted that the applicant have pro-
cedural protection. 7
Thus, except for the procedural right to a hearing, the Court
has established no standards for the committees to follow. Although
Schware established the requirement of a "rational connection,"
cases relying on Schware do not make it clear whether the reversal
of the exclusion is based on a finding that the committee used a
qualification that has no rational connection with the applicant's fit-
ness or whether the committee was reversed because it excluded
when there was no basis for their finding that the applicant failed
to meet the standards. 3s Having no guides as to what is a "rational
connection" between the question asked and the determination of
whether the applicant has good moral character, committees can ask
questions that have little relevance to the ultimate determination to
be made. This is harmful in two ways. In the first place, such ques-
tioning can subject the applicant to invasions of purely private mat-
'373 U.S. 96 (1963). Compare Green v. McElroy, 360 U.S. 474 (1959)
with Cafeteria Workers v. McElroy, 367 U.S. 886 (1961).
373 U.S. at 106.
'Application of Levine, 97 Ariz. 88, 397 P.2d 205 (1964).
"See e.g., Application of Burke, 87 Ariz. 336, 351 P.2d 169 (1960);
Application of Kellar, 81 Nev. 240, 401 P.2d 616 (1965); In re Crum, 103
Ore. 296, 204 P. 948 (1922).
" A possible exception is Florida Bar v. Wilkes, 179 So. 2d 193 (1965).
The court, relying on Schware in a disbarment proceeding, ruled that the
mere belief in existentialist philosophy did not show that the applicant was
unfit to practice law.
"E[Vol. 451014
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ters. 9 Secondly, such irrational questioning can deter freedoms of
expression and association.4" In Hallinan, would it be unreasonable
to assume that future applicants would at least be leary of participa-
tion in civil rights demonstrations? Part of Justice Harlan's ration-
ale in refusing to allow the applicant to use the fifth amendment
was that no deterrence of association would result. But is this
realistic since the applicant has spent the last few years preparing
for entry into the legal profession and it is always questionable
whether an appellate court will reverse the exclusion in question?
Thus, the ultimate responsibility for establishing proper standards
to see if the applicant has "good moral character" lies with the bar
examining committee.
WAILACE C. TYSER, JR.
Antitrust Law-Horizontal Mergers-Section 7 of the
Clayton Act
In United States v. Von's Grocery Co.,' the Supreme Court
struck down a horizontal merger2 as a violation of Section 7 of the
Clayton Act. In March of 1960, when Von's, the third largest retail
grocery chain in the Los Angeles area, purchased the sixth largest,
the United States brought action charging an antitrust violation.
At trial, the District Court decided that from "the evidence, it can-
not be concluded that the merger in question would probably lessen
competition in the metropolitan area either at the time of the mergr
"o See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
"0 Justice Black said in the first Konigsberg case: "It is also important
both to society and the bar itself that lawyers be unintimidated-free to
think, speak, and act as members of an Independent Bar." Konigsberg v.
State Bar, 353 U.S. 252, 273 (1957). See Brown & Fassett, Loyalty Testsfor Admission to the Bar, 20 U. CHI. L. REv. 480, 501 (1953). Another
bad result is the attitude such questioning produces in the applicants. It
perhaps tends to make them give only the "right" answers. Ibid. This is
bad not only because the applicant feels he has to hide some belief, but also
because it will hinder the committee from reaching conclusions based on
truthful answers.
'384 U.S. 270 (1966).
'A horizontal merger is a merger between two companies that compete
directly in similar economic functions, while a vertical merger is one be-
tween companies that buy or sell the product of the other, and a conglome-
rate merger is between companies that have no direct relationship with
each other.
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or in the foreseeable future."3 On appeal' the Supreme Court re-
versed, basing its decision predominantly on the facts that there had
been a continuing decline in the number of individually owned gro-
cery stores in the area and that chain stores had acquired an increas-
ing share of the market.
The first statutory expression of antitrust policy by Congress
was the Sherman Act of 1890,' enacted as an attempt to combat the
trend toward monopolistic control of the economy by gigantic busi-
ness trusts. Unfortunately, the Sherman Act was directed primarily
at the trust device and mergers were not prohibited unless an imme-
diate monopoly was created as a result. The statute did not refer to
the possible future effects of a merger.' Section 7 of the Clayton
Act,7 enacted in 1914, was an attempt by Congress to remedy these
deficiencies of the Sherman Act. However, Since Section 7 only
prevented illegal acquisition of corporate stock to effect merger, the
law could be circumnavigated by purchasing company assets rather
than stock in a merger operation.' The 1950 Celler-Kefauver
Amendment to Section 7 closed this loophole by applying the Clayton
provisions to assets as well as stock. The present statute is in this
form.'
In the decisions leading to Von's, most of the confusion has
centered around formulating a test under which the language of
Section 7, "may be substantially to lessen competition," can be ap-
plied. The first case to reach the Supreme Court after the Cellar-
Kefauver amendment was Brown Shoe Co. v. United States.Y That
'United States v. Von's Grocery Co., 233 F. Supp. 976, 985 (S.D. Cal.
1964).
'Appeal was taken under the Federal Expediting Act, 62 Stat. 989
(1948), 15 U.S.C. § 29 (1964).
'26 Stat. 206 (1890).
'In invalidating a price-fixing agreement among railroads, the Supreme
Court looked only at the immediate effects of the agreement. United States
v. Trans-Missouri Freight Ass'n, 166 U.S. 290 (1897).
" 38 Stat. 730 (1914), 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1964).
'Arrow-Hart & Hegeman Elec. Co. v. FTC, 291 U.S. 587 (1934); FTC
v. Western Meat Co., 272 U.S. 554 (1926).
0 64 Stat. 1125 (1950), 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1964): "No corporation engaged
in commerce shall acquire, directly or indirectly, the whole or any part of the
stock or other share capital and no corporation subject to the jurisdiction
of the Federal Trade Commission shall acquire the whole or any part of
the assets of another corporation engaged also in commerce, where in any
line of commerce in any section of the country, the effect of such acquisi-
tion may be substantially to lessen competition, or to tend to create a
monopoly." (Material added by the 1950 amendment is in italics.)
"0370 U.S. 294 (1962).
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case involved both horizontal and vertical mergers, and, although
the background law concerning each type of merger was different,
the court applied only one test. Mr. Chief Justice Warren rejected
the idea that a mere quantitative analysis of the market share pro-
duced by the merger should be determinative of whether a violation
of Section 7 existed. Rather, the majority opinion indicated that a
broad economic analysis must be used in determining the anti-com-
petitive effects of a merger." The court in Brown Shoe also recog-
nized that the existence of a merger trend in a given line of com-
merce is an important factor that may require that the merger be
struck down, thus formulating the so-called incipiency doctrine. 2
The next important case involving section 7 was Philadelphia
Nat'l Bank.13 While the court did not there reject the broad eco-
nomic analysis used in Brown Shoe, it found that the bank merger
produced a firm controlling an "undue percentage share of the rele-
vant market" and resulted in a "significant increase in the concentra-
tion of firms in that market."' 4 In such circumstances the degree of
market control was alone large enough to create a presumption of
illegality and make it unnecessary to resort to the cumbersome
Brown Shoe test.'5 The reasoning in Philadelphia Bank was carried
a step further in United States v. Aluminum Co. of America6 and
United States v. Continental Can Co.' In each of these cases the
actual increase in market share by the acquiring companies was very
slight,'" unlike that in Philadelphia Bank. The court nevertheless
struck down these mergers, noting that the industries involved were
highly concentrated and that in each case the mergers involved the
acquisition of a viable competitor by an industry leader.
The Supreme Court's difficulties in analyzing merger cases must
' Id. at 321-322.
2 "Third, it is apparent that a keystone in the erection of a barrier to
what Congress saw was the rising tide of economic concentration, was its
provision of authority for arresting mergers at a time when the trend to
a lessening of competition in a line of commerce was still in its incipiency."
Id. at 363.
" United States v. Philadelphia Nat'l Bank, 374 U.S. 321 (1963).
"'Id. at 363. The merger resulted in a 30 per cent share of the market by
the acquiring bank and a control of 78 per cent of the market by the top four
banks.5 Id. at 363-64.
18377 U.S. 271 (1964).
17378 U.S. 441 (1964).
'8In the Aluminum Co. and Continental Can cases, the increase in mar-
ket share was less than 3 per cent in each case; however, the resulting com-
bined market shares were 29 per cent, 25 per cent respectively.
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be attributed to the very nature of the problem itself. The statutory
language is in effect a broad grant of power to the Court to decide
for itself the distinction between good and bad mergers. This re-
quires that the Court predict the effect of a merger before declaring
it invalid.'" But economics is an inexact science and even eco-
nomists themselves cannot predict with certainty the future effects of
a merger. 0 The cost and time of accumulating sufficient data for a
proper analysis is prohibitive and, indeed, the data may even be mis-
leading to judges and lawyers lacking the necessary understanding of
economic theory. In viewing the decisions from Brown Shoe through
Von's, it seems that the Court must be recognizing this fact and is try-
ing to formulate a simple test for applying Section 7. In Philadelphia
Bank, Aluminum Co., and Continental Can, the Court in essence
decided that the resulting share of the market after merger was
simply too large in already concentrated industries and those merg-
ers were invalidated largely on that basis. Even though in Von's
the resulting market share was only seven and one-half per cent,2
far below that in the other cases, the merger was nevertheless in-
validated, primarily because of a decreasing number of small com-
petitiors in the same line of commerce.'
This attitude of the Court toward the individually-owned busi-
ness suggests that something more than a desire for a "simple"
Section 7 test underlines the Von's decision. From the history of
antitrust litigation has emerged the idea that a system of small com-
petitors is somehow inherently desirable2 3 This proposition has not
"o This point was virtually sidestepped by the majority in Voi's. See
Mr. Justice Stewart's dissent: "The Court has substituted bare conjecture
for the statutory standard of a reasonable probability that competition may
be lessened." 384 U.S. 270 at 286.
2 Bok, Section 7 of the Clayton Act and the Merging of Law and
Economics, 74 HARv. L. Rav. 226, 228 (1960).
" Before the merger, Von's had 4.7 per cent of the sales of the relevant
market while Shopping Bag Food Stores, the acquired company, had 4.2
per cent of the total sales. The sales of the largest firm comprised 8 per
cent of the market.
2 What we have .. . is simply the case of two already powerful
companies merging in a way which makes them even more powerful
than they were before. If ever such a merger would not violate § 7,
certainly it does when it takes place in a market characterized by a
long and continuous trend toward fewer and fewer owner-competi-
tors.... United States v. Von's Grocery Co., 384 U.S. 270, 277-78(1966).
" See Judge Learned Hand's view of antitrust laws in United States v.
Aluminum Co. of America, 148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945): "Throughout the
history of these statutes it has been constantly assumed that one of their
[voi. 451018
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gone unquestioned.2 4 Indeed, the very nature of the grocery store
business demonstrates a fallacy in this idea. Supermarket chains
certainly compete more among themselves than do small comer gro-
cery stores sprinkled across a city, and the larger stores usually offer
a better selection of products, often at lower prices. It surely must
be asked whether the small competitor should be protected if cir-
cumstances have already made it difficult for him to compete,2 5 espe-
cially when the interests of the consumer and the industrious, expan-
sion-minded store owner may suffer.
At any rate, the present test for legality of mergers under Section
7 is vague.26 The businessman is not given any ascertainable stan-
dard when considering a. merger. In fact, as Mr. Justice Stewart
remarked, "The sole consistency that I can find is that in litigation
under Section 7, the Government always wins."27 Granted that this
statement is very close to the truth, it is still difficult to say that the
Supreme Court was wrong in Von's. A merger, once allowed, is a
permanent condition, and it is better to stop a trend toward oligop-
oly too soon than too late. Although the Von's merger apparently
did not injure competition, the door would have been open for simi-
lar mergers if this one had been allowed. The trend toward concen-
tration had to be stopped at some point, and the Court cannot be
seriously castigated for acting when it did.
D. J. JONES, JR.
purposes was to perpetuate and preserve, for its own sake and in spite of
possible cost, an organization of industry in small units which can effectively
compete with each other." Id. at 429.
"4 Rill, The Trend Toward Social Competition Under Section 7 of the
Clayton Act, 54 GEo. L.J. 891 (1966). The author questions the wisdom
of prohibiting mergers which increase efficiency and competition.5 It is not as difficult for small stores in Los Angeles to compete with the
larger ones as the majority opinion in Von's would lead one to believe. In
some cases the large, retailer-owned cooperative buying organizations in
the area "were able to offer even lower prices to their members than com-
peting chains could obtain." United States v. Von's Grocery Co., 384 U.S.
270, 299, n. 32 (1966) (Stewart, J., dissenting).
"0 Handler, Some Misadventures in Antitntst Policymaking, 76 YALE L.J.
92, 108-109 (1966).
"'United States v. Von's Grocery Co., 384 U.S. 270, 301 (1966) (Stew-
art, J., dissenting). In the past eleven years the justice Department has won
forty-five of fifty antitrust cases before the Supreme Court. The Federal
Trade Commission has not lost a single antitrust case before the Court in
seven years.
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Appellate Review-Prospective Overruling- Charitable
Immunities
In Rabon v. Rowan Memorial Hosp., Inc.,1 the North Carolina
Supreme Court overruled its prior decisions2 and held that public
hospitals' may no longer rely on the common law tort immunity
doctrine. In so doing the court announced that the decision would
have no retroactive effect but would apply only to the case before it
and to causes of action arising after the filing date of the opinion.
The decision in part reflects an increasing awareness of the courts in
recognizing the hardships that can result from retroactivity.
It is the common law tradition that a judicial decision over-
ruling an established precedent has retroactive as well as prospective
effect. 4 However, when courts strictly adhered to this theory, prob-
lems arose in relation to parties who had based their conduct on
the prior decisions. As a result many courts adopted exceptions to
the general rule of retroactivity. The most common exceptions in-
volved criminal cases5 or cases where contract' or property rights'
'Rabon v. Rowan Memorial Hosp., Inc., 269 N.C. 1, 152 S.E.2d 485
(1967).
'E.g., Williams v. Randolph Hosp. Inc., 237 N.C. 387, 75 S.E.2d 303
(1953); Smith v. Duke Univ., 219 N.C. 628, 14 S.E.2d 643 (1941); John-
son v. City Hosp. Co., 196 N.C. 610, 146 S.E. 573 (1929).
'The court otherwise professes to maintain charitable immunity as ap-
plied to "churches, orphanages, rescue missions, transient homes for the
indigent, and other similar institutions which remain charitable institutions
in fact."
' Mr. Justice Holmes in 1910 wrote "I know of no authority in this
court to say that in general state decisions shall make law only for the
future. Judicial decisions have had retrospective operation for near a thou-
sand years." Kuhn v. Fairmont Coal Co., 215 U.S. 349, 372 (1910) (Dis-
senting opinion). See generally, Currier, Time and Change In Judge-Made
Law: Prospective Overruling, 51 VA. L. REv. 201 (1965) [hereinafter cited
as Currier].
'E.g., State v. O'Neil, 47 Iowa 513, 126 N.W. 454 (1910); State v.
Jones, 44 N.M. 623, 107 P.2d 324 (1940). But see, Warring v. Colpoys,
122 F.2d 642 (D.C. Cir. 1941) (writ of Habeas corpus denied even though
construction of statute under which accused was convicted had been altered
by a later decision). See generally, Freeman, The Protection Afforded
Against the Retroactive Operation of an Overruling Decision, 18 CoLum.
L. REv. 230 (1918); Snyder, Retrospective Operation of Overruling De-
cisions, 35 ILL. L. Rav. 121 (1941); Note, 60 WARV. L. Rav. 437 (1947).
'E.g., Gelpcke v. City of Dubuque, 68 U.S. (1 Wall.) 175 (1863);
World Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Tapp, 279 Ky. 423, 130 S.W.2d 848(1939); Payne v. City of Covington, 276 Ky. 380, 123 S.W.2d 1045 (1938);
Gentzler v. Smith, 320 Mich. 394, 31 N.W.2d 668 (1948).
'E.g., Jones v. Woodstock Iron Co., 95 Ala. 551, 10 So. 635 (1892);
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had been acquired in reliance on court construction of statutes or
constitutions.
North Carolina was an early advocate of these exceptions. In
1904 the supreme court in State v. Bell' held that its earlier decision
interpreting a criminal statute should be changed, but that the defen-
dant could not be convicted for conduct which would not have been
criminal under the prior interpretation. The court stated:
While it is true that no man has a vested right in a decision of
the Court, it is equally well settled that where, in the construction
of a contract or in declaring the law respecting its validity, the
Court thereafter reverses its decision, contractual rights acquired
by virtue of the law as declared in the first opinion will not be
disturbed.9
Two years later, in a case involving the question of whether a lease
executed by a corporation was ultra vires or not, the court applied
the decision prospectively since the parties had relied on a prior
interpretation of a statute by the court.10 The court cited Bell with
approval stating that it was the only "fair and proper course to
pursue" and that the "opposite ruling would have met with strong
condemnation, as being contrary to the plainest principles of jus-
tice."'1 The following year the court continued this reasoning to
apply prospective overruling where a common law precedent was in-
volved." However, in 1908 the court attempted to restrict the broad
language of the prior decisions. In Mason v. Nelson Cotton Co.'3
it stated that the only exception to retroactive application should be
where construction of a constitution or statute was involved. It felt
it should not be extended to an "erroneous decision on general mer-
cantile law which is contrary to accepted doctrine and recognized
business methods."' 4
Hanks v. McDanell, 307 Ky. 243, 210 S.W.2d 784 (1948); Haskett v.
Maxey 134 Ind. 182, 33 N.E. 358 (1893). But cf., Carter Oil Co. v. Well,209 Ark. 653, 192 S.W.2d 215 (1946) (decision on which buyer of land
relied invalidated reservations in deeds; prospective overruling would have
been unfair to seller, who conveyed thinking mineral rights had been re-
served).
136 N.C. 674, 49 S.E. 163 (1904).9 d. at 677, 49 S.E. at 164.
"Hill v. Railroad, 143 N.C. 539, 55 S.E. 854 (1906).11Id. at 578, 55 S.E. at 868.
12 Hill v. Brown, 144 N.C. 117, 56 S.E. 693 (1907). However, the case
involved property rights.
13 148 N.C. 492, 62 S.E. 625 (1908). See generally, Spruill, The Effect
of an Overruling Decision, 18 N.C.L. REv. 199 (1939-40).11Id. at 511, 62 S.E. at 632. Other North Carolina cases that have
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Courts that have felt the need to apply a decision prospectively
have generally advanced 2 reasons: (1) a justifiable reliance by the
defendant on the prior law and (2) an undue hardship resulting
from such reliance.' 5 Although these same two reasons can be ad-
vanced in decisions involving common law interpretations as easily
as in statutory construction, few courts have prospectively overruled
common law decisions. 6 The doctrine as a whole received a great
impetus from Mr. Justice Cardozo speaking for the United States
Supreme Court in Great N. Ry. v. Sunburst Oil & Ref. Co. 7 Al-
though the case involved the interpretation of a statute and the
prospective overruling of a prior interpretation, Cardozo made it
clear that it did not matter whether the decision involved common
law or statutory construction.' 8
However, most cases after Sunburst that applied a decision pro-
spectively still involved contract, property or criminal law.19 In the
field of tort law the rule continued to be one of retroactive applica-
tion of decisions."0 Recently common law doctrines of sovereign and
charitable immunity have been vigorously attacked resulting in
numerous decisions discarding the previous announced rule.21 The
Illinois Supreme Court in Molitor v. Kaneland Community Unit
applied a decision prospectively have also involved contract, property or
criminal law. e.g., Wilkinson v. Wallace, 192 N.C. 156, 134 S.E. 401 (1926) ;
Fowle v. Ham, 176 N.C. 12, 96 S.E. 639 (1918). However, after this
flurry of cases at the beginning of the century, the court has failed to apply
the doctrine in any recent cases. See generally, Note, 11 N.C.L. RItv. 323(1932-33); Note, 5 N.C.L. REv. 170 (1927).
" See cases cited notes 4-6 supra.
"E.g., Jones v. Woodstock Iron Co., 95 Ala. 551, 10 So. 635 (1892);
World Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Tapp, 279 Ky. 423, 130 S.W.2d 1045(1938). Writers have criticized the courts for making this distinction. See
e.g., Freeman The Protection Afforded Against the Retroactive Opera-
tion of an Overruling Decision, 18 CoLum. L. REv. 230 (1918).
1,287 U.S. 358 (1932).
1' Cardozo also made it clear that prospective operation did not conflict
with the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment. He stated that
a state could decide for itself between prospective or retroactive operation.
287 U.S. at 364.
"0 For an extensive list of citations see Note, 60 HARv. L. Rlv. 437, 441-
47 (1947).
"' Tort cases that have applied a decision prospectively have involved
changes in rules of procedure. E.g., Dempsey v. Thompson, 363 Mo. 339,
251 S.W.2d 42 (1952) (instructions on damages in personal injury suit).
See generally, Currier at 244 for the reasoning behind the absence of pro-
spectiveness in tort cases.
2' The court in Rabon lists all the jurisdictions. See 269 N.C. at 17-19,
152 S.E.2d at 496-98.
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Dist. No. 302,2 therefore, felt this situation clearly called for an
application of prospective overruling. The reliance factor was clear.
School districts relying on the immunity had for years failed to pur-
chase any liability insurance and if the decision were applied retro-
actively, the result would have been unjust. In Rabon the North
Carolina Supreme Court specifically recognized this injustice and
prospectively overruled the immunity of charitable hospitals.-
However, the court in Rabon took another step that seems to
stand on more tenuous ground. Since Sunburst was wholly pro-
spective, many critics claimed this left the plaintiff unrewarded and
was little incentive for others to commence actions to change exist-
ing, outmoded laws. 4 As a result, the court in Molitor announced
that the new rule of liability would extend not only to all cases aris-
ing after the lling date of the opinion but also allowed the plaintiff
in that case to recover. The North Carolina Supreme Court fol-
lowed this position.
This practice produces results which are not easily justified.
First of all reliance is the main argument the courts have used to
justify applying decisions prospectively and clearly the defendant be-
fore the court has relied on the rule as much as anybody. Moreover,
there seems little justification for rewarding this plaintiff because
he is before the court and failing to allow numerous other injured
parties to recover-especially where their suits have been commenced
before this one.2 5
2 18 Ill. 2d 11, 163 N.E.2d 89 (1959), cert. denied, 362 U.S. 968 (1960).
"'Although reliance is generally advanced for applying a decision pro-
spectively, Professor Currier suggests that in the immunity field the courts
might not have reached this result without a concern for maintaining insti-
tutional stability. Currier at 245. Other jurisdictions have refused to apply
their decision discarding immunity prospectively, specifically rejectng the
reliance theory. See e.g., Haney v. City of Lexington, 386 S.W.2d 738
(Ky. 1964) (Soverign immunity); Dauton v. St. Luke's Catholic Church,
27 N.J. 22, 141 A.2d 273 (1958) (charitable immunity).
"2 For an extensive listing of law review articles on Sunburst see Note,
13 MONT. L. REv. 74, 78 n.15 (1952). The other criticism generally ad-
vanced against Sunburst is that to announce a new rule to be followed in
the future and not apply it to the case before the court would amount to
mere dictum. See generally, Note, 14 VAND. L. Ruv. 406 (1960).
" See generally Keeton, Creative Continuity In the Law of Torts, 75
HAmv. L. REv. 463 (1962). This led to the ironical result in Molitor that
the other seventeen children injured in the same accident were denied re-
covery in the lower court. Although this was reversed on appeal because
of the procedure followed in the original case indicating that the plaintiff
was representing the other claimants, the expense of an additional appeal
was necessary.
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Of the other three jurisdictions which have applied the new rule
to the plaintiff in the suit before them, 26 the Michigan Supreme
Court has encountered the most difficulty. When the court in Parker
v. Port Huron Hosp. overturned the charitable immunity doctrine,
there was a vacancy on the court reducing the normal membership
from eight to seven. The court split four to three in overruling the
doctrine. The following year in Browning v. Paddock,2" where the
plaintiff's cause of action arose prior to Parker and was thus theo-
retically barred, the court was unanimous in denying liability but the
same split occurred as to the reason. Four justices applied the pro-
spective rule of Parker in barring plaintiff, while three applied the
common law immunity rule. Justice Black, the new member of the
court, stated that if he had been on the court during Parker he would
have voted to apply the decision prospectively. However, he felt that
it should have been wholly prospective and should not have allowed
the plaintiff there to recover. On the same day as Browning the
court discarded the municipal immunity doctrine in Williams v. City
of Detroit.29 The lower court had denied recovery based on the
common law immunity. The supreme court affirmed this but again
split 4-3-1. Justice Black voted with the four to abolish soverign
immunity in the future but felt it should not be applied to the instant
case. His vote was therefore counted with the "three" resulting
in an affirmance denying liability. The result was, in effect, a wholly
prospective decision announcing abrogation of immunity for future
litigants but the peculiar split left the status of soverign immunity
unclear. In 1965 the Michigan Supreme Court apparently reached a
compromise when it abrogated soverign immunity as applied to a
state subdivision. The court announced that its decision would apply
to "pending and future cases" as well as to that case itself. 0
Thus, for courts that are reluctant to overrule outmoded de-
cisions because of the reliance of the parties on precedent, prospec-
tive overruling is a desirable addition to the range of choices. How-
"8 Parker v. Port Huron Hosp., 361 Mich. 1, 105 N.W.2d 1 (1960);
Myers v. Drozda, 180 Neb. 183, 141 N.W.2d 852 (1966); Kojis v. Doctors
Hosp., 12 Wis. 2d 367, 107 N.W.2d 292 (1961).
" 361 Mich. 1, 105 N.W.2d 1 (1960).
', 364 Mich. 293, 111 N.W.2d 45 (1961).
"364 Mich. 231, 111 N.W.2d 1 (1961).
"Myers v. Genesee County Auditor, 375 Mich. 1, 133 N.W.2d 190(1965). Arizona also adopted this position in Stone v. Arizona Highway
Comm'n, 93 Ariz. 384, 381 P.2d 107 (1963).
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ever, the North Carolina Supreme Court in Rabon would have done
well to have considered the warning enunciated by Justice Black in
Williams v. City of Detroit:
If we are to overrule, let us do it outright either way, manfully
according to the tried rules of judicial process. That is the only
way to avoid what Browning and Molitor already have proven;
that an appellate court, having determined to reward one litigant
only of a distinct and inseparable class of litigants, naively asks
for and gets into no end of trouble.8 '
To reduce the uneven treatment resulting from partially prospective
overruling, the preferable solution would have been for the court to
have chosen between wholly prospective and retroactive application. 2
JAmES A. MANNINO
Bankruptcy: Trustee's Title to Bankrupt's Property
In Bank of Marin v. England' a debtor drew five checks upon
his commercial account with the defendant bank. The debtor then
filed a voluntary petition in bankruptcy before the checks were pre-
sented for payment. Six days after the petition was filed, the bank,
having no notice of bankruptcy proceedings, paid the checks when
presented by the payee. The bankruptcy trustee sought to require
the bank to pay him the amount paid by the bank upon the five
checks. The referee found the bank and the payee jointly liable to
the bankrupt's estate for the amount of the checks and the district
court enforced this finding. The decision was affirmed by the Court
of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit2 holding that a bank that honors
checks in good faith without notice of voluntary petition in bank-
ruptcy is liable to the bankruptcy trustee for the amount paid.2
The Supreme Court granted certiorari because of the importance
of the question presented, and reversed.
In 1938 Congress passed the Chandler Act amendments to the
Bankruptcy Act. These amendments were made necessary by the
"Williams v. City of Detroit, 364 Mich. 231, 278-79, 111 N.W.2d 1, 14(1961) (Concurring opinion).
" See generally Keeton, Creative Continuity In the Law of Torts, 75
HARV. L. Rav. 463 (1962).
'385 U.S. 99 (1966).
2 352 F.2d 186 (9th Cir. 1965).
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many uncertainties surrounding the judicial interpretations of the
language of the Bankruptcy Act of 1898.s The Chandler Act pro-
vided in section 70(a)4 that title would vest in the trustee in bank-
ruptcy by operation of law as of the date the petition in bankruptcy
is filed. This section was necessary to effectuate the well settled
objectives of federal bankruptcy legislation of protecting the rights
of creditors and facilitating the speedy and efficient distribution and
settlement of the estate.' The Chandler Act also added section
70(d)," which enumerates transfers whose validity will be upheld
if they take place after petition and before adjudication or before a
receiver takes possession of the bankrupt's property. Section 70(d)7
protects the transferee of personal property from the bankrupt if
the transfer was made in "good faith '8 and for "present fair equiv-
alent value."' The only provision exempting transactions occurring
after adjudication is section 21 (g),"o which allows real property to
be freely transferred, but only real estate located in the same county
or equivalent district as the bankrupt.
Section 70(d) (2)11 provides that a person indebted to the bank-
rupt can pay the indebtedness of the bankrupt without liability to
the trustee provided he acts in good faith and before adjudication of
Bankruptcy Act, ch. 541, § 70(a), 30 Stat. 565 (1898). See WEiN-
STEIN, THE BANKRUPTCY LAW of 1938, 161 (1938); McLaughlin, Amend-
ment of the Bankruptcy Act, 40 HARv. L. REv. 583 (1927).
' 52 Stat. 879 (1938), as amended, 11 U.S.C. § 110(a) (1964).
4 COLLIER, BANKRUPTCY, 70.01, at 926 (14th ed. 1964). See Simonson
v. Granguist, 369 U.S. 38, 40 (1962); Kuehner v. Irving Trust Co., 299
U.S. 445, 452 (1937).
'52 Stat. 881 (1938), 11 U.S.C. § 110(d) (1964).
"52 Stat. 881 (1938), 11 U.S.C. § 110(d)(1) (1964) reads in part:
A transfer of any of the property of the bankrupt, other than real
estate, made to a person acting in good faith shall be valid against
the trustee if made for a present fair equivalent value or, if not made
for a fair equivalent value, then to the extent of the present considera-
tion actually paid therefor, for which amount the transferee shall
have a lien upon the property so transferred ...
'Bankruptcy Act § 70(d)(3), 52 Stat. 881 (1938), 11 U.S.C. (d)(3)
(1964) reads in part:
"A person having actual knowledge of such pending bankruptcy shall
be deemed not to act in good faith unless he has reasonable cause to
believe that the petition in bankruptcy is not well founded. .. ."
'In re Richter, 40 F. Supp. 758 (S.D. N.Y. 1941) (Satisfaction of old
debts not present value even though transferees extended new credit);
Lehman v. Quigley, 118 N.Y.S.2d 579 (Sup. Ct. 1952) (satisfaction of court
judgment on antecedent course of action is not a concurrence of a "present
fair equivalent value").10 52 Stat. 852 (1938), 11 U.S.C. § 44(g) (1964).
152 Stat. 881 (1938), 11 U.S.C. § 110(d)(2) (1964).
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bankruptcy. Under this section the bank would be protected if it
had honored the check after the filing of an involuntary petition but
before the adjudication of bankruptcy."2 However, section 18(f) 13
of the Bankruptcy Act provides that the filing of a voluntary peti-
tion constitutes automatic adjudication and thereby renders section
70(d) inapplicable. Thus in the case before us, since this was in
effect a post adjudication transfer, the bank would not be protected
by section 70(d) (1) or 70(d) (2).
The only other provision in section 70(d) that the bank could
have asserted as a defense is the negotiability proviso of 70(d)
(5).'-' But since the filing of a voluntary petition constitutes adjudi-
cation under section 18(f) it appears that bank payments subse-
quent to filing must be invalid. In Rosenthal v. Guaranty Bank &
Trust Co.'5 the court, basing its decision on the negotiability pro-
viso, upheld the validity of a good faith payment by a bank of a
bankrupt's checks after adjudication. However, this case has been
generally criticized'" on the grounds that presentation of a check
to the drawee bank for payment is not a negotiation. Thus it ap-
pears the negotiability proviso should not protect the drawee bank
in the Marin situation."
Therefore, it appears that a bank paying a check in good faith
without notice that the drawer has filed a voluntary petition in bank-
ruptcy will find no protection under section 70(d). The court of
appeals recognized the inequities of the situation but concluded that
it could not exercise its equitable powers because of section 70(d)'s
invalidation of post adjudication transfers.'" The decision in the
lower court put banks in the impossible position of keeping con-
stantly informed of every bankruptcy proceeding involving their
"Feldman v. Capitol Piece Dye Works, Inc., 293 F.2d 889 (2d Cir.
1961); Citizens' Union National Bank v. Johnson, 286 Fed. 527 (6th Cir.
1923).
1352 Stat. 851 (1938), 11 U.S.C. § 41(f) (1964).
1452 Stat. 882 (1938), 11 U.S.C. § 110(d)(5) (1964) which reads in
part: "Provided, however, that nothing in this title shall impair the negotia-
bility of currency or negotiable instruments."
15 139 F. Supp. 730 (W.D. La. 1956).
" See 70 HAv. L. REv. 548 (1957).
"' The negotiability proviso is for the protection of the holder in due
course who receives payment prior to adjudication. Here the holder is al-
lowed to retain the proceeds and if payment is refused he can share in the
bankrupt's estate as an unsecured creditor. 70 HAv. L. Rzv. 548, 550
(1957).
18 Bank of Marin v. England, 352 F.2d 186, 191 (9th Cir. 1965).
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depositors in every federal court in the country. In addition, the
bank would be under the conflicting duty to honor checks drawn on
its depositors."
The Supreme Court, conceding that this transfer is not protected
by section 70 (d), circumvented sections 70 (a) and 18 (f) by basing
their decision on the due process requirement of notice, and over-
riding equitable considerations. The Court's first contention is that
the bankruptcy of a drawer does not, without more, revoke the
drawee's authority." The Court holds that notice, "reasonably cal-
culated, under all the circumstances, to apprise the interested parties
of the pendency of the action" is required before one can be deprived
of his property.2" Therefore, the Court was unwilling to say that
the mere filing of a voluntary petition was sufficient to put the bank
on notice. In the present Bankruptcy Act there are but limited pro-
visions for the giving of notice to the public of the bankruptcy pro-
ceeding. Under section 58(d)' all notice to creditors is at the
discretion of the court, and creditors may not be entitled to personal
notice since bankruptcy proceedings are considered actions in rem.2
However, in Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co2
the Supreme Court held that personal notice to holders of trust
interests involved in the adjudication was necessary to meet due
process requirements. The Mullane decision, although not in a bank-
ruptcy setting, states that the difference between in rem and in
personam proceedings does not exist when dealing with the due pro-
cess rights of notice and opportunity to be heard. The Court in
Matin, in adopting the Mullane view, rejects the formalistic concept
of an in rem proceeding by notice to the world and requires reason-
able notice to the bank before liability will be imposed. The Court
does not indicate what will constitute reasonable notice. It would
seem that notice by publication is the least that will be required and
certainly this will not impose an onerous burden on the trustee since
he can easily ascertain where the bankrupt's funds are being held.
The Court also refuses to read sections 70(d) (5) and 18(f)
"° UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 3-506.
"
0Bank of Marin v. England, 385 U.S. 99, 102 (1966).
21 Id.
22 52 Stat. 867 (1938), 11 U.S.C. § 94(d) (1964).
" Hanover Nat'l Bank v. Moyes, 186 U.S. 181, 192 (1902).24339 U.S. 306 (1950).
1028 [Vol. 45
TRUSTEE'S TITLE IN BANKRUPTCY
"with the ease of a computer"2 5 and invokes the equitable power
under section 2(a)20 of the act to reach an equitable result. It is
clear that a bankruptcy court is a court of equity and may exercise
these equitable powers in granting or withholding relief in its ad-
ministration the bankrupt's estate.2 7  However, these equitable
powers may only be exercised where the result produced will not be
inconsistent with the Bankruptcy Act.2 Sections 70(d) and 18(f)
clearly indicate the Congressional intention to invalidate post ad-
judication transfers.2 9 It is also clear that the payment of funds
after adjudication frustrates one of the main objectives of the
Bankruptcy Act-preserving the estate for the benefit of creditors.
However, even if it is concluded that equitable relief, in the form
of validation of the transfer, is foreclosed by the act, an equitable
result may still be achieved and the estate preserved by simply ad-
justing the liabilities as between the bank and the creditor. This is,
in effect, what the Court did. They preserved sections 70(d) and
18(f) "by imposing liability on the payee of the checks as if he has
received a voidable preference or other voidable transfer."3
Aside from the inherent in equities in holding the bank liable in
this situation there are other compelling reasons for making the
trustee go only against the payee creditor. If the transaction with
the bankrupt constituted a voidable preference under section 60(a)-
(b) 8 1 of the act then multiple litigation may be avoided by suing
the payee first. This would be true in most cases because the subse-
quent presentment of the check to the bank should be sufficient evi-
dence of bad faith to allow the drawee bank to be indemnified for
the money paid out.3 2 Therefore in this situation, by suing the
payee first there will be no need for an indemnity suit.
2 Bank of Marin v. England, 385 U.S. 99, 102 (1966).
"'52 Stat. 842 (1938), 11 U.S.C. § 11(a), reads in part:
".... courts of bankruptcy are hereby invested . . . with such juris-
diction at law and in equity as will enable them to exercise original
jurisdiction. .. ."
"'Pepper v. Litton, 308 U.S. 295, 304 (1939).
8 Securities Comm'n v. U.S. Realty Co., 310 U.S. 434, 455 (1939);
Pepper v. Litton, 308 U.S. 295 (1939).
"4 COLLIER, BANKRUPTCY 70.67, at 1500 (14th ed. 1964).
"0 Bank of Marin v. England, 385 U.S. 99, 103 (1966).
'152 Stat. 869 (1938), as amended, 11 U.S.C. 96(a)-(b) (1964): A
voidable preference is a payment of an antecedent debt within four months
of bankruptcy with reasonable cause to believe the debtor is insolvent.
" Farmers & Merchants Bank v. Universal C.I.T. Credit Corp., 4 Utah
2d 155, 160-61, 289 P.2d 1045, 1049 (1955).
1967] 1029
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
If the transfer were not a voidable transfer or if joint liability
were imposed there are still several ways to adjust the liability. It
does not seem that the liability should depend on whether payment
was in the form of check or cash. If this were payment of an ante-
cedent debt by cash it would not be a valid transfer since such a
payment is not for "present fair equivalent value." 33 If joint
liability were imposed in this situation the payee creditor would be
in a better position than the bankrupt's other creditors. If the bank
pays first and has no right of indemnity against the creditor, then
the creditor, to the extent of the bank's contribution, will be favored
over the other creditors. On the other hand, the bank's loss would
be total unless by subrogation it were allowed to participate in the
distribution of the bankrupt's estate. The right of subrogation here
would depend on whether this transaction was viewed as if the bank,
by paying the judgment, had paid the creditor's claim and thus stood
in his position as an unsecured creditor. 4 But if the creditor were
to pay the entire judgment, he would still be able to share in the
bankrupt's estate as an unsecured creditor.
The Court in Marin adopted the simplest and most equitable
solution in this situation by limiting the trustee to an action against
the payee. This would result in the payee bearing the entire loss
resulting from distribution by the bankrupt estate. In a situation,
as here, where the bank has had no notice of the bankruptcy pro-
ceeding this is simply a restoration to the status quo.
FRANcIS X. HANLON
Constitutional Law-Is the Restricted Cross-Examination Rule
Embodied in the Fifth Amendm'nt?
In the historic Supreme Court decision of Malloy v. Hoga1 it
was established that the fifth amendment guarantee of freedom from
self-incrimination is imposed on the states by way of the fourteenth
amendment.' The recent case of Spevak v. Klien3 emphasized the
scope of this determination by holding that no group or classifica-
"See note 9 sitpra.
,See, 40 MINN. L. Iv. 499 (1956).
378 U.S. 1 (1964). See notes in 43 N.C.L. Rnv. 9 (1964); 73 YALE
L.J. 1491 (1964).
'U.S. CONST. amend. V provides in part that no person "shall be com-
pelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself. . . ." For ex-
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tion of people is without its purview.4 But an additional problem
area remains that may have a significant impact on North Carolina
procedure. This is concerned with the rules governing the scope
of cross-examination as they affect the criminal defendant who
chooses to testify.
North Carolina adheres to the "wide-open '5 rule of cross-exami-
nation. This procedure dictates that the criminal defendant waives
his immunity from self-incrimination by the mere act of taking the
stand.' As a consequence he is subjected to cross-examination on
any matter relevant to the issues being tried.7 The federal courts,
however, follow a restrictive rule' whereby the defendant technically
waives the privilege by testifying in his own behalf, but can be cross-
examined only on matters brought out on direct.' It is uncertain
whether this rule is based on procedural 0 or constitutional11 con-
amples of other constitutional protections that have been imposed on the
states in recent years see e.g., Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400 (1965)
(sixth amendment guarantee of the right of confrontation); Gideon v. Wain-
wright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963) (sixth amendment right to counsel); Mapp
v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961) (fourth amendment bar of illegally seized
evidence).
'87 Sup. Ct. 625 (1967).
'Id. at 628.
'The "wide-open" rule is so designated because it does not confine the
scope of inquiry to matters testified to on direct. See McCoRMICK, Evi-
DENCE §§ 21, 26, 131 (1954).
'This is established by N.C. GEN. STAT. § 8-54 (1953), which provides
in part:
In the trial of all indictments, complaints, or other proceedings
against persons charged with the commission of crimes . . .the per-
son so charged is, at his request, but not otherwise, a competent wit-
ness, and his failure to make such request shall not create any pre-
sumption against him. But every such person examined as a witness
shall be subject to cross-examination as other witnesses.
' State v. Dickerson, 189 N.C. 327, 127 S.E. 256 (1925). See STAxs-
BURY, NORTH CAROLINA EVIDENCE §§ 56-57 (2d ed. 1963).
'For discussion of the federal approach see Orfield, Examination of
Witnesses in Federal Criminal Cases, 4 ARiz. L. REv. 215 (1963); Orfield,
The Privilege Against Self-Incrimination in Federal Cases, 25 U. PiTT. L.
REv. 503, 547 (1964); 5 U. CHI. L. Rxv. 116 (1937); 36 U. DET. L.J.
162 (1958).
'Fitzpatrick v. United States, 178 U.S. 304 (1900); United States v.
Pate, 357 F.2d 911 (7th Cir. 1966); Simon v. United States, 123 F.2d 80
(4th Cir. 1941); Madden v. United States, 20 F.2d 289 (9th Cir.), cert.
denied, 275 U.S. 554 (1927); Tucker v. United States, 5 F.2d 818 (8th
Cir. 1925). See also MCCORMIcK, EVIDENCE § 26 (1954).
"o Some cases merely state that the defendant becomes subject to cross-
examination to the same degree as any other witness. This, of course, means
the restrictive rule. See e.g., Fitzpatrick v. United States, 178 U.S. 304
(1900).
" The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals in Tucker v. United States, 5
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cepts, but if the Supreme Court should determine that it is a neces-
sary appendage to the fifth amendment protection, the North Caro-
lina practice would become unconstitutional."
In exploring such a possibility, two considerations may prove
controlling. The Court in recent years has not hesitated to expand
the number of individual protections available to criminal defendants
in state court proceedings.1" Moreover, particular attention has been
paid to alleviating conditions surrounding the assertion of constitu-
tional privileges that tend to undermine the strength of the right
guaranteed. For example, the Court reasoned in Escobedo v. Illi-
nois' 4 that guaranteeing a criminal defendant the right to counsel at
the trial stage alone is insufficient when the possibility exists that a
pre-trial confession rendered when the accused did not have benefit
of counsel may negate any advantage of courtroom representation. 15
Applying this rationale to the protection of the self-incrimination
privilege, cross-examination procedures of the North Carolina vari-
ety 6 in which a defendant who takes the stand "is subject to the
same treatment as other witnesses,"'17 become suspect. The privilege
has little value for an accused who deems it expedient to testify but
can ill afford broad cross-examination. It is submitted that the
existence of such an inherent restraint may lead the Court to con-
sider the "wide-open" rule an unwarranted threat to the exercise of
the privilege.
A second consideration is evidenced by the Malloy concern for
F.2d 818 (8th Cir. 1925), accorded the rule constitutional sanction. The
court determined that when the defendant was questioned concerning mat-
ters not brought out on direct testimony, he was "compelled . . . over
seasonable and proper objection to be a witness against himself, in viola-
tion of the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution." Id. at 824. For ex-
amples of both prior and subsequent cases that make no mention of Consti-
tutional implications in the rule see e.g., Fitzpatrick v. United States, 178
U.S. 304 (1900); United States v. Pate, 357 F.2d 911 (7th Cir. 1966).
1" North Carolina is not the only state in which such a determination
would invalidate existing practice. Arizona, for example, has recently re-
stated its position that a criminal defendant who takes the stand to give
testimony in his own behalf is "subject to cross-examination as to all mat-
ters relevant to the issues being tried." State v. Taylor, 99 Ariz. 85, 407
P.2d 59, 64 (1965). Accord, Shelton v. State, 397 S.W.2d 850, 851 (Tex.
Crim. App. 1965).
1" See note 2 supra.
'378 U.S. 478 (1964). See 43 N.C.L. REv. 187 (1964).
15378 U.S. at 486.
' See STANSBURY, NORTH CAROLINA EVIDENCE § 108 (2d ed. 1963).
1 Id. § 56, at 116.
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variations in the implementation of constitutional protections in
state and federal forums. The Court reasoned that as the first,
fourth, and sixth amendment are enforced according to the same
standards in both,' s it would be incongruous to deny a criminal
defendant the same uniformity of application when considering an
assertion of a fifth amendment privilege.' It is conceded that the
Court's attention was focused on claim rather than waiver of privi-
lege, but it must be remembered that the practical effect of the
federal limitation on the scope of cross-examination is to make
waiver incomplete, leaving a portion of the privilege intact.2" Thus,
whether the restricted rule is considered a part of the privilege or
merely a collateral result of its waiver, it is impossible to disasso-
ciate one from the other. Both are interwoven in the trial context
and become a unit for consideration by an accused who must weigh
the advantages of a claim of privilege in light of the consequences of
waiver. As this determination may well depend on the forum be-
cause of the variance in cross-examination procedure, the Court's
propensity for uniformity" may render the "wide-open" rule un-
acceptable.
W. H. FAULK, JR.
Constitutional Law-"Freedom of Association's" Inapplicability
to Greek-letter Fraternities
In April of 1965 the brothers of Sigma Chi fraternity at Stan-
ford University issued an invitation of membership to Kenny Wash-
ington, a Negro-thereby breaking with century-old traditions.'
His admittance to the fraternity was contradictory to the "all white"
heritage of Sigma Chi.2 Shortly after Washington's pledging, the
national fraternity suspended the Stanford chapter-the first of a
21 378 U.S. at 10.
29 Id. at 11.
20 United States v. Pate, 357 F.2d 911 (7th Cir. 1966).
21 See notes 19 & 20 supra and accompanying text.
Sigma Chi was founded at Miami University, Oxford, Ohio, in 1855.
13 ENCYCLOPEDIA AMERICANA 402 (1948).
'A few weeks after Washington's "pledging," the national president of
Sigma Chi predicted that no Negro would ever become a member of the
fraternity. N.Y. Times, June 19, 1965, § 1, p. 14.
'The national executive committee of the fraternity stated that the sus-
pension of the chapter had nothing to do with any membership question.
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series of encounters destined to lead eventually to the severance of
all relations between the local chapter and the parent body.4 In
Washington's home city of Denver, newspaper reports of the Stan-
ford upheaval attracted the attention of a member of the Board of
Regents of the University of Colorado. He suggested to the Board
that Sigma Chi's action in regard to its Stanford chapter indicated
that the fraternity was actively violating a resolution adopted by the
Regents in 1956, whereby fraternities practicing racial or religious
discrimination at Colorado were to be placed on probation. The
Regents subsequently ordered the Beta Mu (Colorado) chapter of
Sigma Chi to produce evidence to the contrary. Officers of Beta Mu
appeared at a hearing, but chose to remain silent. On the basis of
the only evidence available--chiefly letters written by the chief
executive officer of the national fraternity and others directly con-
cerned with the Stanford incident-the Regents concluded that
chapters of Sigma Chi were compelled to practice racial discrimina-
tion. Beta Mu was placed on probation, including loss of rushing
and pledging privileges, until such time as it complied with the 1956
resolution. Following an unsuccessful attempt by Beta Mu to have
the Regents lift the probation, the fraternity brought an action seek-
ing injunctive relief from the penalty, plus a declaratory judgment
that the Regents had exceeded their authority and that their actions
were unconstitutional and void. In Sigma Chi Fraternity v. Regents
of the University of Colorado,5 a three-judge district court denied
relief, holding that the Regents acted within the scope of their
authority and that there was no violation of the fraternity's con-
stitutional rights of freedom of association or procedural due
process.
The fraternity's argument was grounded primarily in allegations
that enforcement of the 1956 resolution resulted in an unconstitu-
tional abridgment of the group's right of "freedom of association."
This right has received judicial recognition chiefly in NAACP v.
Alabama." In that case, the U.S. Supreme Court held that the
According to a statement issued by the national president, the suspension
was based upon the chapter's "contemptousness for the fraternity and its
ritual." Blackwell, How Civil Rights Act Affects Fraternities, COLLEGE AND
UNIv. Bus. 53 (Dec. 1966).
'Id. at 54. The final disaffiliation was the result of a unanimous vote of
the chapter members.
258 F. Supp. 515 (D. Colo. 1966).
°357 U.S. 449 (1958).
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state's insistence that the NAACP disclose its membership lists con-
stituted interference with "freedom to engage in association for the
advancement of beliefs and ideas"-a freedom which the court
equated with freedom of speech and assembly. Sigma Chi argued
that freedom of association as described in NAACP v. Alabama
should be extended to fraternities, and that Colorado protected no
significant state interest by regulating its membership policies. Prior
to its consideration of the right of association issue, the court found
that the Regents' resolution constituted "state action"-a finding
vital to two separate determinations in the case. First, it was neces-
sary to describe the resolution as a "statute" in order to invoke the
jurisdiction of a three-judge Federal panel under 28 U.S.C. § 2281.'
Second, it was necessary to describe the Regents as having sufficient
authority to assert the state's interest. To reach these conclusions,
the court here relied primarily on a statutory provision that "The
Board of Regents shall have the general supervision of the univer-
sity, and the exclusive control and direction of all funds and appro-
priations to the university."8
Having reached the essential constitutional question, the court
asserted that "the right of association is not . . . an absolute right,"'9
and reviewed a number of cases upholding the right in order to
determine whether it should be extended to Sigma Chi."0 These
cited cases applied the right of association doctrine to problems of
state interference with political, economic, religious, or cultural inter-
ests similar to those protected in NAACP. The court characterized
its crucial determination as whether freedom of association neces-
sarily carried with it the advancement or promotion of ideas. Could
it be applied "in relation to a social organization having no broad
'See McWood Corp. v. State Corp. Comm'n, 237 F. Supp. 963 (D.N.M.
1965).
'COLO. REv. STAT. ANN. § 124-2-10 (1963).
'258 F. Supp. 515, 525 (D. Colo. 1966).
"°The court cited NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415 (1963), in which a
Virginia statute regulating the solicitation of legal business was held viola-
tive of freedom of association because litigation was essential to the
NAACP's attempts to obtain its legal and political objectives; Aptheker v.
Secretary of State, 378 U.S. 500 (1964), which couched freedom to travel
in terms of associational rights; Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen v. Vir-
ginia, 377 U.S. 1 (1964), which extended Button to the right of unions to
"associate" for the preservation of their rights by recommending lawyers
for injured members; and Elfbrandt v. Russel, 384 U.S. 11 (1966), holding
that state oaths of allegiance for public employees bore no logical relation-
ship to attempts to inhibit subversive organizations.
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public interest objectives .... ?"11 The three-judge panel concluded
that the right of association had never been applied expressly to a
social fraternity. Then, faced with the apparent necessity of either
rejecting or accepting such an application, the court only skirted the
issue. It turned its attention to Webb v. State University of New
York12 and Waugh v. Board of Trustees,"3 both of which upheld
absolute prohibitions of fraternities by state universities as proper
means to promote a state's interest in supervision and control of its
educational institutions. The 1956 Colorado University resolution,
it said, was aimed at this same state interest. Sigma Chi's assertions
in regard to its own freedom of association were noted only in the
comment that "if the right exists it is a relative one." The court
took notice of two factors tending to reinforce the finding of a
valid state interest: the University's positive interest in eliminating
racial discrimination, and the fact that Sigma Chi's penalty appeared
"mild" when compared to the absolute prohibitions allowed in Webb
and Waugh.
Finally, apart from the issue of freedom of association, the
court resolved the due process problem in the Regents' favor. It
held that Sigma Chi's failure to avail itself of the opportunity to
make a showing barred any complaint of unfairness, and that suffi-
cient evidence was available to sustain the Regents' conclusions.
Noting that Beta Mu was "in the middle" in the case, the court
concluded:
... we are powerless to remedy this. Our function is to consider
the constitutional validity of the action taken. We have found
that it is valid. The fact that the Regents could possibly have
proceeded with more diplomacy or skill in solving this problem
is not a matter for our consideration. 14
It is unfortunate that the court in the present case did not assert
itself with more finality in regard to the question which it raised
regarding the applicability of freedom of association to organiza-
tions lacking public objectives.15 Nevertheless, the decision is im-
1 258 F. Supp. 515, 525 (D. Colo. 1966).
', 125 F. Supp. 910 (N.D.N.Y. 1954).13237 U.S. 589 (1915).
1 258 F. Supp. 515, 529 (D. Colo. 1966).1 
"It is important to note that the NAACP cases arose in contexts of
interference with such interests as political, economic, religious, or cultural
interests, although it does not appear that the right of association is neces-
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portant. The court strongly implies, despite averments to the con-
trary, that the .right should be applied only to protect political or
philosophical interests like those in NAACP. This implication re-
flects the balancing performed by the court, and its decision that
the university's interest-here, the eradication of racial discrimina-
tion-outweighs the fraternity's right to select members free of
state regulation. Extension of freedom of association to Sigma Chi
would have had the effect of using the doctrine to further public
racial discrimination, in complete opposition to its application in
NAACP. Thus, although Sigma Chi appears to add little sub-
stantive law to the holdings in the Waugh 6 and Webb11 cases cited
by the court, it does apply certain elements of the right of associa-
tion doctrine to the previously untouched problem of fraternity
racial discrimination.18
sary limited to such objectives." 258 F. Supp. 515, 525 (D. Colo. 1966)
(emphasis added).
18237 U.S. 589 (1915). In upholding a legislative prohibition of all
fraternities at state schools, the court said at p. 596-597: "It is to be remem-
bered that the University was established by the state, and is under the
control of the state, and the enactment of the statute may have been induced
by the opinion that membership in the prohibited societies divided the atten-
tion of the students, and distracted from that singleness of purpose which
the state desired to exist in its public educational institutions."125 F. Supp. 910 (N.D.N.Y. 1954).
18 The problem has had widespread impact in recent years, although the
instant case reflects the only reported litigation. Sigma Chi alone has had
several chapters involved in controversies, and five have left the fraternity
in recent years. News Release, Stanford University News Service, Nov. 10,
1966. President Barnaby Keeny of Brown University (himself a member
of Sigma Chi) ordered the chapter there to sever all ties with the national
because of the presence of a "social acceptability" clause in the fraternity's
constitution. N.Y. Times, Oct. 26, 1965, p. 28. The clause which he found
offensive to the University's principles states:
Every chapter owes a duty to every other chapter, to the whole fra-
ternity and to any man considered for membership, for as long as it
continues to hold a charter in Sigma Chi, to refrain from proposing
for membership to our fellowship any person who for any reason is
likely to be considered personally unacceptable as a brother by any
chapter or any member anywhere.
Constitution of Sigma Chi Fraternity, Art. VIII, § 1. (Rev. 1965) (emphasis
added).
With the exception of this "mutually acceptable" clause, Sigma Chi re-
tains no patent restrictions on chapter membership policies as of this writing.
The official pledge-initiation report on every pledge filed with the national
fraternity by local chapters contains no references to race and does not
require that a picture be attached.
The impact of the discrimination problem is clearly not limited to the
official reactions of college or fraternity officials. Some important social
attitudes seem to be changing as well. Former congressman Brooks Hays,
10371967]
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
Several aspects of the general problem of fraternity discrimina-
tion were left unexplored by in Sigma Chi. One authority has ar-
gued that a state acts in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment
when it gives official recognition at state universities to fraternities
with discriminatory membership policies.' 9 Similar views are re-
flected in Congressional debates concerning the possibility that fed-
eral funds be withheld from otherwise qualified institutions where
such fraternities exist. Although the statutory language is subject
to differing conclusions,2" at least one high-ranking federal author-
ity has interpreted federal law as authorizing such withholding of
funds.2' Whatever the actual intent of the current statutory pro-
visions, numerous educational institutions have invoked them as the
impetus for regulations similar to the 1956 resolution of the Colo-
rado Regents.2" It would appear that the most significant impact of
a member of Sigma Chi, told the National Interfraternity Conference in
1965:
For us to lag in moving toward this goal [racial equality in fraterni-
ties] is to leave the undergraduate confused about the American
dream of equality of opportunity. We do not want the Greek letter
fraternity, which is an integral part of the American educational
system, to fall behind. . . . Surely it is apparent that the quiet but
profound social revolution now taking place has penetrated college
life. We cannot afford to close our eyes and ears to it.
A recent report of the pledging of a Negro student at Davidson College,
Davidson, N.C. by Sigma Chi is demonstrative of the substantial changes
now being wrought within traditional fraternity precepts. No action has
been taken in the matter by the national fraternity. See The Charlotte Ob-
server, Feb. 17, 1967, p. 1.
"0 Horowitz, Discriminatory Fraternities at State Universities-A Viola-
tion of the Fourteenth Anendnwnt? 25 So. CAL. L. REv. 289, 295 (1952).
" The Higher Education Act of 1965 provides that no federal authority
may be exercised over the membership or internal operations of "any frater-
nal organization, fraternity, sorority, private club or religious organization
at an institution of higher education . . . which is financed exclusively by
funds derived from private sources and whose facilities are not owned by
such an institution." 79 Stat. 1270, 20 U.S.C. § 1144 (1965). The House
version of this provision originally extended it to any of the listed organiza-
tions at any institution of higher education. Thus the Congressional lan-
guage seems clearly to reflect an intent to provide for the possibility of
federal control at publicly supported institutions. See U.S. Code Cong. &
Ad. News, 89th Cong., 1st Sess., v. 2, 4141 (1965).
" James M. Quigley, Assistant Secretary of Health, Education and Wel-
fare, announced in 1965 that under Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964(providing for withholding of federal grants and subsidies from recipients
practicing racial discrimination), colleges would be required to furnish as-
surances of compliance, and that racial discrimination by a fraternity would
invalidate such assurances. N.Y. Times, June 19, 1965, § 1, p. 14.
" When a nondiscriminatory provision was instituted at the University
of North Carolina in 1965, the campus newspaper commented:
[University officials] have voiced their concern that discriminatory
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the decision in Sigma Chi will be similarly pragmatic. No doubt col-
lege authorities will adopt it as a lever for implementing both the
letter and spirit of judicial determinations supporting racial equality
in public educational institutions.3
H. HUGH STEVENS, JR.
Constitutional Law-Current Trends in Recidivist
Statute Procedures
The United States Supreme Court recently affirmed the convic-
tions of three Texas petitioners and in so doing upheld the constitu-
tionality of the common law procedure in applying recidivist
statutes.' The petitioners urged that due process was violated when
it was explained to each juror on voir dire examination that the
state was contending the petitioners had been convicted of similar
crimes earlier, and further that they were deprived of an impartial
trial and jury when the present indictment containing allegations
of the prior convictions was read and evidence of the prior convic-
tions put to the jury at trial.2 The Court, in a 5-4 decision, held
that because the jury was instructed not to consider past criminal
conduct in deciding present guilt that minimum constitutional de-
mands were met.3
The case should be of interest in North Carolina since it sustains
the same procedure used here.' It should also encourage a re-exami-
clauses might be injurious to the University's position with the Fed-
eral Government because the fraternities are chartered by this institu-
tion. If this legal connection is strong enough to place the University
in jeopardy under the .1964 Civil Rights Act, then the clauses clearly
will have to go.
The Daily Tar Heel, Feb. 17, 1965, p. 2.
" See McClaurin v. Oklahoma State Regents, 339 U.S. 637 (1950);
Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
1 Spencer v. Texas, 87 Sup. Ct. 648 (1967). The three cases disposed of
are reported below as Reed v. Beto, 343 F.2d 723 (5th Cir. 1965) ; Spencer
v. Texas, 389 S.W.2d 304 (1965); Bell v. Texas, 387 S.W.2d 411 (1965).
'Brief for Petitioner, pp. 4-5, Spencer v. Texas, 87 Sup. Ct. 648 (1967).
'87 Sup. Ct. at 653.
' N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15-147 (1965) ; State v. Lawrence, 264 N.C. 220, 141
S.E.2d 264 (1965); State v. Morgan, 263 N.C. 400, 139 S.E.2d 708 (1965);
State v. Painter, 261 N.C. 332, 134 S.E.2d 638 (1964) ; State v. Powell, 254
N.C. 231, 118 S.E.2d 617 (1961); State v. Stone, 245 N.C. 42, 95 S.E.2d
77 (1956); State v. Miller, 237 N.C. 427, 75 S.E.2d 242 (1953); State v.
Davidson, 124 N.C. 839, 32 S.E. 957 (1899).
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nation of the procedure in the light of the state's policy of providing
a fair trial and jury."
It has long been recognized that while evidence of prior convic-
tions is relevant and of probative value, it is so highly prejudicial
that, with limited exceptions, a fair trial demands its exclusion.6
Such evidence is generally admitted only in cases where the defen-
dant raises the question of his own character or where defendant
offered himself as a witness. 7
The common law recidivist statutes provide an additional ave-
nue for placing this same evidence before the jury notwithstanding
its volatile nature. The justifying rationale is that the jury is, upon
proper instructions, to suppress the knowledge of prior crimes in
deciding the issue of guilt in the present case. This is questionable.
There is much controversy among authorities as to how effectively
jurors are able to accomplish this mental juxtaposition,8 but it is
safe to assume that even the most intellectually agile and impartial
juror would be hard pressed by the task. Because of this the major-
ity of American jurisdictions and England have changed their pro-
cedures to conform with the spirit of providing an impartial jury
and not with just meeting the minimum standard that will be toler-
ated. Twenty-seven states'0 have by statute or decision adopted some
form of bifurcation procedure whereby evidence of prior crimes is
withheld from the jury until the question of guilt in the present
'U.S. CONsT. amend. VI; N.C. CONST. art I, § 13.
' Michelson v. United States, 335 U.S. 469 (1948); State v. Tessnear,
265 N.C. 319, 144 S.E.2d 43 (1965); State v. McLamb, 235 N.C. 251, 69
S.E.2d 537 (1952); McCoRmICK, EVIDENCE § 157 (1954); STANSBURY,
NORTH CAROLINA EVIDENCE § 104 (2d ed. 1963); 1 WIGMoRE, EVIDENCE
§ 57 (3d ed. 1940).
' McCoRMICK, EVIDENCE § 157 (1954); STANSBURY, NORTH CAROLINA
EVIDENCE § 104 (2d ed. 1963); 1 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE §§ 192-94 (3d ed.
1940); 28 N.C.L. REV. 124 (1949).8 Krulewitch v. United States, 336 U.S. 440 (1949); Blumenthal v.
United States, 332 U.S. 539 (1947); United States v. Banmiller, 310 F.2d
720 (3d Cir. 1962). For an extended discussion on juries, their functions,
and effectiveness, see Skidmore v. Baltimore & Ohio R. Co., 167 F.2d 54
(2d Cir. 1948).
*The difficulty is evidenced by the fact that in Spencer v. Texas the
majority at 554 and the minority at 660 both cited KALVEN & ZEISEL, THE
AMERICAN JURY 180 (1966) as support for their respective positions.
1 Researchers have reached different results on the exact number of
states. See, 87 Sup. Ct. at 665 where 28 states are listed and North Caro-
lina Attorney General as Amicus Curiae, pp. 7-8, Spencer v. Texas, 87 Sup.
Ct. 648 (1967) where it is maintained that less than half the states have
adopted new procedures. This researcher found that 27 states now apply
a two-step procedure. See note 11 infra.
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indictment is determined. Then, if the defendant is convicted, a
second determination is made as to the prior convictions for sentenc-
ing purposes." These procedures assure a fair trial while still per-
mitting the state to effectuate its policy of increased sentences for
habitual criminals. It is significant to note that Texas has joined
the majority of states now using a bifurcation procedure since the
convictions of the petitioners of Spencer v. Texas"2 and that the
Attorney General of Texas even while urging affirmance acknowl-
edged that there could be a "better method of proving prior crimes
for the purpose of enhancing punishment. . ". .. , The majority in
Spencer v. Texas while upholding constitutionality also noted the
inferiority of the single step procedure.' 4 In his concurring opinion
Justice Stewart stated that "it is clear to me that the recidivist pro-
cedures adopted in recent years by many other states . . . are far
superior to those utilized in the cases now before us."' 5
The North Carolina Attorney General filed an amicus curiae
brief in Spencer v. Texas asking the Court to uphold the common
law procedure and thereby sanction the North Carolina approach. 6
The conclusion of the Attorney General's brief states:
" Those states now employing a two step procedure in applying re-
cidivist statutes are: Alaska, ALASKA STAT. § 12.55.060 (Supp. 1966);
Arkansas, ARK. STAT. ANN. § 43-2328 (1964); Colorado, COLO. REv. STAT.
ANN. § 39-13-3 (1963); Connecticut, Conn. Public Act. No. 588 § 5310(1963); Delaware, DEL. CODE ANN., tit. 11, § 3912(b) (Supp. 1966);
Florida, FLA. STAT. ANN. § 775.11 (1965; Idaho, IDAHO CODE: ANN. § 19-
2514 (1948); Kansas, KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-107a 1964); Louisiana, LA.
REv. STAT. ANN. § 15:529.1 (Supp. 1965); Maryland, MD. RuLE OF PROC.
713 (1963); Michigan, MicH. STAT. ANN. § 28.1085 (1954); Minnesota,
MINN. STAT. ANN. § 609.155 (1964); Nebraska, NEB. REv. STAT. § 29-2221
(1964); New York, N.Y. PENAL LAw § 1943; New Mexico, Johnson v.
Cox, 72 N.M. 55, 380 P.2d 199 (1963); North Dakota, N.D. CENT. CODE
§ 12-06-23 (1960); Ohio, OHio REv. CODE ANN. § 2961.13 (1954); Okla-
homa, OKLA. STAT. ANN., tit. 22, § 860 (Supp. 1966); Oregon, ORE. REv.
STAT. § 168.065 (Supp. 1963); Pennsylvania, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 5108
(1963); South Dakota, S.D. CODE § 13.0611 (1939); Tennessee, TENN.
CODE ANN. § 40-2801 (1955) as construed in Harrison v. State, Tenn., 394
S.W.2d 713 (1965); Texas, TEx. CODE OF CIUM. PROc. ANN. art. 36.01
(1966); Utah, UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-1-19 (1953); Virginia, VA. CODE
ANN. § 53-296 (Supp. 1966); Washington, WASH. REv. CODE ARN. § 9.92.
090 (1961); West Virginia, W. VA. CODE ANN. § 61-11-19 (1966).
a, TEx. CODE OF CRIM. PRoc. ANN. art. 36.01 (1966).
18 Brief of Respondent, p. 9. Spencer v. Texas, 87 Sup. Ct. 648 (1967).
1, 87 Sup. Ct. at 655, 656.
'Id. at 656.
"Appreciation is extended to the Office of the Attorney General of
North Carolina for furnishing briefs of counsel as well as its own amicus
curiae brief.
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North Carolina, therefore, asks that its procedure shall re-
main in force and not be disturbed. The criminals of the under-
world are not stupid, and they quickly become aware of the facts
that repeated acts of crime can bring more severe punishment.
When a State legislature says that a prior conviction can bring
about increase of punishment and a State supreme court holds
that the issue as to the prior conviction can be tried at the same
time as the trial of the subsequent offense, then why should the
criminal be protected as to his criminal record? We suggest that
the protection of law abiding citizens who go about their daily
lives should weigh more heavily than the protection of the crimi-
nal.1
7
It is submitted that the force behind the current trend toward
two-step trials is not to undermine the purpose of recidivist statutes
nor to protect the convicted criminal from his past record nor to
lessen the law abiding citizen's protection. Rather, an effort is being
made to afford every defendant a fairer trial untainted by prejudicial
evidence normally excluded.' It is to remove the means by which
prosecutors under the guise of due process and statutory fulfillment
circumvent established rules of evidence.'" It is further submitted
that no valid state policy should be founded upon advocation of a
procedure on its face inferior to alternatives having not only the
same ultimate effect but also desirable intermediate safeguards. For
these reasons North Carolina should consider amending its statutes
so that prosecutors are denied probative benefit derived from intro-
" Brief of the Attorney General of North Carolina as Amicus Curiae,
p. 13, Spencer v. Texas, 87 Sup. Ct. 648 (1967).8 See supra notes 6-7 and accompanying text. Compare, Collins v. State,
70 Okla. Crim. 340, 106 P.2d 273 (1940) where it is held that a defendant
is presumed innocent and therefore entitled to appear in court in civilian
clothing rather than prison garb. Is the distinction between the state's
physically dressing a defendant in prison clothing and mentally dressing
him the same way with evidence of prior convictions great? Cf. Shultz v.
State, 131 Fla. 757, 179 So. 764 (1938).
" The principal case is a prime example of this. There the defendant
attempted to stipulate before the trial that he had been convicted earlier as
the indictment alleged. The prosecutor refused to accept the stipulation and
used the recidivist statute to present evidence to the jury of the defendant's
criminal record. 87 Sup. Ct. at 662.
Three states by statute and case law allow the defendant to stipulate his
prior record even though not providing a two step trial. See, CAL. PENAL
CODE § 1025; ARIz. RuIEs CRIM. PR0C. 180 (1956); State v. Meyer, 258
Wis. 326, 46 N.W.2d 341 (1951). Quaere whether it is good policy to force
a defendant to make the impossible choice between stipulating a false allega-
tion in order to exclude prejudicial evidence or allowing the prejudicial
evidence in order to avoid enhanced punishment under the state's recidivist
statute.
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duction of evidence going only to the question of sentencing ° To
do so would effectuate the due process standards by affording an
impartial jury to every defendant.
The simpliest yet most expedient bifurcation procedure is the
so called Connecticut method2 1 whereby the indictment contains two
pages. On the first page are allegations pertaining to the present
crime. On the second page are allegations of prior crimes to be used
in imposing sentence. The defendant is, in the absence of the jury,
read both pages to give him notice of the charges. Then the jury is
read only the first page. If they return a guilty verdict then the
second page is read to them and a fiinding is made as to the prior
crimes. Thus, one jury and one trial is utilized in deciding both
questions but the defendant is not deprived of full due process by
having a jury decide the question of his guilt with the knowledge
of prior convictions in mind.
In addition to the prejudicial aspect of the present statute, per-
haps the practical desirability for amendment should be examined
in light of the Supreme Court's present decision, recent decisions,
and possible future holdings. The recent decisions dealing with
voluntariness of confessions,2 2 right to a transcript on appeal,m right
to counsel,2 4 and pre-trial publicity 5 leave no room to doubt the
Court's concern for fair trial under the due process clause. In
Spencer v. Texas this same concern is evidenced in the extensive dis-
" It should be noted that the North Carolina Court has construed the
recidivist statute strictly. In several cases tacit recognition of the prejudicial
effect of the statute has been shown where convictions of the principal
crime were reversed even though the sentence imposed did not exceed that
permissible for a first offender. In these cases minor procedural technicali-
ties in applying the statute were not met. State v. Powell, 254 N.C. 231,
118 S.E.2d 617 (1961); State v. Stone, 245 N.C. 42, 95 S.E.2d 77 (1956).
Also see State v. Painter, 261 N.C. 332, 134 S.E.2d 638 (1964) where in
reversing the court said that it was desirable if not necessary that the
warrant specify as particularly as the indictment to meet the recidivist
statute standards. State v. Miller, 237 N.C. 427, 75 S.E.2d 242 (1953)
where the indictment was held inadequate.
21 State v. Ferrone, 96 Conn. 160, 113 Atl. 452 (1921). For codification
see, UTAH CODE, ANN. § 76-1-19 (1953).
22 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966); Escobedo v. Illinois, 378
U.S. 478 (1963); Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S. 368 (1963), where a two
step procedure was required in determining the admission of a confession.
2" Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956).
"Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966) ; Douglas v. California, 372
U.S. 353 (1963); Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
" Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333 (1966); Marshall v. United States,
360 U.S. 310 (1959).
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senting opinions of the Chief Justice and Justice Fortas, 6 joined by
Justices Brennan and Douglas in a separate dissent." Nor is there
much comport for the proponent of the Status quo in the majority's
reluctant affirmance."8 The announcement by Justice Clark, who
voted with the majority, that he intends to retire from the Court 9
further weakens the holding of Spencer and leaves to speculation
whether his replacement would vote for or against affirming if and
when the question is again presented. More importantly, two of the
dissenting Justices felt that the common law procedure for applying
recidivist statutes "undermined 'the very integrity of the fact finding
process' "30 and would have applied their dissents retroactively. As
is noted in the North Carolina Attorney General's amicus curiae
brief, to strike down the common law procedure would be to nullify
North Carolina statutes and holdings."1 To apply such a decision
retroactively would also nullify convictions obtained using these pro-
cedures. Thus, it would seem prudent to consider changing the
statute on these very practical grounds as well as on the policy basis
discussed above.
PHILIP G. CARSON
Criminal Law and Procedure-Harmless Error
The harmless-error statutes and rules' now utilized by all the
states and in the federal judicial system2 are the product of judicial
"87 Sup. Ct. at 656.
'" Id. at 666.
"See notes 14 and 15 supra and accompanying text.
"Time, Mar. 10, 1967, p. 22.
'o 87 Sup. Ct. at 666. Compare, Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335(1965).
'
1 Brief of the Attorney General of North Carolina as Amicus Curiae,
p. 2, Spencer v. Texas, 87 Sup. Ct. 648 (1967).
'Typical of the harmless-error provisions is the California harmless-
error provision which provides:
No judgment shall be set aside, or new trial granted, in any case,
on the ground of misdirection of the jury, or of the improper admis-
sion or rejection of evidence, or for any error as to any matter of
pleading, or for any error as to any matter of procedure, unless, after
an examination of the entire cause, including the evidence, the court
shall be of the opinion that the error complained of has resulted in
a miscarriage of justice.
CAL. CoNsT. art. VI, § 4Y2.
'28 U.S.C. § 2111 (1965) provides:
On the hearing of any appeal or writ of certiorari in any case, the
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reform early in this century. They arose from the desire to allow
appellate courts to judge whether minor trial errors materially affect
the outcome of a trial.' In effect, they provide that there may be
some errors which in the setting of a particular case may be deemed
harmless, thus not resulting in automatic reversal. In Chapman v.
California,4 the United States Supreme Court restricted state harm-
less-error provisions as applied to denial of rights guaranteed by
the Federal Constitution. The rule announced by Mr. justice Black
for the Court states that where there is an error of state procedure
or state law, the states may continue to apply their harmless-error
rules.5 However, state appellate judges may overlook federal con-
stitutional violations only if the court is able to find that the error
is "harmless beyond a reasonable doubt."'
Ruth Elizabeth Chapman and Thomas LeRoy Teale were con-
victed of a 1962 robbery-slaying. At the time of the trial, Article
I, § 13 of the California Constitution provided that a defendant's
failure to testify could be commented upon and could be considered
by the court or jury.' Neither defendant testified at the trial and
the prosecutor, relying on Article I, § 13, filled his argument to the
jury from beginning to end with numerous references to their silence
and inferences of their guilt resulting therefrom." The judge also
charged the jury that they could draw adverse inferences from the
failure to testify.' After trial, but before petitioners appeal had
court shall give judgment after an examination of the record without
regard to errors or defects which do not affect the substantial rights
of the parties.
FED. R. CRIm. P. 52(a) provides:
Any error, defect, irregularity or variance which does not affect
substantial rights shall be disregarded.
See also FED. R. Civ. P. 61.
' See, Kotteakos v. United States, 328 U.S. 750, 759-60 (1946).
'386 U.S. 18 (1967).
5Id. at 21.
8Id. at 24.
CAL. CoNsT. art. I, § 13 provides:
in any criminal case, whether the defendant testifies or not, his
failure to explain or to deny by his testimony any evidence or facts
in the case against him may be commented upon by the court and by
counsel, and may be considered by the court or the jury.
. Excerpts of the prosecutor's argument are reproduced in the appendix
of the majority opinion. 386 U.S. at 26-42.
'The trial judge charged the jury:
It is a constitutional right of a defendant in a criminal trial that he
may not be compelled to testify. Thus, whether or not he does testify
rests entirely on his own decision. As to any evidence or facts against
him which the defendant can reasonably be expected to deny or ex-
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been considered by the California Supreme Court, the United States
Supreme Court declared in Griffin v. California'0 that such com-
ment was a violation of the Fifth Amendment privilege against self
incrimination." When the California Supreme Court heard the ap-
peal of Chapman,' 2 the court, while admitting that petitioners had
been denied a federal constitutional right by the comments on their
silence, nevertheless ruled that the convictions could stand because
the comments to the jury were harmless errors that did not affect
the verdict.' 3 Applying the new test announced in his opinion, Mr.
Justice Black held that California had failed to show the error was
harmless beyond a reasonable doubt and thus reversed the convic-
tion. 4
One question which Chapman presents is whether the Court has
the power to declare this rule. This power seems questionable for
two reasons. First, nowhere does the Court state that the California
harmless-error provision is a violation of due process.' 5 Also, the
Court appears to acknowledge that other harmless-error formula-
tions would be constitutionally permissible.' The Court simply
states that the rule they announced will "provide a more workable
standard."'" Second, the Court in effect has assumed a general
supervisory power over the trial of federal constitutional issues in a
state court. While the Fourteenth Amendment protects individuals
from invasion of fundamental rights,' nothing in the Fourteenth
Amendment gives federal courts supervisory power in the affirma-
plain because of facts within his knowledge, if he does not testify or
if, though he does testify, he fails to deny or explain such evidence,
the jury may take that failure into consideration as tending to indi-
cate the truth of such evidence or as indicating that among the in-
ferences that may be reasonably drawn therefrom those unfavorable
to the defendant are the more probable....
Id. at 19.
10380 U.S. 609 (1965).11Id. at 615. Tehan v. United States, 382 U.S. 406 (1966), determined
that the law as declared in Griffin was applicable to all cases that were still
pending on direct review at the time that Griffin was announced.
12 People v. Teale, 45 Cal. Rptr. 729, 404 P.2d 209 (1965).1 Id. at 741, 404 P.2d at 220.
14 386 U.S. at 26.
1 In his dissent, Mr. Justice Harlan argues that the provision does not
violate due process. Id. at 47.
o Id. at 46. Justice Black states that Congress could make a different
formulation.
'" Id. at 24.See, Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319 (1937).
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five sense of McNabb v. United States.9 As Mr. Justice Cardozo
had occasion to remark, a state rule of law "does not run foul of
the Fourteenth Amendment because another method may seem...
to be fairer or wiser or to give a surer promise of protection to the
prisoner at bar."20
But assuming that the Court has this power, there remains the
basic question of whether this new rule "will provide a more work-
able standard." In People v. Watson,2 the California court, in de-
fining its harmless-error provision, stated that reversal would be
required only when "it is reasonably probable that a result more
favorable to the appealing party would have been reached," and this
judgment "must necessarily be based upon reasonable probabilities
rather than upon mere possibilities."2 Thus, the difference between
the California "miscarriage of justice" test for harmless error and
the "harmless beyond a reasonable doubt" test announced by Mr.
Justice Black would seem to be largely verbalistic. However, the
desirability of a uniform standard for determining whether a fed-
eral constitutional error is harmless is apparent from an examina-
tion of numerous past attempts to formulate a rule.23 Applying this
rule to all state courts will eliminate the need to determine whether
each state harmless-error provision is consistent with the due pro-
cess clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
However, whether the California court is applying its rule of
"miscarriage of justice" or the new rule of "harmless beyond a
" 318 U.S. 332 (1943). The Court held that incriminating statements
elicited from defendants during unlawful detention by federal officials are
inadmissible in federal courts. The Court stated that "the scope of our
reviewing power over convictions brought here from the federal courts is
not confined to ascertainment of Constitutional validity." Id. at 340.
"0 Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 105 (1934). See also Spencer
v. Texas, 385 U.S. 554 (1967) where the Court holds that the Constitu-
tion does not ordain the Supreme Court with authority as rule-making
organ for promulgation of state rules of criminal procedure. Id. at 569.
2146 Cal. 2d 818, 299 P.2d 243 (1956).
2" Id. at 837, 299 P.2d at 255.
23 See, Kotteakos v. United States, 328 U.S. 750 (1946) where the Court
stated the material factors of the harmless-error rules to be the character
of the proceedings, what is at stake upon its outcome, and the relation of
the error asserted to casting the balance for decision on the case as a
whole. Id. at 762. In Fahy v. Connecticut, 375 U.S. 85 (1963) the majority
of five held the test of harmless error to be whether there is a reasonable
possibility that the evidence complained of might have contributed to the
conviction. Id. at 86-87. The four dissenters said the standard was a
determination that exclusion of the unconstitutional evidence could not have
changed the outcome of the trial. Id. at 95.
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reasonable doubt," the same question will remain-is the applica-
tion of the rule to the alleged error a reasonable one or was the
rule applied arbitrarily to destroy or dilute constitutional guaran-
tees? To answer this question, the Court, under whatever rule it
promulgates, will have to look to each state court decision to see if
the rule was reasonably applied. This will entail not only looking at
the case in dispute but looking at previous applications of the rule.
Furthermore, it seems that the impact of the new rule is weak-
ened by the fact that state courts can continue to apply their state
harmless-error statutes to state errors.24 That a state judge will
mentally shift gears and consider one set of criteria to see if there is
a miscarriage of justice and another set of criteria to see if the error
is harmless beyond a reasonable doubt seems unlikely. In California,
the holding in Chapman would probably be the same whichever
criteria is used.25
Apart from the question of whether this new rule "will provide
a more workable standard" is the question of whether a violation
of Griffin should ever be subject to a harmless-error rule. It is
conceded by the Court that there can be errors which in a particular
setting may be so insignificant that they can be considered harm-
less."' Also, it is stated that there are some constitutional rights
so basic to a fair trial that their infraction can never be treated as
harmless error and will result in automatic reversal.2 7 The majority
opinion would seem to indicate that in a particular context a viola-
tion of Griffin could be harmless. This view seems to be in direct
contravention of Griffin which held that "the Fifth Amendment...
forbids either comment by the prosecution on the accused's silence
or instructions by the court that such silence is evidence of guilt. '28
A more desirable result to the case is found in the concurring opin-
ion of Justice Stewart. He holds that violation of Griffin should
2'386 U.S. at 21.
" The California court held that there was no miscarriage of justice be-
cause the proof of guilt was overwhelming. 45 Cal. Rptr. 729, 740-41, 404
P.2d 209, 220 (1965).
" Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97 (1934) (denial of permission to
accused to attend a view held harmless); Motes v. United States, 178 U.S.
458 (1900) (erroneous admission of written statement not prejudicial error).
"' Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963) (right to counsel); Payne
v. Arkansas, 356 U.S. 560 (1958) (coerced confession); Tumey v. Ohio,
273 U.S. 510 (1927) (impartial judge). The concurring opinion of Mr.
Justice Stewart expands this list considerably. 386 U.S. at 42-45.11 380 U.S. at 615.
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never be treated as harmless error and should result in automatic
reversal.29 Harmless-error statutes are designed to stop reversals
due to unimportant technicalities. But a violation of Griffin is a
conscious act on the part of the prosecution or the court. To hold
out the possibility that this violation could be harmless would only
seem to tempt the unethical and award the ignorant.
The adoption of this harmless-error rule has thus committed
the Court to a case-by-case determination of the extent to which
unconstitutional comment on a defendant's failure to testify influ-
enced the outcome of a particular trial; i.e., was the comment "harm-
less beyond a reasonable doubt?" This substantial burden could
have been avoided by placing Griffin violations in the category of
Constitutional rights so basic that infractions can never be harmless
error and will result in automatic reversal. Thus, the most that can
be said at present is that Chapman has clouded the holding of
Griffin, a cloud which hopefully will be dispelled in further deci-
sions.30
EUGENE W. PURDOM
Federal Practice-Sovereign Immunity and Counterclams
Against the Government under the Tucker Act
A problem that has arisen time and again under the Tucker
Act1 involves the question of whether a defendant who has a claim
against the Government, which claim could be the subject of an
original suit under the Tucker Act, may assert it as a counterclaim
in an action brought by the Government against him in a federal
court. Any discussion of this problem must begin with the general
proposition that the Government cannot be sued unless it has con-
sented to be sued and then only in the manner in which it has so
" 386 U.S. at 45. See also O'Connor v. Ohio, 385 U.S. 92 (1966)
where the Court reversed a Griffin violation without even mentioning
harmless error.
"The question remains as to what other constitutional violations will
be subject to the harmless-error test. In Cooper v. California, 386 U.S.
58 (1967), a companion case of Chapman, the Court did not reach the
question of whether the harmless-error test should be applied to Fourth
Amendment violations, as it ruled that the search was not a violation of the
Fourth Amendment. Id. at 59.
124 Stat. 505 (1887).
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consented.2 The necessary consent for original suits in contract is
found in the following section of the present codification of the
Tucker Act:
The district courts shall have original jurisdiction, concurrent
with the Court of Claims, of... (2) Any other civil action or
claim against the United States, not exceeding $10,000 in
amount, founded ... upon any express or implied contract with
the United States .... 3
The Court of Claims has exclusive jurisdiction over claims exceed-
ing 10,000 dollars in amount.4 Both the Court of Claims5 and the
district courts" have jurisdiction over counterclaims and set-offs as-
serted by the United States in suits against it. However, there is
no provision regarding counterclaims asserted against the United
States in actions commenced by it.
It is apparent that the provisions of the Federal Rules govern-
ing counterclaims offer no solution to the problem. Rule 13(a) re-
quires the pleading as a counterclaim of any claim arising out of
the same transaction or occurrence that is the subject matter of the
plaintiff's claim. Rule 13(b) allows the pleading of a claim not
arising out of the same transaction. The Rules further provide that
a counterclaim may claim relief exceeding in amount or different in
kind from that sought by the opposing party.7 However, the liberal
nature of these provisions is seriously diminished for purposes of
this discussion by the protective provision of Rule 13(c) : "These
rules shall not be construed to enlarge beyond the limits now fixed
by law the right to assert counterclaims or to claim credits against
the United States or an officer or agency thereof."
One of the leading cases fixing those limits is United States v.
Nipissing Mines Co.' The Government brought an action in the
district court to recover taxes in excess of 80,000 dollars, and the
defendant counterclaimed for a previous overpayment of 5,000 dol-
lars. Although there was consent for an original suit on the claim
of the defendant under the Tucker Act, the court held that the juris-
2United States v. Shaw, 309 U.S. 495 (1940).
'28 U.S.C. § 1346(a) (2) (1962).
'28 U.S.C. § 1491 (1964).
r28 U.S.C. § 1503 (1950).
828 U.S.C. § 1346(c) (1962).
'FED. R. Civ. P. 13(c).8206 Fed. 431 (2d Cir. 1913).
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diction could not be invoked by way of counterclaim. As construed
by the court the statute was simply not broad enough to give the
same court jurisdiction to render judgment when the claim was
asserted in the form of a counterclaim. Another leading case is
United States v. Shawf The United States had obtained a judg-
ment against a contractor and, at the death of the contractor, filed a
claim upon the judgment in a Michigan probate court to recover
over 49,000 dollars. Under a Michigan statute allowing adminis-
trators to set off claims of the estate against creditors' claims, the
administrator set up a claim against the Government for slightly
more than 73,000 dollars and obtained a judgment against the Gov-
ernment for the difference of approximately 23,000 dollars. The
United States Supreme Court held that the state court had no juris-
diction to render an affirmative judgment against the United States,
although it could have allowed a set-off in an amount necessary to
cancel the Government's claim in the probate court. Had this case
been interpreted to stand for the proposition that a state court never
has jurisdiction to render an affirmative judgment against the United
States, its effect might not have been so confusing. But later lan-
guage in the case indicated a more restrictive holding:
It is not our right to extend the waiver of sovereign immunity
more broadly than has been directed by Congress. We, of
course, intimate no opinion as to the desirability of further
changes. That is immaterial. Against the background of com-
plete immunity we find no Congressional action modifying the
immunity role in favor of cross-actions beyond the amount neces-
sary as set-off.10
This language was in keeping with the holding in Nipissing where
the court refused to allow a counterclaim even though the claim
could have been asserted in the same court as an original suit. This
more restrictive holding is the one accorded the Shaw case by some
later cases in the lower federal courts.1 1
Such strict construction of the Tucker Act apparently resulted
from the fact that the Act expressly grants the Court of Claims and
the district courts jurisdiction over counterclaims, set-offs, and other
demands by the Government in suits by individuals against the
9309 U.S. 495 (1940).10 Id. at 502.
1 See, e.g., United States v. State Bridge Com'n, 109 F. Supp. 690(E.D. Mich. 1953); United States v. Biggs, 46 F. Supp. 8 (E.D. Ill. 1942).
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Government in those courts. 12 Since no such express jurisdiction is
granted in regard to counterclaims by individauls, some courts con-
clude that there was no intention to consent to suit against the
United States by way of counterclaim."
On the other hand there has been some evidence of a changing
judicial attitude toward waiver of sovereign immunity. The trend
had its beginnings in cases under the Federal Tort Claims Act and
has been carried over into contract litigation by some courts. The
leading case under the Tort Claims Act is United States v. Yellow
Cab Co. 4 Yellow Cab was sued by its passenger for injuries result-
ing from a collision of one of its cabs with a United States mail
truck. The company impleaded the United States and demanded
contribution from the Government as a joint tortfeasor. The Court
here applied a liberal construction of the statutory waiver of im-
munity in contrast with the stricter construction in Nipissng and
Shaw. The Court held that the Government could be sued for con-
tribution by way of interpleader and cross-claim although the Tort
Claims Act by its terms referred to original suits only. The neces-
sary consent was implied from the general purpose of the statute
to allow the Government to be sued for its torts.
Subsequent to Yellow Cab, the United States Court of Appeals
for the First Circuit decided United States v. Silverton,15 a case
that has become the important bridge between the tort and contract
cases. In that case the Government sued for the purchase price of
scrap webbing, and the defendant counterclaimed for loss due to the
alleged misrepresentation of the Government's agents as to the char-
acter of the webbing. The court summarized the situation as being
one in which the defendant could have asserted his claim as an
original suit under the Tucker Act and reasoned that if the defen-
dant had done so at the time the Government's action was pending,
Ia See notes 5 and 6, supra.
See, e.g., United States v. Wissahickon Tool Works, 84 F. Supp. 896
(S.D. N.Y. 1949).
' 340 U.S. 543 (1951). In another leading case under the Federal Tort
Claims Act the Court held that the anti-assignment statute did not apply
to assignments by operation of law, and that an insurance company could
bring a suit in its own name against the United States under the Federal
Tort Claims Act where the company had become subrogated to the rights
of an insured by payment to the insured who had a claim against the United
States under the Act. United States v. Aetna Cas. & Surety Co., 338 U.S.
366 (1949).I'200 F.2d 824 (1st Cir. 1952).
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the district court could have consolidated the two cases for trial
under Federal Rule 42. The court took the view that it would
amount to the "emptiest technicality" to reject jurisdiction over
the counterclaim and to require the defendant to institute an original
suit. The court was not unaware of the Nipissing case which it
deemed to be out of harmony with the more liberal view as to the
waiving of governmental immunity as expressed in the Yellow Cab
case.
16
The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit has
indicated, by dictum at least, that it would follow Silverton. Dis-
missing an appeal as premature in Thompson v. United States,'
the court, in a more or less advisory opinion to the lower court,
stated that it was no reason why the defendant's claim against the
United States could not be asserted by way of counterclaim in the
action by the Government since the claim of the defendant was such
that it could have been the subject of an original suit in the district
court. Subsequently the district court decided the counterclaim on
its merits.'8
Other circuit and district courts have joined in the adoption of
the liberal view on the basis of either Yellow Cab or Silverton.9
One notable exception to this trend is the Second Circuit where the
strict construction was introduced by the Nipissing case in 1913.
The courts there have at times expressed a preference for the liberal
view,20 yet they considered themselves bound by the earlier deci-
sions." These courts have adhered to this reverence for Nipissing
and the strict view despite the fact that, since Yellow Cab, they
operate under the liberal view in regard to the tort cases.2
A defendant encounters even more difficulty where his compul-
sory counterclaim against the Government exceeds 10,000 dollars.
Under the Federal Rules he must plead the compulsory counter-
1 Id. at 827.
17250 F.2d 43 (4th Cir. 1957).
'
8 Thompson v. United States, 168 F. Supp. 281 (N.D. W. Va. 1958).
"See, e.g., United States v. Springfield, 276 F.2d 798 (5th Cir. 1960);
United States v. Martin, 267 F.2d 764 (10th Cir. 1959); United States v.
Buffalo Mining Co., 170 F. Supp. 727 (D. Alaska 1959); United States v.
Petaschnick, 143 F. Supp. 206 (E.D. Wis. 1956).
" See United States v. Ameco Electronic Corp., 224 F. Supp. 783, 785
(E.D. N.Y. 1963).21 Ibid.
2 See United States v. New York Omnibus Corp., 128 F. Supp. 86
(S.D. N.Y. 1955).
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claim23 or he will be precluded from bringing a subsequent suit on
his claim. 4 Yet, even in the liberal jurisdictions, the district courts
are without jurisdiction over counterclaims exceeding 10,000 dollars
in amount.2" Thus it has been suggested that the best course for
the defendant is to plead the counterclaim since its dismissal for
lack of jurisdiction does not operate as an adjudication on the
merits."' But if the counterclaim were in fact compulsory, i.e.,
arising out of the same transaction, it is probable that the issues in
the principal claim and the counterclaim would be the same. If,
after the dismissal of the counterclaim, the Government obtained a
judgment on its principal claim, it would seem that the judgment
would bar any retrial of those issues under general principles of res
judicata.2 7
On the other hand, it is possible that, after dimissal of the
counterclaim, the issues in the case would be determined in favor of
the defendant. Apparently he would not be precluded from assert-
ing his claim for affirmative relief in a new suit on general princi-
ples of res judicata in this situation.2 However, the question of
whether he would now be barred for failure to assert his claim as a
compulsory counterclaim would clearly be presented.2 9
'FED. R. Civ. P. 13(a).
See Pennsylvania R.R. v. Musante-Phillips, Inc., 42 F. Supp. 340, 341
(N.D. Cal. 1941).
" 28 U.S.C. § 1346(a) (2) (1962). This section was applied to counter-
claims in United States v. Buffalo Mining Co., 170 F. Supp. 727 (D.
Alaska 1959).
"See 25 GEo. WAsHf. L. REv. 315, 336 n.93 (1957).
"Suppose the United States sued a defendant alleging a breach of con-
tract, and the defendant counterclaimed that the United States had com-
mitted the breach. Even if the defendant's counterclaim were dismissed for
lack of jurisdiction, the defendant probably would have asserted the breach
by the United States as a bar to recovery against him even though he could
get no affirmative relief in the case. Thus, if after the dismissal of the
counterclaim, the United States obtained a judgment the issue of its per-
formance would have been litigated and could not be retried in a subsequent
action. There are, however, two reasons why the result in this particular
situation would not be very prejudicial to the defendant. First, it is quite
possible, if not probable, that since the issues were resolved against him in
this case, they would have been resolved against him even if he had been
the plaintiff in a later suit. Secondly, there may be cases where the partic-
ular issues in the counterclaim and the principal claim are not the same so
that the defendant could assert his claim in a subsequent suit.
" Even if the court finds that the particular issues had been litigated in
the first case, so that they could not be retried in the subsequent case, the
defendant (plaintiff in the second case) should be entitled to a judgment on
the pleadings in the second case since these issues were resolved in his
favor in the first case.
" Apparently the question is not resolved by Rule 41(b), (c) which pro-
1967] COUNTERCLAIMS UNDER THE TUCKER ACT 1055
The most a defendant could do to avoid this possibility of a plea
in bar would be to file his original suit in the Court of Claims
immediately after the dismissal of his counterclaim and hope to win
the race to judgment. An equally unsatisfactory alternative was
offered by the court in United States v. Buffalo Mining Co. 0 After
dismissing the counterclaim, the court gave the defendant leave to
amend by reducing his claim to less than 10,000 dollars.
It seems clear that the interest of efficient litigation requires a
solution to the problem of counterclaims under the Tucker Act.
That the Silverton decision offers only a partial solution is illu-
strated by the Buffalo Mining Co. case. Thus it appears that a
desirable solution can be obtained only by an amendment to the
Tucker Act. Of two possibilities that have been advanced, 1 the
proposal that defendants with counterclaims in excess of 10,000
dollars be allowed to remove the entire case to the Court of Claims
seems the least desirable since it apparently would create more prob-
lems than it would solve." It seems that the better solution would
be to amend the Act to expressly give the district courts jurisdiction
over counterclaims against the United States regardless of the
vides that dismissal of a counterclaim for lack of jurisdiction does not
operate as an ajudication on the merits. It seems that this rule relates to
the broad notion of res judicata and not the type of bar imposed for failure
to assert a compulsory counterclaim in an earlier suit. However, an argu-
ment could be made in favor of the defendant under Rule 13(a). Under
this Rule a pleading need not state a counterclaim that requires the presence
of third parties of whom the court cannot acquire jurisdiction for a personaljudgment. On the basis of that exception it could be argued that the inten-
tion was to except from the definition of "compulsory" any counterclaim
met by jurisdictional problems. Thus a counterclaim dismissed for lack of
jurisdiction under the Tucker Act should not be termed "compulsory" at all.
Another, but perhaps weaker, argument under 13(a) would be that once
the defendant has included the counterclaim in his pleadings, he has com-
plied with 13(a) which requires only the pleading of the counterclaim, and
that it was never intended that a claim, although termed "compulsory"
should be barred where it had been pleaded but dismissed for lack of juris-
diction over the subject matter.
170 F. Supp. 727 (D. Alaska 1959).See 73 HARv. L. Rav. 602, 604 (1960).
32 The threshold problem here would be jurisdictional. The Court of
Claims presently has jurisdiction over suits against the United States. 28
U.S.C. § 1491 (1964). Therefore, the removal provision proposed would
require expanding the jurisdiction of the Court of Claims to cover suits by
the United States, at least in this specific situation. The probable result of
such expansion would be an undesirable increase in the work load of that
court.
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amount of the counterclaim.8 3 This solution would not only bring
uniformity to the treatment of such counterclaims but would also
serve the interest of efficient litigation by allowing all the rights and
liabilities of the parties to be determined in a single suit in the dis-
trict court.
JERRY M. TRAmMELL
Habeas Corpus-Waiver of Constitutional Guarantees
In Stem v. Turner' the appellant, a prisoner, appealed the denial
of habeas corpus relief by a federal district court. The district judge
after a thorough review of most of the records of the appellant's
trial in a North Carolina state court and of his attempts at state
post-conviction relief, refused to grant a plenary hearing and dis-
missed the writ. The district court found as to some of Stem's
allegations that the findings of facts in state hearings were correct
and concluded as to other allegations that the appellant had failed to
exhaust his state remedy under the post-conviction statute. The
Court of Appeals for the 4th Circuit interpreted a section of the
North Carolina Post-Conviction Acte such that the appellant's state
remedy had been exhausted and as a result the appellant was en-
titled to a plenary hearing in a federal district court.
In November of 1958, Thomas Stem was convicted in a North
Carolina court of assault on a female with intent to rape and sen-
tenced to a term of fifteen years. At his trial the two arresting
police officers introduced illegally obtained evidence and testimony
that was extremely prejudicial to him.3 Stem's privately retained
" It appears that such a provision should allow the litigation of permis-
sive as well as compulsory counterclaims. Where neither claim requires a
long and complicated trial, apparently there would be no unreasonable de-
lay. If a long or complicated trial be anticipated the court can always in
"futherance of convenience" order separate trials. FED. R. Civ. P. 42(b).
1370 F.2d 895 (4th Cir. 1966).
'N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15-218 (Supp. 1965).
'Stem was arrested without a warrant at his home. No search was made
of the house at that time, but the police officers returned to the house later
that afternoon to search it. Nowhere in the record did it appear that the
officers had a search warrant, or that Stem had consented to the search. As
a result of the search, the officers found the girl's underpants which were
introduced into evidence, made certain observations they testified about at
the trial, and took photographs of parts of the house. All of this illegally
obtained evidence corroborated the story of the girl. 370 F.2d at 898.
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counsel failed to object to the evidence and testimony even though
North Carolina law renders evidence obtained by an illegal search
incompetent.4 The conviction was not appealed, but Stem did assert
many times in several forums various legal improprieties that sup-
posedly occurred in his trial.5 All of these were denied, including
attempts under the state post-conviction relief statute and under a
writ of habeas corpus to state courts. At this point, the appellant
sought a writ of habeas corpus from the -United States District
Court for the Eastern District of North Carolina which was also
denied.
In seeking a writ of habeas corpus from the federal courts, Stem
asserted many grounds, but the one which eventually found favor
with the court of appeals was ineffectiveness of counsel amounting
to a deprivation of due process under the fourteenth amendment.6
The district judge had concluded that this issue, although formally
raised in the pleadings, had not been asserted with proof to sustain
it in any state court proceeding and, therefore, the appellant had
failed to exhaust the remedy still available to him under the North
Carolina Post-Conviction Hearing Act.7 However, the acte seem-
ingly provides to the contrary that "any claims of substantial denial
of constitutional rights or of other error remediable under this arti-
'N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15-27 (1953). The prohibition against the use of
evidence obtained as a result of an illegal search extends to "facts dis-
covered or evidence obtained" by reason of the search. The federal court
presumed that this would bar testimony concerning observations made dur-
ing the search. Stem v. Turner, 370 F.2d 895, 898 (4th Cir. 1966).
' Stem v. Turner, 370 F.2d 895 (4th Cir. 1966) gives a history of the
case.
A pro se petition for certiorari to review the conviction was denied
by the North Carolina Supreme Court on Nov. 21, 1961. Represented
by privately retained counsel, appellant then sought, and was denied,
relief under the North Carolina Post-Conviction Hearing Act (N.C.
G.S. §§ 15-217 et seq.), after he was given a plenary hearing. A
petition for writ of certiorari to the North Carolina Supreme Court to
review that denial was denied Nov. 26, 1963, and a petition for a
writ of certiorari was thereafter denied by the Supreme Court of the
United States. Stem v. North Carolina, 379 U.S. 849 (1964). Next,
a pro se petition for a writ of habeas corpus was denied by Wake
County (North Carolina) Superior Court on April 15, 1965, and
certiorari to the North Carolina Supreme Court denied June 2, 1965.
Id. at 896 n.2.
8 Stem's main contention centered on the failure of his privately re-
tained counsel to object to evidence that resulted from the illegal search.
Id. at 900.
Id. at 897.8 N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 15-217 to -222 (Supp. 1965).
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cle not raised or set forth in the original or any amendment petition
shall be deemed waived."9 Despite the literal language of the statute,
the Attorney General of North Carolina argued that the state trial
courts followed the practice of considering claims that were not
raised or decided in previous applications. However, the court of
appeals noted that the North Carolina Supreme Court had not had
occasion to speak definitely on the subject and that absent a definite
state adjudication to the contrary, the professed language of the
statute must prevail over asserted trial court practice.1- Since claims
by Stem could no longer be heard under the Post-Conviction Hearing
Act, he had exhausted his state remedies, but since Stem had not
waived his constitutional claims under the federal standard, he was
entitled to a plenary hearing in the federal district court to establish
his claim to a writ of habeas corpus.
The development of the writ of habeas corpus in this country
has been one of growing importance.1" Due in part to currently
expanding concepts of due process of law, the use of the writ to test
the constitutionality of state criminal proceedings will continue to
accelerate.1 2 However, in order to maintain a balance between the
state and federal court systems, Congress has declared that federal
courts should abstain from exercising jurisdiction over state prison-
ers until state remedies have been exhausted.'3
In 1963, the Supreme Court of the United States decided the fa-
'N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15-218 (Supp. 1865).
" 370 F.2d at 897.
"The Judiciary Act of Feb. 5, 1867, ch. 28, § 1, 14 Stat. 385, first ex-
tended federal habeas corpus to state prisoners generally. The history and
development is reviewed in detail in Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 415 (1963).
2 The number of habeas corpus applications filed in federal district courts
by state prisoners is greatly increasing:
1941-127
1950-560
1955-660
1959-828
DIR. OF ADMIN. OFFICE OF UNITED STATES COURT, 1959 ANN. REP. 109.
1962-1115
1963-1903
1964-3531
1965-4664
DIR. OF ADMIN. OFFICE OF UNITED STATES COURT, 1965 ANN. REP. 118.
1 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (1964) provides that:
the habeas corpus writ will not be granted for a state court unless it
appears that the applicant has exhausted remedies available in the
courts of the state. Remedies are not exhausted in state courts if the
applicant has a right under the law of the state to raise by any avail-
able procedure, the question presented.
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mous trilogy of Fay v. Noia,'4 Townsend v. Sain," and Sanders v.
United States,'6 which laid down certain federal standards for deal-
ing with habeas corpus. In Townsend v. Sain, the court attempted to
redefine the guidelines as to when a petitioner tried in a state court is
entitled to an evidentiary hearing in a federal district court. The
Court said:
Where the facts are in dispute, the federal court in habeas corpus
must hold an evidentiary hearing if the habeas applicant did not
receive a full and fair evidentiary hearing in a state court, either
at the time of the trial or in a collateral proceeding. In other
words a federal evidentiary hearing is required unless the state-
Court trier of fact has after a full hearing reliably found the
relevant facts.' 7
The court set out six specific situations in which an evidentiary
hearing would be mandatory under the test, including the case where
"the merits of the factual dispute were not resolved in the state
hearing.'1 8
In Fay v. Noia the Court laid down certain federal standards
relating to the problem of exhaustion and waiver of state remedies.
The court held that procedural defaults incurred by the applicant
during the state court proceedings would not bar federal habeas
corpus relief as a failure to exhaust state court remedies, unless the
state remedies were knowingly waived. The requirement of exhaus-
tion of state court remedies was interpreted to mean those state
court remedies still available to the applicant at the time an applica-
tion for habeas corpus was filed in federal court. The federal habeas
judge was given some discretion in denying relief to an applicant
who had deliberately by-passed state court procedure and in doing
so had forfeited his state court remedies. But the Supreme Court
plainly stated that the forfeiture must meet the federal standards
of waiver, for waiver affecting federal rights is a federal question.'"
The Townsend and Noia decisions outline the possible results
14372 U.S. 391 (1963).
' 372 U.S. 293 (1963).
373 U.S. 1 (1963). See 42. N.C.L. REv. 352 (1964) for a discussion
of all three cases.
17 372 U.S. at 312.81d. at 313.
'9 See Johnson v. Zerbt, 304 U.S. 458 (1938). The case gives the classic
definition of waiver as an intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a
known right or privilege.
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when a state court prisoner seeks habeas corpus relief before a fed-
eral court:
1. If there has been a full hearing in the state court on the merits
on the issue for which relief is sought in the federal court, the state
court prisoner is not entitled to relief whether there has been a
waiver or not.
2. If there has not been a full hearing in a state court on the merits,
but the prisoner has knowingly waived his state court remedies, then
the state court prisoner is not entitled to relief in the federal court.
3. If, however, there has not been a full hearing on the merits in
the state court and there has been no waiver of state court remedies
that meets federal standards, the prisoner is entitled to a hearing in
the federal courts.
This last situation is applicable to Stem v. Turner.2 Stem's
claim for relief based on ineffectiveness of counsel had not been
considered on the merits by a North Carolina hearing, but was
barred by state procedure, a waiver that did not meet the federal
standards.
In McNeil v. North Carolina,2 the court of appeals over-
ruled the same district court judge involved in the Stem case.
The appellant was seeking habeas corpus relief due to the systematic
exclusion of Negroes from his jury, and as in the Stem case the
conflict between the federal standard of waiver and the North Caro-
lina standard resulted in the assumption of habeas corpus jurisdic-
tion by the federal courts. North Carolina case law holds that any
objection to a jury not raised prior to the entry of the plea shall
deemed waived, and the North Carolina post-conviction statutes
state that any claim not raised in the original petition shall be deemed
waived.22 Since this does not meet the federal standard of waiver
of a constitutional protection, the federal district court was directed
to grant the requested writ.
The Supreme Court has made it clear that the doctrine of comity
is not going to prevent the federal courts from using the writ of
habeas corpus to protect the federal rights of state prisoners. Fed-
370 F.2d at 895.
"368 F.2d 313 (4th Cir. 1966).
" See, e.g., State v. Lowry, 263 N.C. 536, 139 S.E.2d 870 (1965) ; State
v. Wilson, 262 N.C. 419, 137 S.E.2d 109 (1964): State v. Inman, 260 N.C.311, 132 S.E.2d 613 (1963); State v. Covington, 258 N.C. 495, 128 S.E.2d
822 (1962).
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eral standards are to be applied in such areas as waiver, and state
procedural defaults will not bar later applications for federal habeas
corpus relief. There was much criticism of the Court from various
sources for these decisions. Justices Clark and Harlan wrote vigor-
ous dissenting opinions to Fay v. Noia, attacking the new federal
standards as abrupt departures from the Constitution and past de-
cisions.' There was a fear that the delicate balance between state
and federal courts would be destroyed,24 and that the federal courts
would be swamped with habeas corpus applications having an ad-
verse effect upon the disposition of meritorious applications.2 5
In Case v. Nebraska 0 the court attempted to answer some of its
critics by placing responsibility on the states to adopt broad post-
conviction relief statutes in order to minimize the necessity of state
prisoners resorting to federal habeas corpus. Justice Brennan in a
concurring opinion stated that:
Our federal system entrusts the states with primary responsibility
for the administration of their criminal laws. The Fourteenth
Amendment and Supremacy clause make requirements of fair
and just procedures an integral part of those laws, and state
procedures should ideally include adequate administration of
these guarantees as well. If, by effective corrective processes,
the States assumed this burden, the exhaustion requirement of
28 U.S.C. § 2254 (1958 ed.) would clearly promote state primacy
in the implementation of these guarantees. Of greater impor-
tance, it would assure not only that meritorious claims would
generally be vindicated without any need for federal courts inter-
vention, but that nonmeritorious claims would be fully ventilated,
making easier the task of the federal judge if the state prisoner
pursued his cause further .... Greater finality would inevitably
attach to state court determinations of federal constitutional ques-
tions, because further evidentiary hearings on federal habeas
corpus would, if conditions of Townsend v. Sain were met, prove
unnecessay 27
The Supreme Court has clearly put the states on notice that the
maintenance of the balance between state and federal court systems
22 372 U.S. at 445 (Clark, J., dissenting).
24 See, e.g., Desmond, Federal and State Habeas Corpus, 49 A.B.A.J.
1166 (1963).
-25372 U.S. at 445 (Clark, J., dissenting).
28381 U.S. 336 (1965) (per curiam with Clark, J. and Brennan, J. con-
curring in separate opinions).
"Id. at 345 (Brennan, J., concurring).
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is now in the hands of the states. The growing protections that the
Court's interpretation of the Constitution affords to state prisoners
demands that the states reform their systems in order to comply with
the federal standards. If the state systems are not reformed in such
areas as right to counsel, discrimination in jury selection and use of
coerced confessions there will be a continued friction between fed-
eral and state courts and an increasing flood of applications for
federal habeas corpus.'
Justice Clark in his concurring opinion in Case v. Nebraska,
cited North Carolina as one of the seven states to lead in providing
modern post-conviction relief procedure for testing federal claims
in the state courts.2' But North Carolina has failed to go far eonugh
in complying with federal standards.
The Supreme Court has indicated "that at some point in the
criminal process, a convicted person will get a full evidentiary hear-
ing on the merits of every federal right he asserts" and "if the
prisoner has had no adequate hearing in the state court he will surely
get one in the federal courts."3 Justice Brennan in Case v. Nebras-
ka31 suggested certain desirable attributes that a state post-convic-
tion procedure should have. He felt that "it should be sufficiently
comprehensive to embrace all federal constitutional claims" and "in
light of Fay v. Noia it should eschew rigid and technical doctrines
"6 Dean Griswold of Harvard Law School in an address, "The States and
Criminal Law," given on May 13, 1965, to the Cleveland Bar Association,
said:
For, after all, the basic responsibility for the enforcement of the
criminal law remains in the States. The States are, or should be, as
much concerned with high standards as is the Federal government.
The States should, in my view, welcome the determinations of the
Supreme Court that the high standards prescribed by our Federal
Constitution are to be taken seriously and should be enforced. What
is needed now is for the States to accept this responsibility and to
adopt means to carry it out. With proper explanation and under-
standing, this can, I believe, be done without impairing our enforce-
ment of the criminal law. When the States do fully meet this re-
sponsibility, we will all be better off, and we will more nearly have
realized the potentialities of our Great Federal Form of Government.
Case v. Nebraska, 381 U.S. 336, 344 n.7 (1965). See, e.g., Brennan, Some
Aspects of Federalism, 39 N.Y.U.L. Rnv. 945, 957-59 (1964).
20 381 U.S. at 340.
Meador, Accommodating State Crimitai Procedure and Federal Post-
conviction Reviews, 50 A.B.A.J. 928, 929 (1964). See White v. Swenson,
261 F. Supp. 42 (W.D. Mo. 1966).J1381 U.S. 336 (1965).
of forfeiture, waiver, or default. '82 Professor Meador of the Uni-
versity of Virginia Law School has stated:
The federal habeas corpus judge will not now be foreclosed by
a state procedural waiver. The federal judge will examine the
alleged waiver himself and will give it effect only if it amounts
to a deliberate by-passing of state procedure, as explained by
Noia. This means that if the states hope to terminate a substan-
tial portion of their criminal business in their own courts, the
states may not invoke any doctrine of waiver more stringent than
this federal concept. The Noia definition of an effective waiver
promises to pose one of the most troublesome aspects of Supreme
Court trilogy. Whatever, we think of it, however, we should
understand its consequences and make decisions about state pro-
cedure accordingly.83
North Carolina deserves praise in its liberal post-conviction hear-
ing statute, but the Stem and McNeil cases have shown that the
federal courts will not be bound by the statute's language concern-
ing waiver.8 4 Counsel from the North Carolina Attorney General's
office stated in both cases that in spite of the language of the post-
conviction statute, North Carolina courts would hear subsequent peti-
tions raising issues available at the time a previous petition was
filed. 5 But the court of appeals felt bound by the stated language
of the statute.30 North Carolina in order to bring its statute in line
with actual state practice and federal standards, should amend N.C.
GEN. STAT. § 15-218 (Supp. 1965) to allow subsequent petitions
for post-conviction hearings dealing with claimed denials of consti-
tutional rights that have not been knowingly and deliberately waived
by the petitioner, and that have not previously been heard on the
merits. In other words, North Carolina should adopt the federal
standard of waiver in the post-conviction relief statute. This would
add finally to North Carolina state court litigation by allowing the
North Carolina courts to make final dispositions of a larger propor-
tion of its criminal cases and eliminate for the federal courts a
potential burden of serious proportions.
GEORGE V. HANNA III
"
2Id. at 346-47.
" Meador, 50 A.B.A.J. 928, 929-30 (1964).
" See note 9 supra and accompanying text.
" Stem v. Turner, 370 F.2d 895, 897 (4th Cir. 1966). McNeil v. North
Carolina, 368 F.2d 313, 316 (4th Cir. 1966).
30 370 F.2d at 897.
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Insurance-Subrogation-Settlement Between Insured and
Tortfeasor
In Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Canada Dry Bottling Co.' the
North Carolina Supreme Court was faced with the question of sub-
rogation rights of an insurer. The insured's automobile was damaged
by the agent of the defendant. The insurer and the insured agreed
that the automobile had been damaged in an amount evaluated at
$489.14. Fifty dollars was deducted as provided by the policy, and
the insurer paid the insured $439.14. The insured instigated an
action for property damages (no personal injury was involved)
against the defendant for $1,300. The defendant moved that the
insurer be made a party to the action, but upon the insured's objec-
tion, the court denied the motion. The insurer was said to have
"acquiesced" in the denial of the motion. A settlement was made
between the insured and the defendant for $400 that was embodied
in a consent judgment containing a release of all claims against the
defendant. Having become by virtue of its payment to the insured
partially subrogated to the claim against the defendant, the insurer
brought action against the defendant for recovery of the $439.14.
In the present action, the Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's
striking of the defendant's pleading of the release as a defense, in-
dicating that a tortfeasor cannot defeat subrogation rights of an
insurer by procuring a release from the insured, where the tortfeasor
had knowledge of the insurer's payment to the insured.
While this general proposition is rather clear,2 other aspects of
the case and the events going before it present questions.
In the action by the insured against the defendant the latter's
motion to have the insurer joined was denied. This ruling was not
appealed, so was not before the Court in the instant case. But it
remains relevant. As in the federal courts3 and most other state
-268 N.C. 503, 151 S.E.2d 14 (1966).
'Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Spivey, 259 N.C. 732, 131 S.E.2d 338
(1963); Phillips v. Alston, 257 N.C. 255; 125 S.E.2d 580 (1962); Powell &
Powell v. Wake Water Co., 171 N.C. 290, 88 S.E. 426 (1916).
Vance agrees with this rule and also indicates that the tortfeasor, who
in good faith and without knowledge of payment by insurer settles with
insured, may set this up as bar to insurer's subrogation action. VANCE, THE
LAW OF INSURANcE, 794 (3d ed. 1951).
'FEu. R. Civ. P., 17(a).
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jurisdictions, 4 the North Carolina statute5 requires that an action
be brought by, or in the name of, the real party in interest. Where
insured property is damaged, the owner of the property has a single
and indivisible cause of action against the tortfeasor for the total
amount of the loss.6 In most courts if the insurer has fully indemni-
fied the insured for his loss, the insurer must bring the subrogation
suit in its own name, since it is entitled to all fruits of the action
and is considered to be the real party in interest.7 But where the
insurer pays only a part of the loss, the insured and the insurer both
own portions of the substantive right against the tortfeasor. In this
situation the insured generally is a necessary party in any suit against
the tortfeasor and is the only plaintiff who may sue alone for the
entire claim. When he sues alone he holds the proceeds of judgment
as trustee for the insurer to the extent payment was made by the
latter.' This is an aspect of the rule against splitting a single cause
of action and is designed to prevent the tortfeasor from having to
defend two actions for the same wrong.9 But as to the status of the
insurer as a party in this partial subrogation situation, the courts
differ. North Carolina cases have held that the trial court has dis-
cretion to join the insurer as a proper party. ° On the other hand
" CLARx, THE LAW OF CODE PLEADING 155 (2d ed. 1947).5N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-57 (1953).
' Service Fire Ins. Co. v. Horton Motor Lines, 225 N.C. 588, 35 S.E.2d
879 (1945); Underwood v. Dooley, 197 N.C. 100, 147 S.E. 686, 64 A.L.R.656 (1929); Powell & Powell v. Wake Water Co., 171 N.C. 290, 88 S.E.
426 (1916).
'Service Fire Ins. Co. v. Horton Motor Lines, 225 N.C. 588, 35 S.E.2d
879 (1945); Underwood v. Dooley, 197 N.C. 100, 147 S.E. 686 (1929);
Fireman's Fund Ins. Co. v. Rowland Lumber Co., 186 N.C. 269, 119 S.E.
362 (1923); Powell & Powell v. Wake Water Co., 171 N.C. 290, 88 S.E.
426 (1916); Cunningham v. Seaboard Air Line Ry., 139 N.C. 427, 51 S.E.
1029 (1905); Harnburg-Bremen Fire Ins. Co. v. Atlantic Coast Line Ry.,
132 N.C. 75, 43 S.E. 548 (1903). VANCE, THaE LAW OF INSURANCE § 134
(3d ed. 1951).8 Lumberman's Mut. Ins. Co. v. Southern R.R., 179 N.C. 255, 102 S.E.
417 (1920); Powell & Powell v. Wake Water Co., 171 N.C. 290, 88 S.E.426 (1916); Fidelity Ins. Co. v. Atlantic Coast Line Ry., 165 N.C. 136,
80 S.E. 1069 (1914).
There might be a question as to whether the insurer has completely paid
for the loss when the exact amount of the loss has not been determined.
It seems that defendant-tortfeasor is entitled to have this question put in
issue. Therefore, when the insured sues, the defendant may plead in de-
fense that there has been complete payoff, so that the insured is not the
real party in interest. Jewell v. Price, 259 N.C. 345, 130 S.E.2d 668 (1963);
Smith v. Pate, 246 N.C. 63, 97 S.E.2d 457 (1957).
9 Ibid.
" Jackson v. Baggett, 237 N.C. 554, 75 S.E.2d 532 (1953); Burgess v.
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the federal courts generally hold that the insurer is a necessary
party, and even though the insured is allowed to sue alone in its own
name, if the defendant-tortfeasor objects, the insurer must be made
a party.1' But in any event the cause of action remains in this situa-
tion single and indivisible.
The defendant here argued before the present court that its in-
tention and that of the insured was that the settlement was to be of
the entire claim, so that anything that should go to the insurer is
being held by the insured, and the insurer's action should be against
the insured. But this argument proved to be unsupportable when
confronted with the cases clearly holding that the insurer's subroga-
tion rights cannot be defeated by settlement and release.12 Thus,
defendant could be said to have waived any policy in his favor de-
riving from the real party in interest and indivisible cause of action
rules (viz. not having to defend two lawsuits) and has effectively
split an initially single cause of action,'8 so that now the way is
open to the insurer to bring his subrogation action. Had the defen-
dant allowed insured's action to go to final judgment, no suit would
have been maintainable by the insurer. The insured would have
been trustee for insurer's share."4
There are at least two asserted reasons why either the insurer is
not considered to be a necessary party or joinder is denied where it
is deemed a proper party. One is that the right of subrogation is
equitable, and therefore the legal rights of the subrogor against third
persons are unaffected by the subrogation."8 However, once subro-
Trevatham, 236 N.C. 157, 72 S.E.2d 231 (1952). See N.C. GEN. STAT.§ 1-68 (1953), which provides that, "All persons having an interest in the
subject of the action and in obtaining the relief demanded may be joined as
plaintiffs .... ; and N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-69 (1953), which provides that,
"All persons may be made defendants, . . . who have, or claim, an interest
in the controversy adverse to the plaintiff, or who are necessary parties to
a complete determination of the questions involved.' See Note, 31 N.C.L.
REv. 224 (1953).
1 See Kansas Elec. Power Co. v. Jarvis, 194 F.2d 942 (10th Cir. 1952);
Virginia Elec. & Power Co. v. Carolina Peanut Co., 186 F.2d 816 (4th Cir.
1951); Gas Serv. Co. v. Hunt, 183 F.2d 417 (10th Cir. 1950); National
Garment Co. v. N.Y., C. & St. L. Ry., 173 F.2d 32 (8th Cir. 1949). Contra,
Braniff Airways, Inc. v. Falkingham, 20 F.R.D. 141 (D. Minn. 1957).
"2 See note 2 supra.
"
2E.g., Powell & Powell v. Wake Water Co., 171 N.C. 290, 88 S.E. 426
(1916), where the court indicated that while the cause of action was indi-
visible, it had been divided by the act of the parties.
:' See note 8 mpra.1 2Illinois Cent. Ry. v. Hicklin, 131 Ky. 624, 115 S.W. 752 (1909). But
cf., Louisville & N.R.R. v. Mack Mfg. Corp., 269 S.W.2d 707 (Ky. 1954).
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gation is established, the subrogee's right to pursue the one liable
to the insured assumes the nature of the insured's rights, which are
legal in the typical case of a tortfeasor who has damaged the prop-
erty of the insured.1" Moreover, in the case where full payment for
the loss is made and subrogation is total, the subrogee alone must
bring the action. 7 Therefore, the insured's rights are affected, and
to say that the equitable nature of the subrogee's rights determines
his status as a party is not true. The second reason is a desire to
avoid jury prejudice arising from the knowledge that the injured
party's loss is covered by insurance."' While this is often perhaps a
realistic argument, much of its force is lost when, as in North Caro-
lina, juries know that insurance is a requirement for vehicle registra-
tion and that consequently the defendant is (or should be) insured
also. The effect of the denial of the defendant's request that the
insurer be joined is to make it impossible for him to settle the entire
claim by settlement with the sole plaintiff the court has allowed
against him. So, if the policy operating here is to protect the insurer
for the above reasons, it is at least debatable whether they carry
enough force to outweigh the desirability of the defendant's being
able to bring the insurer into the action and settle the whole claim.
A complete settlement, of course, could be made without the insurer
in court, but the prospect is not good. As matters now stand, if
defendant is liable, the insurer is virtually assured of recovering the
full amount of its payment, so there is really no reason for it to
settle. But were the insurer brought into court in the original ac-
tion it might find it more desirable to negotiate.
See Hume v. McGinnis, 156 Kan. 300, 133 P.2d 162 (1943), overruled in
Ellis Canning Co. v. International Harvester Co., 174 Kan. 357, 255 P.2d
658 (1953); Atkinson, The Real Party in Interest Rule: A Plea for its
Abolition, 32 N.Y.U.L. Rav. 926, 942 (1957).
" United States Cas. Co. v. Anderson Elec. Car Co., 171 App. Div. 543,
157 N.Y. Supp. 710 (1st Dep't 1916). Atkinson, The Real Party in Interest
Rule: A Plea for its Abolition, 32 N.Y.U.L. REv. 926, 942 (1957).
17 See note 7 supra.
"At least one writer feels this is not a legitimate consideration:
This problem is not met by the courts, and correctly so. The prob-
lem is not to change the application of the law, but to defeat the
prejudice, if one does exist. There are at least two ways to defeat
this prejudice. One is a procedural method to be used to keep the jury
from knowing an insurance company is involved in the litigation (re-
ferring to payment by the company in the form of a loan receipt),
the other is through education of the public in the ideals of justice so
they are not prejudiced when they sit as jurors.
Kessner, Federal Court Interpretations of the Real Party in Interest Rule
in Cases of Subrogation, 39 NEB. L. REv. 452, 462-463 (1960).
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In the federal courts the insurer may be brought in on defen-
dant's motion, so the settlement problem does not arise. Some well
considered cases by other state courts hold that both the insured
and the insurer should be required to join. 9 Even if the North
Carolina notion be retained that the insurer is only a proper party,
there are strong judicial recommendations that it be joined since it
has an ascertainable interest in the subject matter of the contro-
versy.20 In the present situation, where the defendant who wants to
try to settle fails in his effort to have the insurer brought in, he and
the courts are faced with another lawsuit by the insurer.
Another problem with the rule as it stands is that the defendant
risks double payment when he settles. In the instant case the Court
"noted" that the insured's action against the defendant was for
damages in the amount of $1,300,21 but did not discuss the signifi-
cance of this fact. Of course, at the present stage of the proceedings
the full amount of damages has not been determined. The insurer
is asking for the $439.14 it paid to its insured. If the actual damage
is determined to be greater, this figure will still be the limit of the
insurer's recovery, because it had subrogation rights to no more.
There is, of course, no further liability to the insured because of
the release. But if damages are ascertained to be somewhat close to
$400,22 it would appear that the defendant is perhaps going to have
to pay twice-that is, he has already paid $400 for the release, and,
if unsuccessful in the present action, will have to pay the insurer
$439.14 more. Are there procedures available so that he might avoid
this ?
"o Louisville & N.R.R. v. Mack Mfg. Corp., 269 S.W.2d 707 (Ky. 1954);
Pratt v. Radford, 52 Wis. 114, 8 N.W. 606 (1881). See Porter v. Lane
Constr. Corp., 212 App. Div. 528, 209 N.Y. Supp. 54 (4th Dep't 1925),
aff'd mere., 244 N.Y. 523, 155 N.E. 881 (1926).
"Justice Ervin, in Burgess v. Trevatham, 236 N.C. 157, 72 S.E.2d 231
(1952), cites Service Fire Ins. Co. v. Horton Motor Lines, Inc., 225 N.C.
588, 35 S.E.2d 879 (1945) and Lumberman's Mut. Ins. Co. v. Southern
R.R., 179 N.C. 255, 102 S.E. 417 (1920) as sanctioning Professor McIn-
tosh's statement that "[T]here would seem to be no valid objection to join-
ing the insured and the insurer as parties under the general provision for thejoinder of parties, so that all parties interested could be before the court. .. ."
MCINTOsH, NoRTH CAROLINA PRACTICE & PROCEDURE IN CIVIL CAsEs 203
(1929). See Equitable Life Assur. Soc'y v. Basnight, 234 N.C. 347, 67
S.E.2d 390 (1951).
"Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Canada Dry Bottling Co., 268 N.C. 503,
506, 151 S.E.2d 14, 16 (1966).
" That the insurer and the insured agreed that damages sustained were
$489.14 would indicate that the amount probably will be rather close.
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Where the insurer pays the full amount of the loss to its insured,
it is the real party in interest. But the first action having terminated
with the settlement and before damages were assessed, it was not
known whether the insurer had fully indemnified the insured. If it
now appears that the $439.14 covers the entire damages, and the
insurer should have been the real party in interest, the defendant
could argue that it would be inequitable for the insured to retain
the settlement money where it was not the proper party in the suit.
The countervailing argument is that the defendant has waited too
long to raise the issue and will be estopped to allege at this point
that the party he settled with was not the real party in interest.
23
The more serious difficulty is that the insured is not in the present
suit; and, as discussed below, it seems unlikely that the defendant
join the insured in order to make the argument.
It would seem that the general principles of indemnity24 would
require that the defendant not be subjected to this possible double
payment. If the insured has been fully indemnified by the payment
from its insurer, and is allowed to keep the settlement money, there
would appear to be an inequity. Balance could be restored by requir-
ing the insured to return to the insurer all above the amount re-
quired to compensate him for his loss. But it is difficult to see how
the defendant can effect this result. While there are many cases
which allow the insurer to obtain reimbursement of money obtained
by its insured who settles with the tortfeasor, they depend upon
the insured having by such settlement cut off the insurer's rights to
"_Authority for this argument might be found in the court's statement
in Phillips v. Alston, 257 N.C. 255, 259, 125 S.E.2d 580, 583 (1962):
While a tortfeasor is entitled to have the total damages ascertained
in one action, he cannot, when he has knowledge of insurer's rights
by virtue of its payment to the owner, defeat those rights by making
payment to and taking a full release from the owner. The payment
so made and release taken will be construed as a mere adjustment of
the uncompensated portion of the loss. (Italics added.)
It appears from this that the court would not allow the defendant to settle
before putting in issue whether there has been full payment by insured, and
then later maintain that there had indeed been full payment.
2 Vance says that:
the basis of the contract of insurance on property is indemnity. In-
demnity is its sole legitimate purpose, and any contract that con-
templates a possible gain to the insured by the happening of the
event upon which the liability of the insurer becomes fixed is contrary
to the proper nature of insurance, and, in the absence of statute, will
not be allowed.
VANCE, THE LAW OF INSURANCE 101 (3d ed. 1951).
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go against the tortfeasor 5 But in this case the insurer's subroga-
tion rights were not destroyed, making it doubtful that such a re-
imbursement possibility is open. Moreover, the insurer has not
chosen to proceed for reimbursement but has brought an action
against the defendant. The question then becomes whether, if reim-
bursement is possible, the defendant can have the insured joined as
a party. While there are some possible analogous decisions,2" they
are not really very closely related and the prospect seems doubtful.
Unless it was fairly evident that damages were going to run to
a significantly larger figure, the defendant, who paid for a settle-
ment with the insured and still faces a subrogation action by the
insurer, has made a rather bad bargain. The danger of such a bar-
gain could be avoided, and just settlement encouraged, if procedural
devices were available to require that all parties needed for final and
complete settlement could be joined in the suit.
ROBERT L. THOMPSON
Jury--Allowing Challenge for Cause to a Prospective Juror
Opposed to Capital Punishment
In State v. Childs1 defendant was found guilty of rape and
burglary in the first degree and sentenced to death. Appeal was
made on the ground inter alia that the trial judge erred in granting
the State's challenges for cause to prospective jurors on the ground
that they had conscientious scruples against the infliction of the
' See cases collected in 29A Am. JUR. INSURANCE § 1736 (1960).
"One sued by subrogated insurer for having destroyed the property
may require all other insurance companies participating in paying the loss
to be made parties to the action. Powell & Powell v. Wake Water Co., 171
N.C. 290, 88 S.E. 426 (1916). While a fire insurance company, which pays
a loss, is proportionately subrogated to the insurer's right of action against
the tortfeasor, the insurer must work out his remedy through the insured,
so, where several insurance companies each paid part of a loss, it was proper,
where separate actions by the several insurance companies were consolidated,
to make the insured a party. Lumberman's Mut. Ins. Co. v. Southern R.R.,
179 N.C. 255, 102 S.E. 417 (1920). See United States v. Aetna Cas. &
Sur. Co., 338 U.S. 366 (1949) where the Court held that where an insurer
has become partially subrogated to the rights of an insured under the Fed-
eral Tort Claims Act, both are "necessary parties" but not "indispensible
parties" and either party may sue, although in such case the United States
upon timely motion may compel their joinder.
1269 N.C. 307, 152 S.E.2d 453 (1967).
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death penalty. The North Carolina Supreme Court found no error.
It said:
It is a general rule that the State in the trial of crimes punishable
by death has the right to an impartial jury, and in order to secure
it, has the right to challenge for cause any prospective juror who
is shown to entertain beliefs regarding capital punishment which
would be calculated to prevent him from joining in any verdict
carrying the death penalty.2
The practice of excusing, on a challenge for cause, any pro-
spective juror who is opposed to capital punishment is followed in
the federal courts' and in the majority of state courts by either
statute4 or judicial decision.5 This practice originated at a time
when conviction of a capital crime meant a compulsory death sen-
tence,' and the theory behind the practice is obvious. In a case
where a finding of guilty would automatically mean the death penal-
ty, a juror opposed to capital punishment would never vote in favor
of the defendant's guilt, thus prejudicing the prosecution.
Today most states, including North Carolina, have abolished the
mandatory death penalty.' Statutes in those states now give the jury
discretion as to the punishment to be imposed.' Under such statutes
the jury first decides whether the defendant is guilty or innocent of
2 Id. at 317-18, 152 S.E.2d at 461.
'Turberville v. United States, 303 F.2d 411 (D.C. Cir. 1962), cert. de-
nied, 370 U.S. 946 (1962).
' E.g., CAL. PEN. CODE § 1074: "A challenge for implied bias may be
taken for all or any of the following causes and no other... 8. If the offense
charged by punishable with death, the entertaining of such conscientious
opinions as would preclude his finding the defendant guilty; in which case
he must neither be permitted nor compelled to serve as a juror."
State v. Childs, 269 N.C. 307, 152 S.E.2d 453 (1967). See Annot., 48
A.L.R.2d 560 (1956).
'E.g., State v. Vann, 162 N.C. 534, 77 S.E. 295 (1913).
"See Knowlton, Problems of Jury Discretion in Capital Cases, 101 U.
PA. L. Rxv. 1099 (1953).8 In North Carolina the death penalty may be imposed for murder in
the first degree, N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-17 (1953); rape, N.C. GEN. STAT.
§ 14-21 (1953); burglary in the first degree, N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-52
(1953); and arson, N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-58 (1953). In each of these
statutes is the following provision: "Provided, if at the time of rendering
its verdict [of guilty of a capital crime] in open court, the jury shall so
recommend, the punishment shall be imprisonment for life in the State's pri-
son, and the court shall so instruct the jury." This provision gives thejury "an unbridled discretionary right" to recommend that punishment for
the crime shall be imprisonment for life in lieu of death in all cases where
a verdict of guilty of a capital crime has been reached. State v. McMillan,
233 N.C. 630, 633, 65 S.E.2d 212, 213 (1951).
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the crime charged. If guilty, the jury then decides what the punish-
ment shall be-the death penalty or life imprisonment. Since the
death penalty is no longer automatically imposed by the jury upon a
finding of guilty, can it still be said that a juror opposed to capital
punishment may be prevented by that opposition from joining a
verdict of guilty? The courts of two states have said not.
In State v. Lee9 the Iowa Supreme Court held it error to allow
a challenge for cause to a prospective juror who was opposed to
capital junishment. The court said:
It cannot be said that the state is entitled to have the punishment
by death inflicted in any case. The statute authorizes that pun-
ishment, in the discretion of the jury, . . . but the state has no
right to a trial by jurors who have no objection against inflicting
the death penalty, except as it can secure them by challenging
peremptorially those who have such objections.'
In State v. Garrington" the South Dakota Supreme Court, in up-
holding the trial judge's refusal to allow challenge for cause on these
grounds, agreed that under a statute mandatorially imposing the
death penalty upon a finding of guilty, a juror opposed to capital
punishment would not find the defendant guilty. But where the jury
has discretion as to punishment "the entertaining of such opinions
does not have that effect, and is not a cause for challenge."' 2
There is a further challenging theory supporting the proposition
that persons opposed to capital punishment should not be excluded
from juries in capital cases. Basically it is that a jury from which
such persons have been excluded "will necessarily have been culled
of the most humane of its prospective members"' 3 and will contain
members who, consciously or unconsciously, will be more prone to
convict, and tend to find a particular defendant guilty on less evi-
dence than would a jury from which persons opposed to capital
punishment were not excluded.' 4 Professor Walter E. Oberer 5
proposes the argument thusly:
'91 Iowa 499, 60 N.W. 119 (1894).
"Id. at 502, 60 N.W. at 121.
' 11 S.D. 178, 76 N.W. 326 (1898).1 Id. at 184, 76 N.W. at 327.
Oberer, Does Disqualification of Jurors for Scruples Against Capital
Punishinent Constitute Denial of Fair Trial Ot Issue of Guilt?, 39 TEXAS
L. REV. 545, 549 (1961). [Hereinafter cited as Oberer]
" This theory is pointedly supported in AnoRNo, FRENKEL-BRUNSWIK,
LEVINSON, & SANFORD, THE AUTHORITARIAN PERSONALITY (1950). [Here-
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(1) Under modern statutes the guilt issue has been separated
from the punishment issue. (2) The necessity which justified
death-qualification under the old mandatory, one-issue statutes no
longer obtains. (3) A jury qualified to the prosecution's satis-
faction on the punishment issue is correspondingly disqualified
from the defendant's standpoint on the guilt issue. (4) The logi-
cal consequence is that when the same jury decides both issues,
the defendant is denied due process of law through having forced
upon him a partial jury on the most critical issue in the case--
that of guilt or innocence.1 6
Persons opposed to capital punishment form a sizeable and defi-
nite class in our society, and those in favor of capital punishment
are actually in a minority.17 Of the people in favor of capital punish-
ment, many do not like the idea of having anything to do with it
themselves."8 Can it be said then that a jury composed of such a
class of persons, who are in a minority in our society and who may
tend to more quickly find a criminal defendant guilty on less evi-
inafter cited as ADoIxo]. This book, a study on prejudice, includes data
indicating that there are persons possessing certain personality traits in
varying degrees. Among these traits are certain attitudes toward people.
On one end of the scale are persons with attitudes such as moralistic con-
demnation of other people, the tendency to blame other people rather than
oneself, general suspiciousness and distrust of others, orientation towards
persons in positions of power and authority, and an exploitive-manipulative-
opportunistic attitude. The persons on this end of the scale will externalize
and project their hostile feelings by conceiving of others as threatening and
dangerous. On the other end of the scale are persons who feel permissive
toward other people, who tend to refrain from blaming others, who feel
trustingness and openess and see people as essentially "good" until proved
otherwise, who conceive of the environment as congenial rather than dan-
gerous, and who tend persistently to strive for realization of productive
social values. Between these two extremes lie the greater percentage of
people possessing these traits in different degrees. Id. at 405-15.
See also WEIHOFEN, THE URGE TO PUNISH (1956).
In Turberville v. United States, 303 F.2d 411, 420 (D.C. Cir. 1962),
cert. denied, 370 U.S. 946 (1962), the court noted that there was a "thesis
in this area of the law . . . that persons who are not opposed to capital
punishment are psychologically inclined against criminals and therefore a
jury composed of such persons is not an impartial jury." This thesis was
rejected by the court without extensive consideration.
" See note 13 mipra.
" Oberer 555.
" A recent poll indicated that forty-three percent of the people in the
United States are opposed to capital punishment for persons convicted of
murder; this figure rose from twenty-five per cent in 1953. Twelve per
cent of the people have no opinion. This left forty-five per cent in favor of
capital punishment for persons convicted of murder. Press release by the
Gallup Institute dated February 5, 1965 on file in Wilson Library at Uni-
versity of North Carolina at Chapel Hill.
2
18 WEIHOFEN, THE URGE TO PUNIsH, 168 (1956).
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dence, does not deprive that defendant of due process of law? In
two recent cases attention has been focused on the constitutional
aspects of the problems of exclusion from juries of members of
definite and sizeable classes in society.
In Labat v. Bennett"9 the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Cir-
cuit held inter alia that systematic total exclusion of daily wage
earners as a class violated the criminal defendant's due process and
equal protection rights to an impartial jury representing a cross-
section of the community. °
In a different context is Schowgurow v. State."' There the
Maryland Court of Appeals held that the provisions "of the Mary-
land Constitution requiring demonstrations of belief in God as a
qualification for service as a grand or petit juror are in violation of
the Fourteenth Amendment, and that any requirement of an oath
as to such belief, or inquiry of prospective jurors, oral or written,
as to whether they believe in a Supreme Being is unconstitution-
al.",
22
These cases indicate that when a state systematically and totally
excludes from the jury a sizeable and clearly defined class of per-
sons, such as those opposed to capital punishment, a criminal defen-
dant is denied a jury drawn from a cross-section of society and
his constitutional rights have thus been invaded.
" 365 F.2d 698 (5th Cir. 1966), petition for cert. denied, 35 U.S.L. WEEK
3272 (U.S. Jan. 10, 1967) (No. 956).
" In Labat the court relied upon the words of the United States Supreme
Court in Thiel v. Southern Pacific Co., 328 U.S. 217 (1946); Glasser v.
United States, 315 U.S. 60 (1942); and Smith v. Texas, 311 U.S. 128
(1940). The court in Smith said, "It is part of the established tradition in
the use of juries as instruments of public justice that the jury be a body truly
representative of the community." 311 U.S. at 130. In Glasser it was pointed
out that "the proper functioning of the jury system, and, indeed our de-
mocracy itself, requires that the jury be a 'body truly representative of the
community,' and not the organ of any special group or class." 315 U.S. at
86.
In Fay v. New York, 332 U.S. 261 (1947), the Court rejected a con-
stitutional challenge to purported exclusion from juries, by the state of New
York, of working class people in order to form a "blue-ribbon" jury. How-
ever, it should be noted that the Court accepted the proposition that a jury
should represent a cross-section of the community, and based its opinion
heavily upon the lack of evidence that any "person was excluded because
of his occupation or economic status." Id. at 291. Further, in Theil the
Court stated that exclusion of daily wage earners "cannot be justified by
federal or state law," although it rested its decision that daily wage earners
cannot be excluded from federal juries upon its supervisory powers. 328
U.S. at 222.
21 240 Md. 121, 213 A.2d 475 (1965).
"Id. at 131, 213 A.2d at 482.
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A questionable point in the argument against excluding those
opposed to capital punishment is that if the jurisdiction requires
that the jury be unanimous in its decision on punishment, whether
it be death or life imprisonment, as well as guilt, then one juror
opposed to capital punishment could prevent a unanimous vote for
the death penalty. Among the states that have considered the partic-
ular question, there is a split of authority.23 Some states require
unanimity on both guilt and punishment." Others hold that if the
verdict is guilty of the capital crime and the jury does not vote
unanimously to recommend life imprisonment, the death penalty
will automatically be imposed; so there does not have to be a un-
animous vote in order to impose the death penalty.2 5
No case has been found in which the North Carolina Supreme
Court has been faced with this question. The North Carolina
statutes provide that certain crimes "shall be punished with death:
Provided, if at the time of rendering its verdict in open court, the
jury shall so recommend, the punishment shall be imprisonment for
life .... 26 From this wording it would appear that if the jury did
not unanimously so recommend, the death penalty would be im-
posed. If this interpretation were placed upon the statute by the
court, then some jury members opposed to capital punishment could
not prevent imposition of the death penalty. If the position taken
was that the jury must be unanimous as to which penalty is to be
imposed, then one juror could prevent the death penalty from being
imposed. However, it is suggested that in this situation it should
be possible to have a bifurcated trial. In the first stage, a jury from
which no one opposed to capital punishment was excluded would
consider the defendant's guilt or innocence. If the defendant is
found guilty, the trial would move into the second stage with a
jury from which everyone opposed to capital punishment was ex-
cluded. This jury would consider the punishment to be imposed.
Admittedly, this process would require more time and be more ex-
pensive to the state. However in this way the defendant's interest in
2 3Amnot., 1 A.L.R.3d 1461 (1965); Annot., 92 L. Ed. 2d 1072 (1948);
Knowlton, Problems of Jury Discretion in Capital Cases, 101 U. PA. L.
Rnv. 1099, 1125 (1953).
" E.g., State v. Reynolds, 41 N.J. 163, 195 A.2d 449 (1963), cert. denied,
377 U.S. 1000 (1964).
"
5E.g., Commonwealth v. McNeil, 328 Mass. 436, 104 N.E.2d 153 (1952).
"6 N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 14-17, 21, 52, 58 (1953).
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an impartial jury on the question of his guilt, as well as the prose-
cution's interest in an impartial jury on the question of punishment,
would be protected. Certainly the desire to see that a criminal de-
fendant, who may lose his life, gets a decision as to his guilt by a
fair and impartial jury outweighs considerations of the time and
cost of this procedure.17
The courts and legislatures must face the realization that exclu-
sion from the jury of persons opposed to capital punishment con-
tinues as a vestige of an ancient rule of law that had its origin
under the now non-existant mandatory death penalty statutes. They
should be made aware of the psychological data indicating that a jury
from which this large segment of society has been excluded may
result in prejudice to the defendant on the question of his guilt.
Decisions must be made on whether the present practice is to con-
tinue, and, if so, what interest society has in its continuation. Hope-
fully, the constitutional implications of this practice will lead to
judicial decisions or legislation to the effect that these persons should
no longer be excluded from the jury in capital cases. If the present
27 The necessity of bifurcated trials has been recognized by other courts.
In Holmes v. United States, 363 F.2d 281 (D.C. Cir. 1966) the court noted
the prejudicial effect of pleading the defense of insanity and the defense of
not guilty before the same jury and stated that the trial judge could impanel
a second jury to hear evidence on the insanity issue, after the first jury
had considered the issue of guilt, "if this appears necessary to eliminate
prejudice." Id. at 283.
Another example is the situation in which the jury determines the volun-
tariness of a criminal defendant's confession, and then, upon a finding that
it was involuntary and excludable, proceeds to determine the defendant's
guilt. The United States Supreme Court in Jackson v. Denno, 278 U.S.
368 (1964) found this practice unconstitutional and held that the same jury
should not decide both issues.
Examples of statutory provisions for bifurcated trials can be seen in
California, CAL. PEN. CODE § 190.1, and in New York, N.Y. PEN. LAw
§ 1045-a. Under these statutes the trial court may for good cause discharge
the jury that decided the guilt question in a capital case, and impanel a new
one to decide the question of punishment; other wise the same jury will
decide both issues. It should be noted that the Supreme Court of California
recently rejected, with little discussion, the contention of a criminal defen-
dant that since the trial court could discharge the jury deciding the guilt
issue in a capital case, there was no reason for the judge to sustain chal-
lenges for cause to prospective jurors who indicated that they could not
vote for the death penalty. The court read into the statute a "legislative
directive" that "whenever possible the same jury shall serve at both phases
of the trial by reasons of continuity and economy of effort." People v.
Smith, 63 C.2d 779, -, 48 Cal. Rptr. 382, 389, 409 P.2d 222, 229 (1966).
For a discussion of the right to a bifurcated trial in general, see 45
N.C.L. REv. 541 (1967).
DUTY OF FAIR REPRESENTATION
practice continues the bifurcated trial process could be utilized to
avoid the unfairness of the present situation.
PENDER R. MCELROY
Labor Law-Breach of the Duty of Fair Representation
as an Unfair Labor Practice
Since 1962 the National Labor Relations Board has held that
the failure of a union to represent its members fairly is an unfair
labor practice.' The NLRB has used Sections 8(b) (A),2 8(b)2 3
and 8(b) 34 of the National Labor Relations Act to reach this result.
'Miranda Fuel Co., 140 N.L.R.B. 181 (1962), enforcement denied, 326
F.2d 172 (2d Cir. 1963). See e.g., Local 12, United Rubber Workers, 150
N.L.R.B. 312 (1964); Automobile Workers Union, 149 N.L.R.B. 482
(1964); Local 1367, Int'l Longshoremen's Ass'n, 148 N.L.R.B. 897 (1964);
Independent Metal Workers Union, 147 N.L.R.B. 1573 (1964).
'Section 8(b) 1 provides in part that it shall be an unfair labor practice
for a union or its agents "to restrain or coerce (A) employees in the ex-
ercise of the rights guaranteed in section 7: Provided, That this paragraph
shall not impair the right of a labor organization to prescribe its own rules
with respect to the acquisition or retention of membership therein. .. "
Labor Management Relations Act (Taft-Hartley Act), 61 Stat. 140 (1947),
29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(1) (1964).
Section 7 provides "Employees shall have the right to self-organization,
to form, join, or assist labor organizations, to bargain collectively through
representatives of their own choosing, and to engage in other concerted
activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or
protection, and shall also have the right to refrain from any or all of such
activities. . . ." 61 Stat. 140 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1964).
' Section 8(b)2 provides in part that it shall be an unfair labor practice
for a union or its agents "to cause or attempt to cause an employer to dis-
criminate against an employee in violation of subsection (a) (3) or to dis-
criminate against an employee with respect to whom membership in such
organization has been denied or terminated on some ground other than his
failure to tender the periodic dues and the initiation fees uniformly required
as a condition of acquiring or retaining membership. . . .' 61 Stat. 141
(1947), 29 U.S.C. § 158(b) (2) (1964).
Section 8(a)3 provides that it shall be an unfair labor practice for an
employer "by discrimination in regard to hire or tenure of employment or
any term or condition of employment to encourage or discourage member-
ship in any labor organization ... " 61 Stat 140 (1957), 29 U.S.C.
§ 158(a)(3) (1964).
'Section 8(b)3 provides that it shall be an unfair labor practice for a
union or its agents "to refuse to bargain collectively with an employer,
provided it is the representative of his employees subject to the provisions
ship in any labor organization. . . ." 61 Stat. 140 (1947), 29 U.S.C.
§ 158(b) (3) (1964).
Section 8(d) provides in part "to bargain collectively is the performance
of the mutual obligation of the employer and the representative of the em-
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Until recently appellate review of these opinions has been limited to
one inconclusive case.5 Now the Court of Appeals for the Fifth
Circuit, in a landmark decision, has approved the Board's use of
Section 8(b) (1) (A) to reach unfair representation by unions, leav-
ing unanswered the question of whether or not the Board's reliance
on Section 8(b)2 and 8(b)3 was proper.
In Local 12, United Rubber Workers v. NLRB' the local union
had refused to process the grievances of eight Negro members con-
cerning discrimination in employment. The Negroes complained that
racially separate plant facilities were maintained. Further, they com-
plained that separate seniority rolls for white male, Negro male, and
female employees were maintained prior to 1962 despite the fact that
the bargaining contract appeared to give seniority without regard
to race or sex. During this period the complainants had been laid
off for a year. The eight Negro employees executed affidavits that
during the period of the layoff new white workers had been hired in
violation of their seniority rights. The union grievance committee
concluded that no contract violation existed and that a union com-
plaint would therefore be baseless. The complainants appealed with-
in the union structure and the union's international president held
that the grievance should be processed. However, Local 12 still re-
fused to process the grievances and in October 1962 unfair labor
practices charges were filed with the labor board. The Court of
Appeals affirmed the NLRB's finding of a Section 8(b) (1) (A)
violation,7 but failed to consider the Board's application of Sections
8(b)2 and 8(b)3 to the case.
Neither the National Labor Relations Act nor the Railway Labor
Act specifically states that a union owes a duty of fair representa-
tion to the employees it represents. The concept of fair representa-
tion had its genesis in Steele v. Louisville & N.R.R.,9 a 1944 de-
ployees to meet at reasonable times and confer in good faith with respect to
wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of employment, or the negotoa-
tion of an agreement, or any question arising thereunder, and the execution
of a written contract . . . but such obligation does not compel either party
to agree to a proposal or require the making of a concession. . . ." 61 Stat.
140 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 158(d) (1964).
" Miranda Fuel Co., 140 N.L.R.B. 181 (1962, enforcement denied, 326
F.2d 172 (2d Cir. 1963). The decision by a three judge panel involved a
majority opinion, a concurrence on different grounds and a dissent.
' 368 F.2d 12 (5th Cir. 1966).
7Id. at 24.
44 Stat. 577 (1926), as amended, 45 U.S.C. §§ 151-63 (1964).
'323 U.S. 192 (1944).
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cision of the United States Supreme Court. There the court held
that a union could not negotiate a contract which would result in
Negro employees, who were not union members, losing job oppor-
tunities. The court found that under the Railway Labor Act a union
is given the exclusive right to represent all employees and as the
exclusive bargaining representative is required to "represent non-
union or minority union members of the craft without hostile dis-
crimination, fairly, and impartially, and in good faith.""' This is not
to say that there cannot be relevant differences, but "discriminations
based on race alone are obviously irrelevant and individious."' " Be-
cause Section 9(a) 12 of the National Labor Relations Act makes
the union an exclusive bargaining agent, the Supreme Court in Wal-
lace Corp. v. NLRB' s recognized that the duty of fair representation
exists under this act also.
Steele and Wallace may have seemed sufficient for the enforce-
ment of the duty of fair representation, but they actually established
a judicial remedy of limited value. 4 A party faced delay, expense,
and technical barriers when he carried his complaint into the courts.
The first application of the effective administrative remedy of un-
fair labor practice proceeding 5 for breach of the duty of fair repre-
'
0 Id. at 204.
"Id. at 203.
12 Section 9(a) provides " Representatives designated or selected for the
purposes of collective bargaining by the majority of the employees . . . shall
be the exclusive representatives of all the employees in such unit for the
purposes of collective bargaining in respect to rates of pay, wages, hours
of employment, or other conditions of employment.... ." 61 Stat. 143, U.S.C.
§ 159(a) (1964).
12323 U.S. 248 (1944).
', For discussions on the sufficiency of the judicial remedy see SoVRN,
LEGAL RESTRAINTS ON RACIAL DISCRIMINATION IN EMPLOYMENT 144-60
(1966); Cox, The Duty of Fair Representation, 2 VILL. L. REv. 151, 172-77
(1957); Murphy, The Duty of Fair Representation under Taft-Hartley, 30
Mo. L. REv. 373, 374-77 (1965); Rosen, The Law and Racial Discrimina-
tion in Employment, 53 CALIF. L. REv. 729, 771-81 (1965); Sovern, The
National Labor Relations Act and Racial Discrimination, 62 COLUM. L. REv.
563, 609-13 (1962).
"5 There are other administrative remedies available in addition to un-
fair labor practice proceedings. One method used by the Board to dis-
courage a union becoming or remaining an exclusive representative is the
removal of the contract bar. Normally the NLRB makes a collective bar-
gaining agreement a bar to a new election for three years. However, in
Pioneer Bus Co., 140 N.L.R.B. 54 (1962) the Board implied that discrimi-
tory contracts would not bar a new election. Independent Metal Workers
Union, 147 N.L.R.B. 1573 (1964) the Board overruled previous de-
cisions which allowed a union to retain certified status while it excluded
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sentation came in 1962 with NLRB v. Miranda Fuel Co."0 The
union had requested that one of its members be reduced in seniority
when circumstances indicated no valid reason for this demand.
Under pressure from the union the employer acquiesced and the
employee was reduced in seniority. The majority of the Board indi-
cated that Section 7 protected employees from such "invidious treat-
ment by their exclusive bargaining agent in matters affecting their
employment."'1 7 The remedy for such discrimination was available
under Section 8(b) (1) (A). Further, the Board found violations of
Sections 8(b)2 and 8(b)3"8 which impose duties on both unions
and employers not to conduct themselves in such a manner as to en-
courage or discourage union membership. Presumably, the union by
demonstrating its arbitrary power forced non-members and members
in poor standing to become active in union affairs to preserve their
jobs."0 Two Board members dissented in Miranda pointing out that
the concept of fair representation had not been advanced or litigated
in the case and that the legislative history of the act did not support
the interpretation of the majority.20 On appeal enforcement was de-
nied, but the court was badly split and did not really decide whether
the new theory was valid."' Until Rubber Workers this was the
only appellate decision dealing with fair representation as an unfair
labor practice.
Racial discrimination was not involved in Miranda so it re-
mained for Hughes Tool' to extend the theories of Miranda into
that area. In Hughes Tool Locals 1 and 2 of the Independent Metal
Workers Union had been certified as joint bargaining representa-
tives; Local 1 was white and Local 2 was Negro. After a bid for
an apprenticeship by a Negro employee was refused consideration
by the company, the grievance committee of Local 2 protested.
Negro employees from membership and classified or segregated its mem-
bers on a racial basis.
1 140 N.L.R.B. 181 (1962), enforcement denied, 326 F.2d 172 (2d Cir.
1963).
17 140 N.L.R.B. at 185.
'Oid. at 185.
°See note 3 supra.
"Accord, Murphy, The Duty of Fair Representation Under Taft-Hart-
ley, 30 Mo. L. Rav. 373, 382 (1965). Contra, SovERx, LEGAL RESTRAINTS
ON RACIAL DiscamniNAToN IN EMPLOYMENT 163 (1966) where it is
averred that Congress implicitly accepted Steele and gave Negroes the right
of equal treatment when Taft-Hartley was enacted in 1947.
"326 F.2d at 172.
"147 N.L.R.B. 1573 (1964).
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When this failed to get results, Local 1 was asked to intervene. The
Board affirmed the trial examiners finding that Sections 8(b) (1)
(A), 8(b)2, and 8(b)3 were violated because Local 1 refused to
process grievances as requested.
In Hughes Tool the majority of the Board expanded its theory
to include Section 8(b)3, and the dissenters of Miranda clarified
their opposition to holding unfair representation an unfair labor
practice. The principal dispute among the Board members concerned
the technicalities of the application of the first three Sections of 8(b)
to fair representation, but there was a related schism involving the
philosophy of the function of the NLRB. In Hughes Tool the major-
ity of the Board cited Brown v. Board of Educ3 and Shelley v.
Kraemer24 for the proposition that racial segregation in union mem-
bership, when engaged in by an exclusive bargaining agent under
the NLRA, cannot be condoned by a "Federal Agency."25 This line
of thought can be linked to the Steele case which recognized the
possibility that a favored status under a statute might be enough to
make collective bargaining governmental action and hold a union to
constitutional standards 6 However, no Supreme Court opinion has
yet held that the Constitution requires a union and employer not to
discriminate. The reasoning of the majority in effect makes the
NLRB a fair employment practices committee for it becomes the
function of the Board to use its power to eliminate discrimination.
The minority of the Board replied that Congress up to that time
had been unable to pass fair employment legislation and that it was
clearly not the congressional intent that the NLRA operate as a
substitute.2 8 Further, it may be argued that collective bargaining
operates best with a minimum of interference, governmental or
otherwise. For this reason application of constitutional standards to
fair representation by unions might disrupt collective bargaining by
requiring burdensome judicial and administrative regulation. It ap-
pears possible to the advocates of the minority view that the applica-
tion of constitutional standards to collective bargaining could seri-
-'347 U.S. 483 (1954).
"334 U.S. 1 (1948).
' 147 N.L.R.B. at 1574 & n.3.
28For a discussion of this possibility see Rosen, The Law and Racial
Discrimination in Employment, 53 CALIF. L. REv. 729, 750-56 (1965).
Steele was based on an interpretation of the Railway Labor Act.
Hughes Tool, 147 N.L.R.B. 1573, 1578-93 (1964) (separate opinion).
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ously hamper"9 the Board in implementing the act's principal goal of
promoting union-employer relations because strict constitutional
standards would result in a loss of necessary flexibility in collective
bargaining.f0
The advocates of each viewpoint manifest the basic split in philos-
ophy by their varied interpretations of Section 8(b) and its related
provisions. The approach of the minority of the Board emphasizes
statutory intent and is strictly an argument of logic, while the results
reached by the majority, although at times seemingly based on illogi-
cal reasoning, are more equitable. An example of this is the inter-
pretation put on Section 8(b) (1) (A) by the majority of the Board
in Rubber Workers.' The reasoning in this opinion was simply
that by refusing to process grievances the respondent union "re-
strained or coerced" the Negro employees in exercising their right
to be represented without invidious discrimination. The Board
stated simply that there was no justification for the refusal to process
the grievances since the sole reason for the refusal was racial dis-
crimination. The dissenters freely admitted a duty of fair representa-
tion under Section 9(b),3 but indicated that there was nothing in
the legislative history to indicate a congressional intent to make fair
representation a protected Section 7 right.3  They argued that an
unfair labor practice occurs only where there is conduct relating to
"union membership, loyalty, the acknowledgment of union author-
ity, or the performance of union obligation. 134 Reasoning that the
refusal to process a grievance did not relate to any of these factors,
the minority found no unfair labor practice within the meaning of
Section 8(b) (1) (A). The fifth circuit expressly repected this nar-
row view of Section 8(b) (1) (A) stating that the breach of every
" See Rosen, The Law and Racial Discrimination in Employment, 53
CALIF. L. R!v. 729, 754-56 (1965).
0 Id. at 755.
1 150 N.L.R.B. at 312.
"Section 9(b) provides:
The Board shall decide in each case whether, in order to assure to
the employees the fullest freedom in exercising the rights guaranteed
by this subchapter, the unit appropriate for the purposes of collective
bargaining shall be the employer unit, craft unit, plant unit, or sub-
division thereof...
61 stat. 143 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 159(b) (1964).
" 150 N.L.R.B. at 324 (dissenting opinion).
31 Id. at 325.
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other duty imposed by the act has been held an unfair labor practice
and there is no reason for this single exception.35
Still unanswered by the court is the propriety of the Board's use
of Sections 8 (b)2 and 8(b) 3 to enforce the duty of fair representa-
tion. Section 8(b) (1) (A) specifically gives a union the right to
establish its own regulations concerning membership, but in light of
Steele it is unclear whether a union may exclude Negroes from
membership on the arbitrary and invidious basis of race. 6 How-
ever, Section 8 (b)2 and 8(a) 3 make it clear that if workers denied
membership are then denied jobs the law is violated.3" The disagree-
ment between the majority and the minority of the Board is over
the conclusion of the majority that Section 8(b)2 and 8(a)3 are
violated regardless of union membership or lack of it, when for
"arbitrary or irrelevant reasons or upon the basis of an unfair classi-
fication, the union attempts to cause or does cause an employer to
derogate the employment status of an employee."3" The critical ques-
tion is whether the conclusion of the Board is tenable on the some-
what strained logic that an employee will be encouraged to be a
"good union" member because he sees the union coerce the employer
to arbitrarily discriminate against a fellow worker. The minority
sees no direct effect on union membership by such arbitrary conduct
for the discrimination is unrelated to the union activities of the em-
ployee. 9 Although this view is logical, the majority position seems
more responsive to actual human behavior. Fear of the union's
power to discriminate arbitrarily results in union members striving
to remain on good terms with the union, and this necessarily entails
maintaining union membership.
The use of Section 8(b)3 by the Board to reach unfair repre-
sentation by the union raises some interesting problems of statutory
interpretation. This section can be viewed in at least two ways as
observed by Professor Archibald Cox:
" 368 F.2d 12, 21 (5th Cir. 1966).
"See 93 CONG. REc. 4193 (1947) (remarks of Senator Taft).
" See SOVERN, LEGAL RESTRAINTS ON RACIAL DIscRIMINATION IN EM-
PLOYMENT 165 (1966).
"' Miranda Fuel Co., 140 N.L.R.B. 181, 186 (1962), enforcement denied,
326 F.2d 172 (2d Cir. 1963).
" Local 12, United Rubber Workers, 150 N.L.R.B. 312 (1964). The
same division present on the Board in Miranda continues here but is clari-
fied to some extent.
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The critical inquiry would seem to be whether section 8(b)3
should be construed: (1) to regulate only the union's conduct in
relation to employer, or (2) to embody all its statutory obliga-
tions in negotiating or administering an agreement as the em-
ployees' exclusive representative. The former interpretation
leaves room for judicial remedies for breach of the duty of fair
representation. The latter makes breach of the duty an unfair
labor practice .... 40
The Board has followed the second view that the "duty to bargain
collectively includes the duty to represent fairly.141 The Board rea-
soned earlier in Local 1367, Int'l Longshoremen's Ass'n 2 that Sec-
tion 8(d)43 contemplated only lawful agreements and that bargain-
ing agreements which discriminated invidiously were unlawful.
Thus, employers and unions were enjoined from entering such con-
tracts. When such unlawful agreements were entered, the contract
could not be one envisioned by Section 8(d) nor could the union
be said to have bargained in good faith as to either the employees it
represents or employers.4 4 Professor Sovern and the minority of the
Board dispute this view and claim that Section 8(b)3 is simply the
counterpart of Section 8(a)5,45 with a duty only between unions
and employers to bargain collectively. 6 This is a more logical con-
clusion and the history of the act lends it support.4 7
" Cox, The Duty of Fair Representation, 2 VILL. L. REv. 151, 172
(1957).
" Local 1367, Int'l Longshoremen's Ass'n, 148 N.L.R.B. 897, 899 (1964).
2 148 N.L.R.B. 897 (1964).
"See note 4 supra.
"148 N.L.R.B. at 899-900.
"Section (8)5 provides that it shall be an unfair labor practice for an
employer: "to refuse to bargain collectively with the representatives of his
employees, subject to the provisions of section 159(a) of this title." 61
Stat. 140 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 158 (a)(5) (1964).
," See Sovern, The National Labor Relations Act and Racial Discrimina-
tion, 62 COLUM. L. REv. 563, 589 (1962).
"In addition to the problems raised by this paper, Rubber Workers has
implications in the area of preemption. Obiter dictum in this case approved
the doctrine of giving exclusive jurisdiction to the NLRB where the activity
was arguably subject to Sections 7 and 8 of the NLRA. See San Diego
Bldg. Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236 (1959). For a discussion
of preemption see SOVERN, LEGAL RESTRAINTS ON RACIAL DISCRIMINATION
IN EMPLOYMENT 171-74 (1966).
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 78 Stat. 253, 42 U.S.C.§§ 2000(e) (1)-(11) is also beyond the scope of this note but it now serves
as an important new weapon in halting discriminatory practices by unions.
See Rosen, The Law and Racial Discrimination in Employment, 53 CALIF.
L. REV. 729 (1965); Sherman, The Union Duty of Fair Representaton and
the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 49 MINN. L. REV. 771 (1965).
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Regardless of the technique 8 used by the majority of the Board
to conclude that it is an unfair labor practice to breach the duty of
fair representation, the courts should hesitate to accept this result.
Under its present course of action, apparently approved in Rubber
Workers, the Board seems to have established itself as a fair employ-
ment practice committee.49 This development is undesirable for the
expansion of the Board's jurisdiction to include fair employment
practices has an adverse effect on the primary function of the Board,
that of supervising the collective bargaining process. Setting up fair
employment standards to be applied by the Board while labor and
management engage in collective bargaining would destroy much of
the flexibility and perhaps the effectiveness of the collective bargain-
ing process." The extensive supervision required might amount to
little less than governmental control of labor-management relations.
To those who contend that only the administrative remedy offered
by the NLRB is sufficient,51 one might reply that a potent fair em-
ployment practices committee with power to institute court action on
a complaint or to give effective remedies for discrimination in em-
ployment could achieve the same end as the NLRB without inter-
fering with the present function of the Board.
JAMES NATHAN DUGGINS, JR.
Securities Regulation-Unlisted Tradings: A Vanishing Art?
The historical background of unlisted trading reflects the de-
velopment of our national securities exchanges. Prior to the evolu-
tion of exchanges, local brokers, gathering on street corners, would
trade in any available securities.1 In 1817, the New York Stock Ex-
"' For methods used by the courts to reach desired results see Blumrosen,
The Worker and Three Phases of Unionism: Administrative and Judicial
Control of the Worker-Union Relationship, 61 MicE. L. REv. 1435, 1445-46(1963).
," Murphy, The Duty of Fair Representation Under Taft-Hartley, 30
Mo. L. REV. 373, 385-86 (1965).
" Rosen, The Law and Racial Discrimination in Employment, 53 CALIF.
L. REv. 729, 754 (1965).
"1 See Sovern, The National Labor Relations Act and Racial Discrimina-
tion, 62 CoLum. L. REV. 563, 609-13 (1962). See also note 13 supra.
1 [1958-1959] 25 SEC. ANN. REP. 71. As early as 1752 American mer-
chants established an "exchange" at Broad Street in New York City, for
dealings in meal and water borne produce. At the tip of Wall Street nearest
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change, moved indoors and permitted trading in thirty listed stocks
by seven member firms and thirteen individual brokers.2 Any secur-
ity could be temporarily inserted for trading on the exchange "list"
on paying a twenty-five cent fine. A majority vote of members
present was required for full listing.' In 1869, the newly formed
New York Stock Exchange Committee on Stock List4 promulgated
listing requirements and passed on applications for those securities
which sought exchange privileges.5 The strict listing requirements
of this committee is an indirect source for modem unlisted trading
privileges and practices.
The New York Stock Exchange was primarily a railroad stock
market; industrials were considered speculative securities and many
could not qualify for listing. When the "Unlisted Department" was
created in 1885 securities unable to meet the rigid requirements of
the Committee on Stock List were traded on an unlisted basis." The
Department, however, was abolished in 1910 pursuant to recommen-
dations made by the Hughes Committee which studied speculation
in securities.7 Today all trading in unlisted securities takes place
either on the American Stock exchange or the regional stock ex-
changes registered under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.1
Unlisted trading prior to the enactment of specific legislation con-
sisted of brokers trading in a security, generally without regard to
the issuer's wishes, at the request of exchange members. The issuers
of these securities were not required to, nor did they undertake to
make the informational disclosures required of securities listed on
the wharves, a more sophisticated market was developed. Here incoming
cargoes of European manufactured goods were auctioned off to local mer-
chants. MEEKER, THE WORK OF THE STOCK EXCHANGE at 61 (rev. ed. 1930)
[hereinafter cited as MEEKER].
MEEKER 64.
'[1958-1959] 25 SEc. ANN. REP. 71-72.
Now the Board of Governors of the New York Stock Exchange.
'With the creation of the Securities and Exchange Commission, the re-
quirements for listing on the national securities exchanges were supple-
mented by those for registration. MEEKER 451. See also [1958-1959] 25
SEc. ANN. REP. 72 n.21.
'MEEKER 71.
" The title of the committee was the New York Governor's Committee
on Speculation in Securities and Commodities; however, it is popularly
called the "Hughes Committee." Most stocks in the Unlisted Department in
1910 were industrials and were subsequently admitted to listed status. 2 Loss,
SECURITIES REGULATIONS 1133 (2d ed. 1961) [hereinafter cited as Loss].
848 Stat. 881, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-78jj (1964) [hereinafter cited as Ex-
CHANGE Acr].
1086 [Vol. 45
1967] UNLISTED TRADING 1087
exchanges although the trading mechanics for listed and unlisted
issues were identical. A listed security, for comparison, is admitted
to trading on an exchange upon the issuer's application to the ex-
change on which listing is desired. The issuer must file information
generally related to corporate and financial organization as a condi-
tion to listing. In contrast, unlisted issues will be traded although in-
vestors lack the information available as to listed securities.
9
A rule of practice on the Philadelphia Stock Exchange in 1876
was that "members may call up the various stocks of any chartered
company, whether on the regular list or not."1 Some regional stock
exchanges limited this practice and others completely banned it; how-
ever, an amended rule of the same stock exchange in 1932 was
adopted in substance by the other regional exchanges. 1 It provided
that "no securities could be admitted to unlisted trading which were
not listed on the New York Stock Exchange, New York Curb Ex-
change, as it was then styled, or the Boston Stock Exchange, Pitts-
burgh Stock Exchange, or Chicago Stock Exchange."'
The New York Curb Exchange 3 was the largest market in un-
listed securities in both share and dollar volume prior to the Ex-
change Act; however, the number of securities enjoying unlisted
trading privileges was drastically reduced in the years between 1933
and 1934 resulting from an examination conducted by the New
York State Attorney General. 4 Findings of speculation and manip-
'As a result of an examination by the New York State Attorney Gen-
eral, infra note 14, the "Curb" adopted rules which attempted to remedy some
or the deficiencies. Unlisted trading privileges for a security would be per-
mitted only if the issuer furnished periodic reports to stockholders at least
once a year. These reports must contain balance sheets and statements of
profit and loss. Members of the exchange who traded in unlisted securities
were required to file an annual report of the issuer of each security as an
official copy with the exchange. This copy must be similar to the one issued
to the shareholders of the corporation. The "Curb" required each exchange
member who desired a security to be traded on an unlisted basis to become
a shareholder of that issuer, and all information received by the exchange
member in his capacity as a shareholder was to be filed with the
exchange. These rules were said to have come too late because the bulk of
the securities enjoying unlisted trading privileges were admitted to the
"Curb" prior to July 5, 1933, the date that the investigation ended. SEC,
REPORT ON TRADING IN UNLISTED SECURITIES UPON EXCHANGES 8-9, 38-47
(1936) [hereinafter cited as REPORT ON TRADING].
0 [1958-1959] 25 SEC ANN. REP. 72.11Ibid.
'Ibid.
The New York Curb Exchange became known as the American Stock
Exchange in 1953.
" Unlisted trading privileges for almost one thousand issues were termi-
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ulation in unlisted trading prompted Congress to consider legisla-
tion.
The original congressional proposals in 1934 were vigorously
opposed by the "Curb" and the regional exchanges as they sought
immediate abolition of unlisted trading privileges as the solution to
the regulatory problem.' 5 The exchanges' contended that outright
abolition of unlisted trading would result in unwarranted federal
regulation. 6 The substance of the retort was four-part. First, the
criticized manipulatory practices had been modified after the two
year investigation by the New York Attorney General. Second, the
exchanges desired to maintain the dollar generating commissions for
its member firms and brokers from the existing volume of unlisted
trading. Third, regional markets for nationally known issues listed
on the New York Stock Exchange were desired where sufficient
demand and trading activity was present. And, finally, unlisted
trading was an integral and established exchange procedure of long
standing.
nated due to inactivity; nevertheless, the "Curb" market retained its position
as the largest market for trading in unlisted securities. Loss, 1133.
16 One such bill was H.R. 7852 to Provide for the Registration of Nation-
al Securities Exchanges ... and to Prevent Inequitable and Unfair Practices
on such Exchanges, and for other Purposes. Several eloquent speeches in
defense of unlisted trading privileges on the "Curb" were made by its chief
executive officer. But E. Burd Grubb, then President of the New York Curb
Exchange confessed that:
In the past, the exchange has itself too freely admitted securities to
unlisted trading, particularly . . . where, at the time of admission, no
active market in the security existed in the East or in New York. The
exchange has recognized these mistakes, and on its own volition, since
January 2, 1933, has removed from dealing by reason of inactivity
696 issues of stock and 247 issues of bonds.
Stock Exchange Regulation, Hearings on H.R. 7852 and H.R. 8720 Before
the House Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 73rd Cong., 2d
Sess. at 389 (1934).
10 Hon. John Dickenson, Assistant Secretary of Commerce and Chair-
man of the Interdepartmental Committee on Stock Exchange Regulation,
stressed the necessity that
disciplinary powers over the members and over security issues shall
be left primarily for each exchange, each to be responsible to the
Federal Stock Exchange Authority for the enforcement of its regula-
tions. If this is not done the moral of the exchange may be destroyed
and the Stock Exchange Authority overwhelmed with the policing of
alleged violations on all the exchanges of the country.
Id. at 515. Mr. Grubb, President of the "Curb" Exchange, presents a
powerful argument for the preservation of the unlisted department on the
New York Curb Exchange. Hearings on S. 84, S. 56 and S. 97 Before the
House Committee on Banking and Currency, 73rd Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 15, at
7115-23 (1934).
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The basic objective of the Exchange Act was to compel public
disclosure about exchange-traded securities to investors, the ex-
changes, and the Securities and Exchange Commission. Section 12
of the Exchange Act imposed the additional requirement of registra-
tion of securities with the Commission upon the listing requirements
of the national exchanges. Subsection (f) however, excepted securi-
ties admitted to exchanges with unlisted trading privileges.
In 1934 Congress directed the SEC to study trading in unlisted
securities for two years and then to make recommendations. Dur-
ing this time the Commission could extend until July 1, 1936 un-
listed trading privileges for securities so traded prior to March 1,
1934, and extend until July 1, 1935 unlisted trading privileges for
any security registered on any other exchange prior to March 1,
1934.
The Commission's 1936 report was submitted by Chairman
James M. Landis to the Senate Committee on Banking and Cur-
rency.' The Commission found that the problem was significant. On
the sixteen exchanges permitting trading in unlisted securities dur-
ing 1935, security issues of listed companies exceeded those of un-
listed companies by 365 issues; however, the volume of shares of
securities traded on an unlisted basis exceeded those of listed secu-
rities by 548,514,503 shares. Also, bonds admitted on the same
exchanges with unlisted trading privileges had a total face value
exceeding that of listed bonds by 675,293,516 dollars.'9 The
"Curb," the largest primary market for unlisted trading, had 753
issues of stock, comprising 600,051,527 shares, and 522 bond issues,
with a total face value of 6,381,843, 636 dollars, appearing on the
exchange with unlisted trading privileges. The Commission con-
cluded that the solution to the problem of regulating unlisted trading
did not lie in termination.20 It observed that issues not admitted to
unlisted trading privileges were traded on the over-the-counter mar-
ket. Many issuers would not attempt to comply with exchange list-
ing requirements but if the issues retained unlisted trading privi-
leges, there would be a great degree of surveillance than if the
REPORT ON TRADING 1.
'8 Trading in Unlisted Securities upon Exchanges, Hearings on S. 4023
Before the Senate Committee on Banking and Currency, 74th Cong., 2d
Sess. at 1, 3 (1936).
" REPORT ON TRADING 4-5.
20 1d. at 7-16.
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securities were traded solely on the over-the-counter market where
no means were yet devised to register the securities or compel needed
disclosures. Thus the imperfect status quo would better serve the
investing public than would abolition of the privilege.2 Further-
more, the Commission found that if unlisted trading were to be
terminated, there would be a danger of decline in security values due
to section 7(c) of the Exchange Act and Regulation T of the
Federal Reserve Board and the smaller exchanges would be en-
dangered.22 Also, the Commission favored the opportunity to extend
the scope of exchange trading in securities for which an exchange
market is appropriate and where full information is available.2"
The recommendations contained in the Commission's report2 4 were
21 Ibid.
22 Ibid.
28 Ibid.
24 1. Subsection (f) of section 12 of the Securities Exchange Act
of 1934 should be amended to provide-
a) That unlisted trading privileges on any exchange to which any
security had been admitted prior to March 1, 1934, may be continued
beyond June 1, 1936, on such terms and conditions as the Commis-
sion may by rules and regulations prescribe as necessary or appro-
priate for the protection of investors or to prevent evasion of the pur-
poses of the Act. No expiration date should be expressly set, but the
Commission should continue to have the power to bring about the
teminartion of this situation in part or as a whole.
b) That securities the issuer of which has duly registered any
security on an exchange pursuant to section 12 may, during the period
when such other registration is effective, be admitted to trading on
any exchange in accordance with such terms and conditions as the
Commission may by rules and regulations prescribe as necessary or
appropriate for the protection of investors and to prevent evasion of
the Exchange Act.
2. The Commission should thereupon proceed expeditiously to per-
fect regulations and a program of administration designed to make
effective for all securities traded on an unlisted basis on exchanges
requirements concerning adequacy of public distribution, degree of
local trading activity, minimum information to be supplied, and other
requirements necessary to assure a properly functioning market on
such exchanges for such securities. Such a program could be put into
effect pursuant to section 6(a) section 12(f) and section 19(b) of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934.
3. The existing power of the Commission to bring about adequate
reporting by issuers of substantial size, whose securities have a wide
public distribution, should be perfected to the end that there be infor-
mation supplied by these issuers comparable to that now furnished by
those who have registered their securities on an exchange. That end
being attained, the Commission should then be empowered to pre-
scribe terms and conditions under which the securities of these issuers
should be permitted to enjoy an exchange market, where the public
interest, not subjected to the sole control of management, would be
furthered by the creation of an exchange market.
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adopted in substance and, as amended, constituted section 12(f) of
the Exchange Act prior to the Securities Acts Amendments of 1964.
Three categories of the securities can be traded on an unlisted
basis on national exchanges without registration. The privilege can
only be continued or extended by the applicant exchange. Commis-
sion approval will follow, if the security meets the requirements of
one of the three categories. The first category ("clause I securi-
ties"), adopting the recommendations of the Commissions study, 5
provides for continuation of unlisted trading in a security if such
security was admitted to the applicant exchange prior to March 1,
1934. Clause (1) is a "grandfather clause," as it represents "his-
torical or classical" unlisted trading. The first category is restricted
and admissions to it are necessarily unavailable. For the second
category (so-called "clause 2 securities"), also recommended by the
Commissions study,26 unlisted trading privileges in any security may
be continued or granted by the applicant exchange if the security is
also duly listed and registered on any other national securities ex-
change. There, multiple or dual trading, on more than one national
exchange, is available under clause (2) .17 This privilege remains in
effect only so long as the security remains both listed and registered
on another national securities exchange. The third category ("clause
3 securities") permits unlisted trading privileges for securities which
are not listed on any other national exchange if they comply with
the registration requirements of either the Exchange Act or the
Securities Act of 1933.2" The theory of this privilege is that the
information concerning these issues is "substantially equivalent to
that available in respect to a security duly listed and registered on
a national securities exchange." Clause (3) is self-policing as the
privilege remains effective only so long as the informational dis-
closures are kept current. The aim of clause (3) was to "enhance
the scope of unlisted trading" because securities previously traded
solely over-the-counter could now seek an exchange market; hence
REPORT ON TRADING 2-3. See also S. REP. No. 1739, 74th Cong., 2d Sess.
(1936); H.R. REi. No. 2601, 74th Cong., 2d Sess. (1936).
25 See note 24 supra.
'6 See note 24 supra.
= "The terms 'multiple' and 'dual' are used more or less interchange-
ably in this context, the former, of course, implying that the phenomenon
of 'dual' trading may extend to several different markets"' SEC, REPORT
OF SPEcrAL STUDY OF SECURITIES MARXErs pt. II, at 809 (1963).
"848 Stat. 74 (1933), as amended 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-77aa (1964).
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it represented a compromise between the exchange and the over-the-
counter market.2" It was found that the "public interest would be
served by exchange trading although the issuer did not itself seek
it." Clause (3) ties in with section 15(d) of the Exchange Act since
it extended unlisted trading privileges to securities traded on the over-
the-counter market. Through this section, Congress perfected the
Commission's power to bring about reliable disclosures of widely
distributed securities generally unavailable to the public prior to
section 15 (d).31
The general policy of subsection 12(f) is that the Commission
shall continue or extend unlisted trading privileges by approving
only those applications which are "necessary or appropriate in the
public interest or for the protection of investors." When approval
of applications to extend unlisted trading privileges is sought pur-
suant to clauses (2) and (3), a hearing is held by the Commission at
which it is determined whether the general policy of Subsection
12(f) is met. The applicant exchange must demonstrate that in the
"vicinity of the exchange"32 there is sufficiently widespread public
distribution and trading activity3 3 in the issuer's securities that un-
"
3Loss 1134.
'REPoRT oN TRADING 25.31 Hearings on S. 4023 Before the House Committee on Interstate and
Foreign Commerce, 74th Cong., 2d Sess. at 4 (1936).
"The concept of "vicinity of the exchange" has resulted in a multitude
of litigation by the various securities exchanges. The interpretation origin-
ally given in the Matter of Applications by the New York Curb Exchange,
3 S.E.C. 81 (1938) was later adhered to. There, the Commission concludes:
"that the claim of the Curb Exchange to a vicinity including the whole
United States is not sustained .... Rather, we interpret 'vicinity' to mean
the particular geographical section or sections in which a particular exchange
ranks as the, or one of the, national exchanges to which investors would
look for an exchange market in the securities for which unlisted trading is
sought." Id. at 85. The Commission has consistently held, as did the Third
Circuit in National Ass'n of Securities Dealers v. S.E.C., 143 F.2d 62 (3d
Cir. 1944), that the vicinity of the New York Curb Exchange is Massa-
chusetts, Rhode Island, Connecticut, New York, New Jersey, Pennsylvania
and Ohio with respect to certain bonds. Compare In the Matter of Applica-
tion by the Baltimore Stock Exchange, 12 S.E.C. 516 (1942) (State of
Maryland held the vicinity of the Baltimore Exchange); In the Matter of
Application by the Boston Stock Exchange, 12 S.E.C. 658 (1943) (vicinity
of the applicant exchange held all of New England except Fairfield County,
Conn.); In the Matter of Application by the Chicago Stock Exchange, 9
S.E.C. 805 (1941)( State of Illinois held vicinity of the Chicago Stock
Exchange). The vicinity of substantially every stock exchange has been
litigated. For a complete list of the decisions and a review of their holdings,
see 2 CCH FED. SEc. L. REP. 23, 241 (1966). See also Loss 1136-1137.
" In the Matter of the Boston Stock Exchange, 3 S.E.C. 691 (1938).
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listed trading privileges for such securities is "necessary or appro-
priate in the public interest or for the protection of investors." The
Commission is neutral in this determination and is in no way in-
fluenced by the fact that an exchange files under clause (2) (because
such security also enjoys listed and registered trading status on
another national exchange) or clause (3) (where an issue has traded
on the over-the-counter market). The SEC criteria do not favor
clause (2) over clause (3) applicants or vice versa; however, the
ultimate determination to be made is "whether under the statutory
standards a market on the particular exchange is an appropriate
medium for trading in the particular security."3
An application under clause (3) will be granted only upon terms
and conditions which will subject the issuer, its officers and direc-
tors, and any beneficial owner of more than ten percent of the
security to duties substantially equivalent to those applicable to
securities listed and registered on a national exchange. For example,
if a certain security is subject to a regulatory standard other than
the Exchange Act, the periodic reporting, proxy solicitation and in-
sider trading provisions of that other statute would be compared to
sections 13, 14 and 16 of the Exchange Act to determine whether
the substantially equivalent test is met. This requirement is best
illustrated by In the Matter of Applications by the New York Curb
Exchange for Unlisted Trading Privileges in American Gas and
Electric Company, Public Service Company of Colorado and The
Washington Water Power Company.85 Here the "Curb" sought
Here, an application for extension of unlisted trading privileges under sub-
section 12(f), Clause (2) of the Exchange Act was granted. Of the
1,500,000 shares that were outstanding, 245,100 or approximately 16 2/3%
were held by 3,299 shareholders in New England. For the twelve months
ended on April 30, 1938 the volume of trading in the security was 7,325
shares as contrasted to the volume in 1937 of 11,309 shares. This volume
was compared to that in the same security on the New York Stock Exchange
which amounted to 514,000 shares for the same 1937 period. The Commis-
sion found that there exists sufficient public distribution and trading activity
in the vicinity of the applicant exchange to render the extension of unlisted
trading privileges.
"Loss 1135-1136.
" In the Matter of Applications by the New York Curb Exchange, 7
S.E.C. 672 (1940). The securities represented were three series of multi-
interest-bearing sinking fund debentures and cumulative preferred stock
of American Gas and Electric Company, mortgage bonds and sinking fund
debentures of Public Service Company of Colorado, and mortgage bonds
of The Washington Water Power Company. Later it was agreed between
the Commission and counsel for the New York Curb Exchange that first
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SEC approval under section 12(f) (3) of the Exchange Act of
unlisted trading privileges of securities of an issuer subject to sec-
tion 15(d) of the Exchange Act and registered under the Public
Utilities Holding Company Act of 1935.36 Although the bonds and
debentures would not normally be subject to the proxy solicitation
requirements of section 14 of the Exchange Act, the companies were
already subject to equivalent proxy regulation under the Holding
Company Act.3" Only the preferred stock of American Gas was an
equity security as defined in section 3 (a) (11) of the Exchange Act.
Section 16 of the Exchange Act would be inapplicable to transac-
tions by the officers, directors and beneficial holders of more than
ten per cent of the bonds and debentures. The Holding Company
Act by section 17(a) and (b) imposed restrictions upon officers and
directors similar to those of sections 16(a) and (b) of the Ex-
change Act. However, section 16(c) of the Exchange Act did not
have a regulatory counterpart in the Holding Company Act, so that
short term trading as well as short selling of equity securities by
"insiders" was not regulated. Counsel for the "Curb" produced a
letter from American Gas which stated that the corporate records
disclosed that no shareholder held in excess of ten per cent of the
preferred stock. Furthermore, the manager of the "Curb's" Un-
listed Trading Division testified that short selling in the preferred
stock could not readily be anticipated due to the quality investment
grade of the stock and the market price; this indicated that the
security was selling at a substantial premium. The Commission
found that since the investment grade of the preferred stock negated
a potential for speculative short selling by "insiders" and since the
corporate records disclosed no shareholders owning more than ten
per cent of the equity security, the applications for extension should
be approved. 8
and refunding mortgage bonds in Pennsylvania Electric Company be in-
cluded as a part of the applications.
" 49 Stat. 838, 15 U.S.C. §§ 79-792-6.
" In the Matter of Applications by the New York Curb Exchange, 7
S.E.C. 672, 675 (1940).
" It is interesting to note that when the Curb attempted to procure an
agreement from the issuer, American Gas and Electric Company, to the
effect that its officers and directors would not sell its preferred stock short,
the issuer responded that "it would not in any way associate itself or be-
come obligated in connection with the application of the New York Curb
Exchange for the extension of unlisted trading privileges to this preferred
stock." Id. at 677.
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The Commission may suspend the privilege of unlisted trading
for a period not exceeding twelve months if for the protection of
investors. If an exchange seeks to continue or extend unlisted trad-
ing privileges under clause (1) for a security which its issuer has
withdrawn from exchange listing, the Commission may terminate
trading in that security unless the issuer can establish that de-listing
was not designed to evade the policies of subsection 12(f) of the
Exchange Act.
Prior to the Exchange Act brokers traded in securities not listed
upon exchanges without regard to the issuer's wishes. The Ex-
change Act responded by providing that an issuer, market making
broker or dealer or anyone having a bona fide interest in terminating
or suspending a security's unlisted trading privileges may apply to
the SEC for an order to that effect.39 The Commission may also
on its own motion suspend or terminate such privileges on finding
this is necessary for investor protection.40 General objection to ex-
change trading, inadequate public distribution of the security in the
"vicinity of the exchange" and insufficient trading activity are spe-
cifically assigned as reasons for suspension or termination.
When an applicant exchange seeks unlisted trading privileges
under clause (1) for a security which has delisted from a national
exchange,41 or when an application is filed under clauses (2) and
(3) ,42 or whenever the Commission or others would suspend or
terminate unlisted trading in a security, 43 appropriate notice and
opportunity for a hearing must be given to parties directly affected
by the Commission not later than ten days prior to the hearing.
Securities for which unlisted trading privileges have been con-
tinued or extended are deemed to be registered on a national securi-
ties exchange and the rules of that exchange will be subject to review
by the Commission by virtue of its power under section 19(b) of
the Exchange Act.' The Commission may, "if in the public interest
" 2 CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 30, 966 (1965).
"'EXCHANGE Acr § 12(f) (3).
"EXCHANGE ACT § 12 (f) (4).
"EXCHANGE ACT § 12(f) (2).
"EXCHANGE ACT § 12(f) (3-4).
This section provides that the Commission may make a written request
to a national securities exchange suggesting that the exchange effect a
change in its rules and procedures. If the changes suggested by the Com-
mission are not effectuated and the Commission feels that the changes are
necessary to insure fair dealings in securities traded on the exchanges, it
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or for the protection of investors," either unconditionally, upon
specified terms and conditions, or for stated periods exempt such
securities from the operation of any provisions of section 13, 14 or
16 of the Exchange Act. 5
The Securities Acts amendments of 1964 extended registration
and the requirements formerly applicable only to securities listed on
national securities exchanges under the Exchange Act, to many
securities traded on the over-the-counter market. As for unlisted
securities, the 1964 amendments modified clause (1), left substan-
tially unchanged clause (2) and eliminated clause (3). These changes
made by the amendments reflect the recommendations made by the
Report of the Special Study of Securities Markets of the Securities
and Exchange Commission."
Clause (1) was an anomaly and remains so. Although section
12 (f) (6) declares that securities admitted to unlisted trading privi-
leges shall be deemed registered, clause (1) securities are not so at
all. These securities admitted to trading on a national exchange on
an unlisted basis prior to March 1, 1934 may today continue to be
traded on that basis with Commission approval upon application by
the exchange which originally admitted the security.47 With the
class limited by statute and continuation of the privilege resting in
the Commission's discretion, time alone by means of "retirement,
redemption, liquidation, reorganization, or the transition of seasoned
securities to a listed status"48 will gradually eliminate clause (1)
securities. Congress found no reason to change the general pattern
in respect to clause (1) securities even though pursuant to law dis-
closures provided for in sections 13, 14 and 16 of the Exchange
Act need not be made. Furthermore, the Special Study in its 1963
report noted that if a clause (1) security was required either to
register or make disclosures substantially equivalent to securities
listed and registered on national exchanges pursuant to sections
12(g) or 15(d) of the Exchange Act, the initial clause (1) exemp-
may, after a hearing, supplement the rules of the exchange by rules, regula-
tions or by order.
'" Section 13 is concerned with periodic reports; section 14 with proxy
solicitation requirements; and section 16 deals with duties in regard to offi-
cers, directors and principal shareholders of issuers.
"SEC, REPORT OF SPECIAL STUDY OF SECURITIES MARKETS pt. II, at
809 (1963).
'
T EXCHANGE AcT § 12(f) (1) (A).
" H.R. REP. No. 2601, 74th Cong., 2d Sess. 2-3 (1936).
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tion from sections 13, 14 and 16 of the Exchange Act would be
meaningless.4" This is because the disclosures made under sections
12 (g) and 15 (d) 50 of the Exchange Act are substantially equivalent
to those under sections 13, 14 and 16. The unfortunate anomaly of
clause (1) securities still exists, but only in the minutest detail.
The amendments left clause (2) securities substantially un-
changed. The reason for maintaining the status quo can be explained
by statutory interpretation. The statute provides that unlisted trad-
ing privileges on a national exchange may be extended "to any
security duly listed and registered on any other national securities
exchange."51 If the Commission has available section 13, 14 and 16
disclosures, by virtue of the fact that the security admitted to un-
listed trading privileges is also listed and registered on another na-
tional exchange, the information need not be duplicated. However,
if admission to the privilege of unlisted trading was originally predi-
cated upon the fact that a security was listed and registered on
another national exchange and delisting subsequently follows, un-
listed trading privileges on all exchanges must terminate.
The Commission in its 1936 report emphasized the importance
of securing registration of securities traded on the over-the-counter
market. If listed and registered securities are subject to the pro-
visions of sections 13, 14 and 16 of the Exchange Act, it is arguable
that securities traded over-the-counter should be as well as they have
no exchange surveillance. Prior to the amendments few exchange
applicants filed pursuant to clause (3) and fewer were granted. It
was the least used and legally the most troublesome of the three
clauses. By extending sections 13, 14 and 16 of the Exchange Act
17 C.F.R. § 240.12f-4 (1964).
50 Section 15(d) of the Exchange Act, as amended, provides that the
obligation of an issuer to file periodic reports is suspended if, and so long
as, the issuer has a class of securities registered pursuant to section 12 of
the Exchange Act. Section 12 (g) of the Exchange Act requires an issuer of
securities traded on the over-the-counter market, with total assets exceeding
1,000,000 dollars and a class of non-exempt equity security held of record by
750 or more persons to be reduced to 500 after July 1, 1966, to register
such security by filing a registration statement with the Commission within
120 days after the last day of its first fiscal year ended after July 1, 1964 on
which it meets the above standards. The revision of section 15 (d) and the
addition of section 12(g) necessitated certain amendments to Rule 12f-4,
which provides exemptions from sections 13, 14 and 16 of the Exchange
Act for issuers having securities admitted only to unlisted trading privileges.
See SEC Exchange Act Release No. 34-7491 (1965).
" ExcHANGE AcT § 12(f) (1) (B).
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to cover certain issuers whose securities are not listed on a national
exchange by means of sections 12(g) and 15(d), it would follow
that those securities traded on the over-the-counter market would
immediately qualify for unlisted trading privileges under clause (3).
Numerous applications would be filed by exchanges seeking to ex-
tend unlisted trading privileges for these securities; hence, clause
(3) was deleted by the amendments.5' The extension of the regis-
tration requirements of the Exchange Act to 12 (g) over-the-counter
issuers not only was consistent with the policy of the Exchange Act
but by subjecting large over-the-counter issuers to the same require-
ments as issuers of listed securities, it eliminated many of the immu-
nities formerly enjoyed by over-the-counter securities and thus made
formal listing more attractive.
The amendments eliminate the criteria of public distribution
and trading activity in the "vicinity of the exchange" in determining
whether or not to extend or continue unlisted trading privileges
although these remain factors to weigh in the Commission's de-
cision. The main question now is whether or not the privilege is
"necessary or appropriate in the public interest or for the protection
of investors."'
The 1964 amendments delete the provision requiring differentia-
tion between listed and unlisted security quotations,5 4 because the
Commission's authority under the Exchange Act could not be ex-
tended to enjoin "outsiders" from withholding the "U" and "L"
designations which were required by law when an exchange pub-
lished the transactions and quotations.55 In determining if the public
interest is best served by suspending, terminating, continuing and
extending unlisted trading privileges, the Commission is provided
leeway by the liberalized investor protection approach provided for
by the amendments.
I. RULE 12(F)-i: APPLICATIONS FOR PERMISSION TO
EXTEND UNLISTED TRADING PRIVILEGES
To extend unlisted trading privileges under subsection 12(f) (1)
of the Exchange Act,5' an application executed by a duly authorized
S. REP. No. 354 88th Cong., 1st Sess. 59 (1963).
Exchange Act section 12(f) (prior to 1964 Amendments) second para-
graph.
"' S. REP. No. 354, 88 Cong., 1st Sess. 59 (1963).
"' See note 42 supra.
"a 17 C.F.R. § 240.12f-1 (1964).
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officer of the exchange must be filed with the Commission. It must
identify the issuer as well as the security and contain data, and its
source, in respect to public distribution and trading volume in the
security in the "vicinity of the exchange" for a specified period pre-
ceding the date of the application. The Commission also requires
that other information "pertinent to the question of whether the
continuation or extension of unlisted trading privileges in such
security is necessary or appropriate in the public interest or for the
protection of investors" be included in the application.
II. RULE 12(F): CHANGES IN SECURITIES ADMITTED
TO UNLISTED TRADING PRIVILEGES
When there is a change in a clause (2) security,57 it shall be
considered the same security admitted to unlisted trading privileges
if, under Regulation 12B5" and Regulation 12D,59 its issuer need
not file a new application for registration with the SEC to continue
listed registered status on a national securities 0 exchange.
The following Illustrations will be utilized to clarify the remain-
ing provisions of this rule:
Illustration 1: XYZ Corp.'s charter authorizes 1,000,000 shares of
five dollar par value Class "B" common stock of which 100,000 are
outstanding. On January 1, 1966, XYZ's securities have been ad-
mitted to unlisted trading privileges on a national exchange. The
securities do not enjoy trading privileges on any other national ex-
change. The corporation has paid a quarterly dividend of twenty-five
cents per share for the past two years. On July 1, 1966, the major-
ity of the Board of Directors, in accordance with the provisions in
the by-laws, resolves the following:
A) Due to dissatisfaction with the corporate name, XYZ changes
its name to ABC Corp., and changes the name of the class
"B" common stock to class "A" common.
B) Due to substantial non-recurring losses sustained in the pre-
ceding calendar year, the quarterly dividend is reduced to
ten cents per share.
C) Due to contemplated expansion, the par value of class "B"
r 17 C.F.R. § 240.12f-2 (1964).
r817 C.F.R. § 240.12B (1964). These rules are concerned with registra-
tion and reporting.
rg 17 C.F.R. § 240.12D (1964). These rules specify the effectiveness of
registration and exchange certificates.
6017 C.F.R. § 240.12f-2 (a) (1) (1964).
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common stock (now class "A") is reduced from five to 2.50
dollars per share and the number of shares authorized is
correspondingly increased to 2,000,000 shares.
The Secretary of XYZ Corp. notifies the national exchange on
which the securities are enjoying unlisted trading privileges, and
the exchange notifies the Commission of such changes on Form 27.
XYZ's securities are deemed the same securities theretofore ad-
mitted to unlisted trading privileges on such national exchange. 1
Illustration 2. Assume all facts in Illustration 1 are true, but the
Board also resolves that:
D) The newly named ABC Corp. and DEF Corporation will
consolidate on July 30, 1966 into the ABF Corporation.
E) In honor of the Chairman of the Board, on July 8, 1966,
125,000 shares will be issued as a gift to him for fifty years
of service to ABC Corp.
The exchange and the Commission are notified of the changes as in
Illustration 1, but in addition the exchange, through a duly qualified
officer, files an application with the Commission which identifies the
issuer and the security and gives a brief description of each change
in the security together with a copy of all the written matter sub-
mitted to shareholders relating to the changes. If the Commission
determines that after the resolved changes are completed the security
is substantially equivalent to that which was originally granted un-
listed trading privileges, the security shall be deemed the same, and
unlisted trading privileges in it may continue on the applicant ex-
change. The Commission should find that the security is the same
in each illustration. 2
III. RULE 12(F)-3: TERMINATION OR SUSPENSION OF
UNLISTED TRADING PRIVILEGES
The applicant desiring suspension or termination of unlisted
trading privileges in a security traded on a national exchange must
8, 17 C.F.R. § 240.12f-2(a) (2) (A) (B) (C) (1964).
S17 C.F.R. § 240.12f-2(a) (3), (b) (1964). Note that a major change
in the capitalization of the issuer can be accomplished by merger, consolida-
tion, or acquisition of assets or securities as well as a similar transaction.
A sale of securities for cash, a stock dividend or stock split is not included
in that category; however, where the number of shares of the issuer's out-
standing stock has been increased by more that 100% within any twelve
consecutive calendar months, this will be considered a major change in
capitalization. Also, if an application is filed pursuant to Rule 17 C.F.R.
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identify itself, the issuer, and the security and must state its interest
in the security and reasons for suspension or termination. Informa-
tion, and its source, regarding the character and volume of trading
activity and public distribution of the security for specified periods
must also be furnished.' Furthermore, if the exchange desires to
suspend or terminate unlisted trading privileges in such security, it
may do so according to its own rules after which it must notify the
Commission promptly on Form 28 as to the action it has taken.
IV. RULE 12(F)-4: EXEMPTION OF SECURITIES ADMITTED
TO UNLISTED TRADING PRIVILEGES FROM SECTIONS
13, 14 AND 16
Section 12(f) (6) of the Exchange Act provides that a security
admitted to unlisted trading privileges on a national exchange shall
be deemed registered, but the Commission may exempt any security
from the operation of section 13, providing for periodic disclosures
of the issuer's financial and managerial operations, section 14, re-
lating to proxy solicitation requirements, and section 16, protecting
against "insider" dealings in the issuer's securities.
Rule 12(f)-4(a) exempts a security traded on an unlisted basis
from the requirements of section 13 of the Exchange Act unless it
falls within either of two categories. The first group includes the
original security for which the privilege has been granted or another
security of the same issuer listed and registered on another national
exchange, or registered under section 12(g) of the Exchange Act.
The second encompasses those securities which, but for the "deemed-
registered" provision of section 12(f) (6), would be required to file
data under section 15 (d) of the Exchange Act.
Rule 12(f)-4(b) provides that clause (2) securities or those
required to register under section 12(g) of the Exchange Act are
not exempt from section 14, but all other securities for which un-
listed trading privileges have been extended or continued are so
exempt.
Rule 12(f)-4(c) (1) provides an exemption from section 16 of
the Exchange Act in respect to equity securities for which unlisted
trading privileges have been continued or extended. 4 Equity securi-
§ 240.12f-2(b) (1964), Form 27 of the Securities and Exchange Commis-
sion need not be filed.
63 17 C.F.R. § 240.12f-3 (1964).
" 17 C.F.R. § 240.12f-4 (1964).
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ties in the first category, however, are not exempt. "Any equity
security for which unlisted trading privileges on any national securi-
ties exchange have been continued or extended pursuant to section
12(f) of the Act and which is not listed and registered on any
other such exchange or registered pursuant to section 12 (g) of the
Act shall be exempt from section 16 of the Act insofar as that
section would otherwise apply to any person who is directly or in-
directly the beneficial owner of more than 10 per cent of such secur-
ity, unless another equity security of the issuer of such unlisted
security is so listed or registered and such beneficial owner is a direc-
tor or officer of such issuer or directly or indirectly the beneficial
owner of more than 10 per cent of any such listed or registered
security.", 00
V. RULE 12F-6: CONTINUANCE OF UNLISTED TRADING
PRIVILEGES IN MERGER EXCHANGES :67
If a clause (1) security is traded on a national exchange which is
absorbed by another, the privilege continues without further order
of the Commission if the vicinity of the absorbed exchange includes
that of the surviving exchanges. The same rule is applicable to
clause (2) and (3) securities. The vicinity of the exchange is de-
termined by the United States Bureau of the Census.""
The statutes have been analyzed, the regulations set forth and
the effects of the amendments have been noted. What is the future
of unlisted trading privileges ? Clause (1) securities admitted to un-
listed trading privileges prior to July 1, 1964 may continue to enjoy
the privilege."' The repeal of clause (3) does not in any way affect
the extension of unlisted trading privileges to a security already
listed and registered on another national exchange;"° in fact, the
0" 17 C.F.R. § 240.12f-4(c) (2) (1964). See also SEC Exchange Act
Release No. 34-7491 (1965), amended paragraphs (a), (b), and (c) of Rule
12f-4, and added paragraph (d) which provides, "Any reference in this
rule to a security registered pursuant to section 12(g) of the Act shall
include, and any reference to a security not so registered shall exclude, any
security as to which a registration statement pursuant to such section is at
the time required to be effective."
" 13 Fed. Reg. 8195 (1948) (repealed September 1, 1964, by SEC Ex-
change Act Release No. 34-7408 (1964).
07 17 C.F.R. § 240.12f-6 (1964).
0817 C.F.R. § 240.12f-7 (1964). See also SEC Exchange Act Release
No. 34-7397 (1964). This rule served a transitional purpose. It is of no
importance today.
0 EXCHANGE ACT § 12(f) (1) (A).
"oEXCHANGE ACT § 12(f) (1) (B).
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amendments proscribe admission to the privilege if the issuer's
securities are not listed and registered on at least one other national
exchange.7'
Commission surveys for the preceding four years72 validated the
SEC's forecast in its 1936. report that clause (1) securities would
gradually diminish in number and importance. Some issuers have
chosen to list their securities on national exchanges, and others
whose securities previously enjoyed the privilege have liquidated,
merged or in other ways terminated an unlisted trading status which
at one time existed. Today almost all trading in clause (1) securi-
ties is conducted on the American Stock Exchange (formerly the
"Curb") ."3
The future of unlisted trading lies in clause (2) securities which
are registered and listed on one national securities exchange but
enjoy unlisted trading privileges on another. All securities traded
on the New York Stock Exchange are listed only after approval by
the Exchange's Board of Governors. No securities traded on any
other exchange may be traded on an unlisted basis on the New York
Stock Exchange. However, securities listed and registered on the
"Big Board" may be traded on an unlisted basis on regional securi-
ties exchanges. The American Stock Exchange, on the other hand,
does not trade in securities listed and registered on the New York
Stock Exchange, under a firmly established policy. The American
Exchange is the home of clause (1) securities and many issues of
old established nationally known securities still enjoy exchange trad-
ing there without complying with the registration requirements of
section 12 of the Exchange Act.
Although the American Exchange does not trade in securities
listed and registered on the "Big Board," it does trade in issues
listed and registered on the various regional exchanges. However,
trading volume in clause (2) securities on the American Exchange
is apt to remain relatively constant, if not decrease. The reason
stems mainly from the exchange's policy decision. Moderate size
issuers considering listing on a national exchange will tend to prefer
the New York Stock Exchange. The "Big Board" is the largest
national exchange and is located closest to the major sources of
7Ibid.
See generally [1961-1965] 28-31 SEc. ANN. REP.
"See Chart I supra.
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world capital. The regional exchanges have a self-imposed monop-
oly on trading in clause (2) securities listed and registered on the
"Big Board."
Many smaller issuers will list their securities only on a regional
exchange because they are known only in the exchange vicinity. If
the American Exchange trades only in the latter class of securities
on an unlisted basis, most share volume of clause (2) securities will
be transacted on the regional exchanges. The liquidity of regionally
listed issues on the American Exchange will most probably be less
impressive than that of nationally traded issues also traded on
regional exchanges. This is because the "float" of outstanding se-
curities of an issuer listed on the "Big Board" proportionally ex-
ceeds that of securities listed on regional exchanges, and also because
the supply and demand factor would be similar to that of the New
York Stock Exchange. It seems clear that the future of unlisted
trading lies on the regional securities exchanges where securities
listed and registered on the New York and American Stock Ex-
changes can be traded on an unlisted basis pursuant to clause (2).
Statistics for the calendar years ending June 30, 1962 through
1965, 74 indicate a positive increase in clause (2) securities. Seven
regional exchanges have more stocks traded under clause (2), and
four have a greater volume of shares traded in this category than
the American Exchange. In view of the trends reported by the
Commission, it is not inconceivable that in the next two decades no
clause (2) securities will be traded on the American Exchange.7"
However, the American Exchange will continue to be the home of
unlisted trading in "historical" clause (1) securities, but over the
years this class will be eliminated.
The evidence to date indicates that within the next two decades
all clause (2) trading will be transacted on the regional exchanges.
Aside from the statistically demonstrable trends, this statement finds
further support in the strong policy of the American Exchange to
encourage full listing.
Even so, the regional exchanges favor multiple trading. The
President of the San Francisco Stock Exchange recently declared"
that:
' See note 72 supra.
7 See Chart II infra.
" The statement was presented before the Senate Committee on Banking
and Currency of the 84th Congress. See note 77 infra.
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"'[T]rading in dual issues by our exchange does not constitute
a duplication of trading on the New York Stock Exchange, but
on the contrary provides an important supplementary market
which has proven to be in the public interest. Members of our
exchange generate orders in these securities for the very reason
that they are traded here. If they were not listed locally, mem-
ber firms might well recommend to their clients other securities
of equal value that were listed locally rather than those traded
only in Eastern markets.' "77
A similar view is taken by the Vice President and Secretary of the
Midwest Stock Exchange.
There is no doubt that dual trading will benefit the regional
exchanges; in fact, the increase in dual trading activity in the past
few years has raised internal standards of supervision of trading on
the regional exchanges, and undoubtedly the regional exchanges will
perfect and enforce their rules and regulations so as to minimize the
opportunity for manipulation in unlisted securities.
Although the volume of trading in unlisted stocks and bonds is
decreasing yearly on the American Stock Exchange, unlisted trading
on the regional securities exchanges is only beginning to exhibit its
importance. Clearly the practice of unlisted trading is not a vanish-
ing art, but rather a mushrooming innovation presently emerging
on the regional exchanges which might cause regulatory concern to
the SEC in the years ahead.
STEVEN H. LEVENHERZ
"WALTER, THE ROLE OF REGIONAL SECURITY EXCHANGES 31 (1957).
See also, Stock Market Study Hearings, 84th Cong., 1st Sess. 241 (1955);
Hearings Before the Senate Committee on Banking and Currency, 84th
Cong., 1st Sess. at 241 (1955).
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CHART I
PART I
NUMBER OF STOCKS ON THE EXCHANGES IN THE VARIOUS
UNLISTED CATEGORIES AS OF JUNE 30, 19651
Exchanges Unlisted Only2  Listed and Registered on Another
Exchange
Clause Clause Clause Clause Clauses'(1) (3) (1) (2,) (3)
American 113 2 15 3 1
Boston 0 0 121 248 0
Chicago Board of Trade 0 0 3 0 0
Cincinnati 0 0 0 136 0
Detroit 0 0 13 187 0
Honolulu 13 0 0 0 0
Midwest 0 0 0 125 0
Pacific Coast 1 0 55 171 0
Plila-Balt-Washington 2 0 201 297 0
Pittsburgh 0 0 16 65 0
Salt Lake 2 0 0 0 1
Spokane 3 0 1 2 0
Wheeling4  0 0 0 0 0
TOTAL5  134 2 425 1,234 2
,SEC, 31st Ann. Rep., Table 9. 171 (1965). The categories used reflect Clauses (1), (2), and (3) of section 12 (f)
of the Exchange Act, as in effect prior to the 1964 Amendments.2None of these issues have listed stocks on domestic exchanges.
3Thea have become listed and registered on other national securities exchanges subsequent to the time they were
admittted to unlisted trading privileges.
'The Wheeling Stock Exchange dissolved and terminated its exemption from registration as a national securities
exchange effective 4130/65.
ODuplication of issues among exchanges bring the figures to more than the actual number of issues involved.
CHART I
PART II
UNLISTED SHARE VOLUMES ON THE EXCHANGES-
CALENDAR YEAR 1964
Exchanges Unlisted Only Listed and Registered on Another
Exchange
Clause Clause Clause Clause Clause(1) (s) (1) (2) (3)
American 23,574,054 16,940 5,466,660 4,032,000 27,510
Boston 0 0 2,190,933 2,221,728 0
Chicago Board of Trade 0 0 0 0 0
Cincinnati 0 0 602,531 0
Detroit 0 0 548,802 7,331,663 0
Honolulu 65,180 0 0 0 0
Midwest 0 0 0 16,400,855 0
Pacific Coast 23,429 0 5,543,927 10,344,890 0
Phila.-Balt.-Wash. 0 6,010,126 6,585,844 0
Pittsburgh 0 0 243,426 304,469
Salt Lake 406 0 0 0
Spokane 841,300 0 9,937 60,513 0
Wheeling 0 0 0 991 0
24,504,369 16,940 20,013,811 47,885,524 27,510TOTAL
UNLISTED TRADING
CHART II
TRADING VOLUME OF FULLY LISTED ISSUES COMPARED TO
THAT OF UNLISTED ISSUES'
In previous reports attention was called to the fact that since the
enactment of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, with its prohibi-
tions and restrictions against the admission of new securities to
unlisted trading, the volume of trading in fully listed securities
(particularly stocks) is coming to represent an ever-increasing pro-
portion of the total trading volume of the Exchange. This trend
continued in 1965 as evidenced by the following table, from which
it will be noted that the percentage of trading volume in fully listed
stock issues on the Exchange in 1965 amounted to 92.82%, com-
pared with 91.15% in 1964.
VOLUME OF TRADING
STOCKS Listed Unlisted Total
1965 495,858,689 (92.82%) 38,363,310 (7.18%) 534,221,999 (100%)
1964 341,066,678 (91.15%) 33,117,164 (8.85%) 374,183,842 (100%)
1963 286,826,110 (90.56%) 29,908,952 ( 9.44%) 316,735,062 (100%)
1962 276,090,210 (89.47%) 32,519,094 (10.53%) 308,609,304 (100%)
1961 436,162,950 (89.22%) 52,668,087 (10.78%) 488,831,037 (100%)
1960 249,971,471 (87.39%) 36,068,511 (12.61%) 286,039,982 (100%)
1959 328,560,667 (87.84%) 45,497,879 (12.16%) 374,058,546 (100%)
1958 204,119,378 (84.92%) 36,239,146 (15.08%) 240,368,524 (100%)
1957 181,073,796 (84.61%) 32,937,770 (15.39%) 214,011,566 (100%)
1956 189,422,438 (82.99%) 38,808,609 (17.01%) 228,231,047 (100%)
1955 181,840,462 (79.42%) 47,115,853 (20.58%) 228,956,315 (100%)
1950 61,262,801 (56.83%) 46,529,539 (43.17%) 107,792,340 (100%)
1945 72,376,565 (50.50%) 70,932,727 (49.50%) 143,309,292 (100%)
1941 18,098,385 (52.22%) 16,557,969 (47.78%) 34,656,354 (100%)
1936 50,219,304 (37.50%) 83,691,128 (62.50%) 133,910,432 (100%)
BONDS
1965 $141,748,000 (96.48%) $5,179,000 ( 3.52%) $146,927,000 (100%)
1964 98,246,000 (94.57%) 5,640,000 ( 5.43%) 103,886,000 (100%)
1963 71,662,000 (92.71%) 5,631,000 ( 7.29%) 77,293,000 (100%)
1962 72,173,000 (93.12%) 5,335,000 ( 6.88%) 77,508,000 (100%)
1961 49,127,000 (80.03%) 6,057,000 (10.97%) 55,184,000 (100%)
1960 27,003,000 (82.65%) 5,667,000 (17.35%) 32,670,000 (100%)
1959 25,563,000 (79.46%) 6,608,000 (20.54%) 32,171,000 (100%E)
1958 15,533,000 (68.16%) 7,257,000 (31.84%) 22,790,000 (100%)
1957 10,536,000 (63.71%) 6,002,000 (36.29%) 16,538,000 (100%)
1956 13,534,000 (60.74%) 8,748,000 (39.26%) 22,282,000 (100%)
1955 15,911,000 (45.04%) 19,419,000 (54.96%) 35,330,000 (100%)
1950 12,029,000 (25.30%) 35,520,000 (74.70%) 47,549,000 (100%)
1945 11,316,000 ( 6.76%) 156,017,000 (93.24%) 167,333,000 (100%)
1911 23,726,000 ( 9.50%) 225,999,000 (90.50%) 249,725,000 (100%)
1936 50,679,000 (6.10%) 772,506,000 (93.90%) 823,185,000 (100%)
'This is a reproduction of American Stock Exchange Annual Satistical Review 1965, (February 25, 1966) p. 24.
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Taxation-Business Expenses Deduction of Clayton Act
Treble Damages
For many years the Commissioner of Internal Revenue has de-
nied, on grounds of public policy, the deduction under section 162
of the Internal Revenue Code of fines and penalties arising from
business activities.' The Commissioner seemingly reversed himself,
however, when he announced in Revenue Ruling 64-224 that treble
damages paid by manufacturers to their customers in settlement of
suits brought under section 4 of the Clayton Act could be deducted
as a business expense.2
In the recent case of Commissioner v. Tellier' the United States
Supreme Court laid down a three part test for non-deductibility that
throws doubt on the correctness of Revenue Ruling 64-224. In
'4A MERTONS, LAW OF FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION §§ 25.50-53 (1966).
Section 162(a) allows a deduction for "all the ordinary and necessary ex-
penses paid or incurred during the taxable year in carrying on any trade or
business. . . ." The early cases disallowing deductions for fines and penalties
followed a theory that no such expenses were "ordinary and necessary."
E.g., Burroughs Bldg. Material Co. v. Commissioner, 47 F.2d 178, 180 (2d
Cir. 1931). Generally, however, "ordinary and necessary" requires only
that an expense be directly related to a business and considered "helpful"
within the trade as a means of pursuing that business. Commissioner v.
Heininger, 320 U.S. 467, 471 (1943); Welch v. Helvering, 290 U.S. 111,
113-14 (1933); Kornhauser v. United States, 276 U.S. 145, 153 (1928).
More recent cases attempt to determine if the expense is ordinary and neces-
sary apart from the question of whether allowance of the deduction would
be against public policy. Coed Records, Inc., 47 T.C. No. 41, (1967);
Tellier v. Commissioner, 342 F.2d 690, 694 (1965), aff'd, 383 U.S. 687(1966). Separation of the two issues is desirable because it focuses the
attention of the court on the policy which is said to require disallowance
rather than on the wrongful conduct of the taxpayer. Where the activity
that gives rise to a fine is one that is uncommon in a trade, it would still be
appropriate to deny a deduction on the grounds that it is not "ordinary and
necessary" apart from considerations of policy. United Draperies, Inc. v.
Commissioner, 340 F.2d 936, 938 (7th Cir. 1965).2 Rev. Rul. 64-224, 1964-2 Cul. BULL. 52. The Ruling was issued in the
wake of the famous "Philadelphia electric cases" in which many of the
nations manufacturers of heavy electrical equipment were found guilty of
rigging prices submitted to both public and private utility companies. Under
the criminal provisions of the Sherman Act the manufacturing corporations
were heavily fined; some 30 corporate executives received fines, and in a
few cases, prison sentences. 1800 civil suits were then brought under the
Clayton Act, and it has been estimated that at least $300,000,000 has been
paid out by the electric companies in settlement of them. See STAFF OF
JOINT COMMITrEE ON INTERNAL REVENUE TAXATION, 89TH CONG., 2D SESS.,
STAFF STUDY OF INCOME TAX TREATMENT OF TREBLE DAMAGE PAYMENTS
UNDER THE ANTITRUST LAWS 1-3 (Comm. Print 1965).
"383 U.S. 687 (1966).
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Tellier the issue was whether expenses for counsel incurred in a
losing fight against a criminal charge growing out of the conduct of
a business could be deducted as a business expense. The opinion
states that an expense may be disallowed when allowance would
frustrate a sharply defined policy of some other state or federal law.
Further, the policy that might be frustrated must be one that is
evidenced in a governmental declaration. Finally, the frustration
which would result from allowance of the deduction must be severe
to justify disallowance. In Tellier the deduction was allowed be-
cause there is no policy against the employment of counsel that
could be frustrated by a deduction. The question this note attempts
to answer is whether a deduction for treble damages paid by manu-
facturers convicted of price fixing should be disallowed under the
three part test of Tellier.
DoEs ALLOWANCE FRUSTRATE SHARPLY DEFINED POLICY
OF THE CLAYTON ACT?
If the treble damages provided by section 4 of the Clayton Act
are punitive, i.e., if the policy of section 4 is to deter price fixing, a
strong argument can be made that deduction of those damages
should not be allowed. The Commissioner continued to maintain
that amounts paid for fines and penalties should not be deducted as
a business expense,4 because to do so would reduce the "sting" of
the penalty and thereby encourage the taxpayer to violate the statute
under which the penalty was imposed.5 If, however, the purpose
of the treble damages of the Clayton Act is to compensate the party
injured in his business, the deduction should be allowed, just as
compensatory damages paid by a business after judgment in a negli-
'Coed Records, Inc., 47 T.C. No. 41 (1967).
'Tank Truck Rentals, Inc. v. Commissioner, 356 U.S. 30, 36 (1958).
It has been pointed out that disallowance of a deduction does more than
merely protect the policy of the statute that has been violated. When no
deduction is given, the burden of the penalty is increased because the tax-
payer must pay tax on money that he does not have. Since the economic
impact of disallowance can vary greatly on different facts, and since this in-
crease in tax burden may or may not show any relationship to the penalty
provided by the statute that has been violated, critics have suggested that
the doctrine of disallowance should be abandoned unless the statute that
provides the penalty should itself call for disallowance of a deduction. Com-
ment, Business Expenses, Disallowance, and Public Policy: Some Problens
of Sanctioning with the Internal Revenue Code, 72 YALE L.J. 116-23 (1962) ;
Keesling, Illegal Transactions and the Income Tax, 5 U.C.L.A. L. R-v. 26,
34-40 (1958).
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gence suit are deducted.' It is also possible that the treble damages
of section 4 may serve both punitive and compensatory policies.
In this case it would seem that the deduction should be disallowed
to prevent frustration of one of the policies of the Clayton Act.'
In Revenue Ruling 64-224 the Commissioner takes the position
that the treble damages of section 4 of the Clayton Act are com-
pensatory in nature.8 The legislative history of both the Sherman
Act and the Clayton Act supports his position. Sections 1, 2, and 3
of the Sherman Act provide a fine of $50,000 and imprisonment
for one year for violation of its provisions,9 and it is clear that
this fine may not be deducted as a business expense.' In contra-
distinction section 4 of the Clayton Act refers to "threefold dam-
ages" for "any person who shall be injured in his business or prop-
erty."" Section 4A of the Clayton Act provides "actual damages"
whenever the United States is injured by a violation of the antitrust
laws.' 2 During the debate Senator Sherman compared the two types
of provisions ::"
It is the second section that gives the civil suit, and that is not
to be prosecuted at all by the United States .... The first section
deals with the public injury to the people of the United States
and there the suit is brought . . . to restrain, limit, and control
such arrangements as far as they are illegal. The second section
gives a private remedy to every person injured. It seems to me
the two sections are as distinct from each other as possible.
When asked more specifically if the treble damages of the proposed
legislation were penal in nature, Senator Regan said, "This mea-
sure is given a civil remedy. It is not in the nature of a prosecution
for crime."' 4
'Helvering v. Hampton, 79 F.2d 358 (1935).
" In Cox v. Lykes, 237 N.Y. 376, 143 N.E. 226 (1924) (Cardoza, J.), it
was said, "We are to remember that the same provision may be penal as to
the offender and remedial as to the sufferer .... The nature of the problem
will determine whether we are to take one viewpoint of the other."
'Rev. Rul. 64-224, 1964-2 Cum. BULL. 52.
°69 Stat. 282 (1955), 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-3 (1964).1' See Anthony Cornero Stralla, 9 T.C. 801 (1949) (fines against illegal
gambling business); Universal Atlas Cement Co.- v. Commissioner, 9 T.C.
971 (1947), aff'd, 171 F.2d 294 (2d Cir. 1948), cert. denied, 336 U.S. 962(1949) (state antitrust fines) ; I. T. 1174, I-1 Cum. BuLL. 269 (1922).1138 Stat. 731 (1914), 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1964).
1269 Stat. 212 (1955), 15 U.S.C. § 15a (1964).
1121 CONG. Rzc. 2563 (1890).
1421 CONG. REc. 3147 (1890). The provision under discussion became
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The case law also provides considerable support for the Com-
missioner's position that the treble damages are compensatory. In
United States v. Cooper Corp.'5 it was said that "the [Clayton]
Act envisaged two classes of action-those made available to the
government. . . and, in addition, a right of action for treble damages
granted to redress private injury.""" Cases involving other statutory
damages analogous to the treble damages of the Clayton Act fre-
quently stress the compensatory aspect of those damages. In Over-
night Transport Corp. v. Missel'7 it was held that statutory double
damages paid by an employer to an employee for failure to pay
required overtime were compensatory. The theory of Missel is that
the excess over actual damages provided by the statute is supplied
not to punish, but to insure that the injured party will not be pre-
vented from attaining an adequate recovery by the cost of a lengthy
and complicated suit or difficulty in proving his damages.' Section
4 of the Clayton Act may reflect a similar policy in that it provides
not only for enhanced damages but for the costs of suit and a
reasonable attorney's fee as well.' 9 Finally the Commissioner can
also point to an older Ruling in which treble damages for payments
to private parties under the Emergency Price Control Act of 1942
were held deductable.20
section 7 of the Sherman Act, 26 Stat. 210 (1890). It was taken over, with
minor changes, to become section 4 of the Clayton Act in 1914. When the
fine under the Sherman Act was increased in 1955 from $5000 to $50,000,
committee reports were issued indicating that the only penalties provided by
antitrust law were those in the Sherman Act. t.R. R P,. No. 618, 84th
Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1955); S. REP. No. 70, 84th Cong., 1st Sess. 3 (1955).
' 312 U.S. 600 (1941).
2
0 Id. at 608
17316 U.S. 572 (1942).8Id. at 583. The Commissioner also points to Huntington v. Attrill, 146
U.S. 657, 686 (1892), holding that statutory damages are not penal in nature
for purposes of enforcement of a judgment in a foreign jurisdiction, and to
Brady v. Daly, 175 U.S. 148, 153 (1899), holding statutory damages not
penal for application of a statute of limitations. The force of such cases is
greatly reduced by the more recent case of Testa v. Katt, 330 U.S. 386(1947) where it was held that even if the damages provided by a federal
statute were considered penal, state courts would have to take jurisdiction
over an action brought before them. Where a federal statute is involved, it
is no longer necessary to label the damages "compensatory" in order to get
a trial in a state court.
'°38 Stat. 731 (1914), 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1964).
"I. T. 3630, 1943 Cum. Buml. 113. Chiefly because of the precedent of
I. T. 3630, the Antitrust Division of the Department of Justice has accepted
the viewpoint of the Internal Revenue Service. This acceptance is impor-
tant because another clue to the policy expressed by statutory damages may
be found in the opinion of the administrative agency in charge of enforce-
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Cases dealing specifically with Clayton Act recoveries contradict
the Commissioner, however, in treating the two-thirds of an award
that is in excess of actual damages as punitive in character. In
Commissioner v. Glenshaw Glass Corp.,21 where the taxpayer was
an injured party who had received a treble damage award, the one-
third actual damage was taxable to the recipient because it was com-
pensation for lost income. It was held that the two-thirds excess
damages were also taxable to the recipient, even though these dam-
ages were punitive. It would seem that whether the actual damages
are taxable to the recipient as a replacement of lost income or are
considered a tax free return of capital, they are compensatory from
the point of view of the party paying the damages. In either event,
however, the two-thirds excess would be characterized as penal.
Lower court opinions express a theory that these punitive excess
damages were made available to multiply the agencies that would
help support the act,22 increase public respect for the Sherman Act,
and provide a "sanction allowed to a private litigant, because of the
public interest."' '24
The Commissioner's case is further weakened by a surprising
inconsistency within Revenue Ruling 64-224 itself. A second hold-
ing of the Ruling is that actual damages paid to the government as
an injured party under section 4A of the Clayton Act may not be
deducted by the taxpayer as a business expense:
Amounts paid in satisfaction of damage claims by the United
States under section 4A of the Clayton Act . . .although re-
sembling restitution, are in effect punishment for injury to the
public occasioned by the violation of law. . . . The illegality
ment of the act providing the damages. See Jerry Rossman Corp. v. Com-
missioner, 175 F.2d 711, 713 (2d Cir. 1949). Although the Antitrust
Division has expressed willingness to argue that Clayton Act damages are
a penalty, it feels that allowance of the deduction will not necessarily en-
courage potential violators of the Sherman Act to treat the possibility of
incurring treble damages as a "business risk." Even if full deduction is
allowed, the business suffering judgment will still, if the income tax rate is
50%, be subjected to an irreplaceable loss of 150% on every dollar that is
earned in violation of the Sherman Act. STAFF OF THE JOINT COMMITTEE
ON INTERNAL REVENUE TAXATION, STAFF STUDY OF INcOME TAX TREAT-
MENT OF TREBLE DAMAGE PAYMENTS UNDER THE ANTITRUST LAws, Appen-
dix E (Comm. Print Nov. 1, 1965).
2 348 U.S. 426 (1955).
'
2Kinnear-Weed Corp. v. Humble Oil & Refining Co., 214 F.2d 891, 893
(5th Cir. 1954) (dictum).
:'Maltz v. Sax, 134 F.2d 24 (7th Cir. 1943).
2' Karseal Co. v. Richfield Oil Co., 221 F.2d 358, 365 (1955) (dictum).
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giving rise to the damage combined with the fact that the injury
is inflicted upon the Government requires that such payments not
be allowed as deductions.
The language of section 4A and section 4 is practically identical.
It is a strange result that "actual damages" when paid to the gov-
ernment are punitive and "threefold damages" paid to private liti-
gants are entirely compensatory. In both situations illegality gives
rise to damages. If the recoupment of actual damages by the gov-
ernment is "in effect punishment for injury to the public," it does
not seem unreasonable to assume that excess damages awarded to
private litigants may contain an element of punishment. When the
government is injured by an antitrust violation it has the purely
punitive provisions of the antitrust statutes at its disposal. If the
compensation for actual damages is also punishment, this fact tends
to blur the distinction that might otherwise be made between the
purely punitive provisions of antitrust laws and the multiple dam-
ages of the Clayton Act. Even if the distinction made by the Com-
missioner is not completely arbitrary,25 it certainly suggests that
if a court were presented with the issue of whether the treble dam-
ages of the Clayton Act contain an element of punitive damages
designed to protect the public, it might well find that they do.
Is THERE A SUFFICIENT GOVERNMENTAL DECLARATION?
If there is a penal policy in the treble damages of section 4 of
the Clayton Act, there is a sufficient governmental declaration of
that policy in the antitrust statutes to satisfy the second require-
ment for disallowing a deduction in Tellier. It is only required that
the policy be evidenced in some statute or regulation and not that
it be explicitly announced or defined.26 This requirement originated
in Lilly v. Commissioner7 where opticians were disallowed a deduc-
tion for kickbacks paid to ophthalmologists who were sending them
business. The tax court reasoned that since these payments were
considered unethical by the medical profession, to allow their deduc-
tion would frustrate a public policy against them. In reversing, the
United States Supreme Court refused to allow the tax court to roam
For a vigorous defense of the Commissioner, see Lamont, Controversial
*Aspects of Ordinary and Necessary Business Expense, 42 TAXEs 829-832
(1964).28383 U.S. 687, 694 (1965).
27343 U.S. 90 (1952).
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the moral landscape in search of policy and imposed the requirement
that before a policy should be invoked against a deduction, it should
be grounded on some official declaration of public law that the acts
involved were objectionable." Since the antitrust statutes set out
both the prohibited conduct and the remedies available, they should
provide sufficient evidence of policy to satisfy the minimal require-
ment of governmental declaration in Tellier.
DOES ALLOWANCE OF THE DEDUCTION FOR TREBLE DAMAGES
PRESENT A "SEVERE" FRUSTRATION OF ANTITRUST POLICY?
The third requirement in Tellier is that the degree of frustration
that would result from a deduction be "severe." ' 9 If there is a
penal policy in Clayton Act treble damages, one can argue that to
allow a deduction would work a direct and severe frustration of
antitrust law.30 The severity test has been used by the United States
Supreme Court, however, not primarily to measure the absolute ef-
fect of allowance of a deduction on the policy of the law that has
been violated, but rather to balance this harmful effect of allowance
against the harmful effect that disallowance will have on the busi-
ness that has claimed the deduction."- This balancing process is
necessary because the legislative history of section 162 shows that
Congress has been less concerned with protecting the public from
28 1d. at 97.
383 U.S. 687, 694.See Commissioner v. Longhorn Portland Cement Co., 148 F.2d 276
(5th Cir. 1945), cert. denied, 326 U.S. 728 (1945), reversing 3 T.C. 310
(1944); Atzingen-Whitehouse Dairy, Inc., 36 T.C. 173 (1961).
"In Tank Truck Rentals v. Commissioner, 356 U.S. 30, 35 (1958), the
use of the severity test was explained,
[T]he test of non-deductability always is the severity and immediacy
of the frustration resulting from allowance of the deduction. The
flexibility of such a standard is necessary if we are to accommodate
both the congressional intent to tax only net income and the presump-
tion against congressional intent to encourage violation of public
policy.
It would appear that the destructive effect of disallowance has also been a
factor in decisions against the Commissioner on grounds other than the
severity test. In Lilly v. Commissioner, 343 U.S. 90 (1952), where the
requirement of governmental declaration was first announced, the Commis-
sioner attempted to impose a total tax of $49,500 on a net profit of $25,000
for one of the taxable years in question. One writer has called this "taxation
of gross income with a vengeance." Paul, The Use of Public Policy by the
Commissioner in Disallowing Deductions, 1954 So. CALiF. TAX INST. 715,
737-42.
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misuse of the expense deduction than it has been interested in estab-
lishing a morally neutral concept of net income.32
The awkwardness of the severity test is dramatically illustrated
by the conflicting results of two cases decided in 1958 on the same
day by the United States Supreme Court. In Tank Truck Rentals,
Inc. v. Comm'r3" the issue was whether fines paid by a trucking
firm for violations of weight statutes could be deducted. The Court
held that they could not, saying that to allow deduction of a pay-
ment that was itself illegal would present the most severe form of
frustration of other law and that allowance of a fine would present
a slightly less severe frustration that could also not be tolerated.34
But in Commissioner v. Sullivan payments of rent and wages in the
operation of a bookmaking establishment were in issue.Y5 Although
a state statute specifically prohibited these payments, 6 the Court
held that they could be deducted: "If we enforce as federal policy
the rule espoused by the Commissioner in this case, we would come
close to making this type of business taxable on the basis of its
gross receipts, while all other business would be taxable on the basis
" The basic purpose of section 162 is to allow a determination of how
much money a business has left over after expenses. In 1913 it was urged
in debate on the first income tax bill that only lawful expenses be allowed
as deductions and the answer, in the words of Senator Williams, could not
have been clearer:
[T]he object of this bill is to tax a man's net income; that is to say,
what he has at the end of the year after deducting from his receipts
his expenditures or losses. It is not to reform men's moral character;
that is not the object of the bill at all. The tax is not levied for the
purpose of restraining people from betting on horse races or upon
"futures," but the tax is framed for the purpose of making a man pay
upon his net income, his actual profit during the year. The law does
not care where he got it from, so far as the tax is concerned, although
the law may very properly care in another way.
50 CONG. REc. 3849 (1913). See also SEIDMAN, LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF
FEDERAL INCOME TAx LAws, 1938-1961, 995-97 (1963). Congress has since
repeatedly refused to include a provision in the Code that would generally
disallow immoral or undesirable expenses. For a detailed review see Com-
ment, Business Expenses, Disallowance, and Public Policy: Some Problems
of Sanctioning with the Internal Revenue Code, 72 YALE LJ. 111-112
(1962).
83356 U.S. 30 (1958).3
'Id. at 35.
356 U.S. 27 (1958).
8 Thus bringing the issue squarely within the language of the Tank
Truck Rentals, which should result in disallowance. This is distinguishable
from the situation where deduction of an otherwise legal expense incurred in
the pursuit of an illegal business is allowed. Compare Commissioner v.
Doyle, 231 F.2d 635, 637 (7th Cir. 1956) with Allen v. Commissioner, 283
F.2d 785, 790 (1960).
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of net income. If that choice is to be made, Congress should do it."
The court then said that only if it were "clear that the allowance is
a device to avoid the consequences of violations of law" should the
deduction be disallowed.17
How then would Clayton Act treble damages be treated under
the severity test? On the one hand, allowance of the deduction
certainly permits the taxpayer to "avoid the consequences" of an
antitrust violation, and, if this dictum in Sullivan is followed, the
deduction should be disallowed.88 Where a Clayton Act suit is based
on a prior criminal conviction under the Sherman Act, 9 there is an
appealing argument that the relatively weak provisions of the Sher-
man Act should be buttressed through disallowance.4" On the other
hand, payment of treble damages can have a heavy impact on a firm.
If this impact is so great as to destroy or seriously impair a firm's
competitive position,41 disallowance of the deduction would conflict
"'356 U.S. 27, 29 (1958).
"Ibid.
"Where there has been a criminal conviction, there is no doubt that the
guilty parties knowingly entered into a conspiracy to restrain trade and it is
under these circumstances that the deterrence of non-deductability would be
most useful. In litigation over deductability of 'damages paid under the
Emergency Price Control Act of 1942 a distinction between willful and
innocent violations was made with the result that deduction was denied
where the violation was willful but allowed where innocent. Compare Na-
tional Brass Works, Inc. v. Commissioner, 16 T.C. 1051 (1951), af'd, 205
F.2d 104 (9th Cir. 1953) with Jerry Rossman Corp. v. Commissioner, 175
F.2d 711 (2d Cir. 1949).
" The number of Clayton Act suits has increased greatly in recent years
to the point where they may be considered a major means of enforcement
of antitrust law. Bicks, The Department of Justice and Private Treble
Damage Actions, 4 ANTITRUST BULL. 5 (1959). If private claimants must
pay income tax on the two-thirds excess damages received, see note 21
supra, it would perhaps be desirable to offset this factor deterring claimants
from exercising their enforcement function with a concomitant factor of
non-deductability to deter potential violators. On the other hand, it might
be more desirable in view of the basic policy of encouragement of competi-
tion to encourage claimants by excluding the two-thirds excess from gross
income and allowing deductions by defendants. See generally Loevinger,
Private Action--The Strongest Pillar of Antitrust, 3 ANTITRUST BULL. 167
(1958).
' fie Attorney General has recognized the danger of excessive damages
to the competitive positions of firms, especially small firms, in his own suits
on behalf of the United States for actual damages under 4A of the Clayton
Act. In recent suits following the "Philadelphia electric cases" the Attorney
General settled for as much as 10% of total sales with major manufacturers
and as little as 2% from small firms. STAFF OF THE JOINT COMMITE ON
INTERNAL REVENUE TAXATION, STAFF STUDY OF INCOME TAX TREATMENT
OF TREBLE DAMAGE PAYMENTS UNDER THE ANTITRUST LAWS, 9-11 (Comm.
Print Nov. 1, 1965).
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with both the policy of the Internal Revenue Code to tax only net
income and the policy of the Sherman Act to encourage competi-
tion.4 2 If presented with a case where disallowance of the deduction
would have a crippling effect on a firm, a court might be motivated,
although it could not easily say so, to allow the deduction in order
to protect the competitive position of the firm. In this event the
court could allow the deduction, as in Sullivan, by stressing the
intent of Congress to tax only net income. Such a holding would
amount, however, to virtual abandonment of disallowance of deduc-
tions for fines and penalties on the grounds of public policy.
CONCLUSION
It is apparent that there is no clear answer to the question
whether allowance of the deduction for treble damages frustrates
policy of the Clayton Act because it is unclear whether that policy
is penal or compensatory. There is, however, a sufficient govern-
mental declaration to justify a decision either way, and if a court
were to find a significant penal policy present in the Clayton Act,
the first and second tests in Tellier for disallowing a deduction
would be met. Furthermore, under the dictum in Sullivan, if a
penal policy were found in the Clayton Act, the third test of severity
would be met. In view of the ease, however, with which the United
States Supreme Court abandoned the position it took in Tank Truck
Rentals when it was faced, in Sullivan, with a business that would
be destroyed by disallowance, it is possible that a deduction for
Clayton Act treble damages might be allowed if necessary to pre-
serve competition. One could argue that since the issues are so un-
certain, the Commissioner was well within proper exercise of dis-
cretion to grant the deduction in a Revenue Ruling. The better
view, however, is that the Commissioner was incorrect to decide a
question of such great public interest in a way that forecloses litiga-
tion.43  HENRY C. MCFADYEN, JR.
4' The emphasis of modern antitrust law has shifted from the negative
"trustbusting" theme of the early 1900's to a more positive theme of main-
taining competition in all possible ways. Penalties which are so great as to
damage ability to compete would be self-defeating. See generally NEALE,
THE ANTITRUST LAWS OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 29-30 (1962).
'" For the views of Senator Hart, Chairman of the Senate Antitrust and
Monopoly Subcommittee, and Representative Celler, Chairman of the House
Committee on the Judiciary and its Antitrust Subcommittee, see 42 TAXES
830 (1964). See generally United States v. Borden, 308 U.S. 188, 187
(1939).
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Torts- Dog Owner's Statutory Liability in North Carolina
Homer Truitt, age five, was bitten by a dog in and about his
left eye. The attack occurred within the city limits of High Point,
Guilford County, North Carolina. Six months later, two claims for
damages were filed with the Board of County Commissioners of
Guilford County, one by the mother in behalf of Homer Truitt for
the dog bite injury, and one by the father for medical expenses he
had paid for the treatment of his son's injury.' The claims were
filed pursuant to N.C. GEN. STAT. § 67-13 (1965)2 the relevant
portions of which are as follows:
The money arising under the provisions of this article [license
tax on dogs3 ] shall be applied to the school funds of the county
in which said tax is collected: Provided, it shall be the duty of
the county commissioners, upon complaint made to them of in-
jury to person or injury to or destruction of property by any
dog, upon satisfactory proof of such injury or destruction, to
appoint three free-holders to ascertain the amount of damages
done, including necessary treatment, if any, and all reasonable
expences incurred, and upon the coming in of the report of such
jury of the damage as aforesaid, the said county commissioners
shall order the same paid out of any moneys arising from the
tax on dogs as provided for in this article....4
'Record, p. 6, In re Truitt, 269 N.C. 249, 152 S.E.2d 74 (1967).
'The following amendments to N.C. GEN. STAT. § 67-13 (1965) are
applicable to Guilford County: N.C. Sess. Laws 1933, ch. 547; N.C. Sess.
Laws 1945, ch. 138; N.C. Sess. Laws 1951, ch. 143.
"Any person owning or keeping about him any . . . dog shall pay
annually a license or privilege tax. . . ." N.C. GEN. STAT. § 67-5 (1965).
This statute levying the dog tax has been upheld as constitutional on two
grounds. The first is that it is a privilege tax levied for a valid public
purpose, that purpose being to get rid of worthless dogs likely to be a
nuisance and to preserve only those valuable enough for their owners to
pay the tax on them. See McAlister v. Yancey County, 212 N.C. 208, 193
S.E. 141 (1937); Newell v. Green, 169 N.C. 462, 86 S.E. 291 (1915);
Mowery v. Town of Salisbury, 82 N.C. 175 (1880). The second is that it is
a valid police regulation to control and to regulate dogs. See Board of
Comm'rs v. George, 182 N.C. 414, 109 S.E. 77 (1921); Newell v. Green,
169 N.C. 462, 86 S.E. 291 (1915). Accord, City of Birmingham v. West, 236
Ala. 434, 183 So. 421 (1938); City of Dickinson v. Thress, 69 N.D. 748,
290 N.W. 653 (1940). See generally Annot., 49 A.L.R. 848 (1927).
'N.C. GEN. STAT. § 67-13 (1965). [Emphasis added.] The statute is
similar to those of other states which impose a tax on dogs with the tax
revenues being used to compensate owners of livestock for injuries to the
livestock caused by dogs. CONN. GEN. STAT. REv. § 22-355 (1958); ILL.
Rnv. STAT. ch. 8, § 15 (1966); IND. ANN. STAT. § 16-324 (1964); MASS.
GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 140, § 161 (1965); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 347.15
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The Board of Commissioners of Guilford County denied these
claims, but on appeal to the superior court, a judgment in favor of
both claimants was entered. The county's appeal to the Supreme
Court of North Carolina unsuccessfully attacked the constitutional-
ity of the statute under which the claimants sued.5 Unconstitution-
ality was asserted on the grounds that the statute: (1) authorizes
the payment of private claims out of dog-tax revenues in violation
of N.C. CoNsT. art. VII, § 6 (which prohibits counties from levy-
ing any tax for expenses other than necessary ones without a vote
of a majority of the electorate) ;6 and (2) contravenes N.C. CONST.
art. I, § 7 (which prohibits the granting of "exclusive or separate
emoluments or privileges"). 7
(1957); Mo. ANY. STAT. § 273.110 (1959); NED. REV. STAT. § 54-603
(1960); N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 466:21 (1955); N.J. REv. STAT. § 4:19-4
(1959); ORio REv. CODE ANN. § 955.29 (1954); ORE. REV. STAT. § 609.170
(1953); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 3, § 488 (1963); R.I. GEN. LAws ANN. §
4-13-20 (1957); VA. CODE ANN. § 29-209 (1964); WASHr. REv. CODE ANN.
§ 16.08.010 (1962); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 174.11 (1957). These statutes are
generally upheld, not as taxes within the "public purpose" concept, but as
valid police regulations. E.g., Wisdom v. Board of Supervisors, 236 Iowa
669, 19 N.W.2d 602 (1945); Nichols v. Logan, 184 Ky. 711, 213 S.W. 181
(1919); Worcester County v. Ashworth, 160 Mass. 186, 35 N.E. 773
(1893); Van Horn v. People, 46 Mich. 183, 9 N.W. 246 (1881); Hofer v.
Carson, 102 Ore. 545, 203 Pac. 323 (1922); State v. Anderson, 144 Tenn.
564, 234 S.W. 768 (1921).
The taxing act having been held valid and its main objective being to
create a fund to pay damage caused by dogs, is not the purpose valid?
... Since the levy for the stated purpose has been declared valid and
not in contravention of the State Constitution, it seems clear the
validity extends to the expenditure of funds for the stated purpose.
Id. at 252, 152 S.E.2d at 76.
'The decisions heretofore rendered by the Court make the test of a
'necessary expense' the purpose for which the expense is to be in-
curred. If the purpose is the maintenance of the public peace or the
administration of justice; if it partakes of a governmental nature or
purports to be an exercise by the city of a portion of the State's dele-
gated sovereignty; if, in brief, it involves a necessary governmental
expense-in these cases the expense required to effect the purpose is
'necessary' within the meaning of Art. VII, sec. 7 [now sec. 6], and
the power to incur such expense is not dependent on the will of the
qualified voters.
Henderson v. City of Wilmington, 191 N.C. 269, 279, 132 S.E. 25, 30
(1926). The county in the principal case contended that the statute autho-
rizing the payment of claims combined with the levy of the dog tax consti-
tuted a levy of a tax to finance a non-necessary expense, that is, compensation
of private claims. Brief for Appellant, pp. 4-8. See also Brief for Appellees,
pp. 2-6.
'The Constitutional limitation contained in Art. I, sec. 7, has been
frequently invoked by this Court to strike down legislation conferring
special privileges not in consideration of public service. . . . But
11191967]
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Under the statute' involved in In re Truitt,9 a party injured by
a dog has a cause of action against the county for his damages; the
county, upon payment of these damages, then has a cause of action
against the dog's owner for reimbursement. This statute' presents
two distinct problems. The first, the constitutional question," has
been considered and answered many times by the North Carolina
Supreme Court,' as it was in the principal case.' 3 The second is
unrelated to the first and has never been answered by the court.
Undecided as yet is the question of what relationship, if any, this
statute bears to the common law liability of dog owners for injuries
inflicted by their dogs. This note will primarily be directed to this
question.1
4
In North Carolina, scienter is the basis of a dog owner's com-
mon law liability for injuries inflicted by his dog.'" Liability arises
where the motivation is for a public purpose and in the public interest,
and does not confer exclusive privilege, legislation has been upheld.
Brumley v. Baxter, 225 N.C. 691, 698, 36 S.E.2d 281, 286 (1945). See
Brief for Appellant, pp. 8-10; Brief for Appellees, pp. 7-8.
'N.C. GEN. STAT. § 67-13 (1965).
0269 N.C. 249, 152 S.E.2d 74 (1967).
"oN.C. GEN. STAT. § 67-13 (1965).
"Though legislative determination of what constitutes a public purpose
and a necessary expense is given great weight by the Court, the final de-
termination is for the Court. Horton v. Redevelopment Comm'n, 259 N.C.
605, 131 S.E.2d 464 (1963); Dennis v. City of Raleigh, 253 N.C. 400, 116
S.E.2d 923 (1960); Nash v. Town of Tarboro, 227 N.C. 283, 42 S.E.2d
209 (1947); Purser v. Ledbetter, 227 N.C. 1, 40 S.E.2d 702 (1946); Palmer
v. Haywood County, 212 N.C. 284, 193 S.E. 668 (1937); Starmount Co. v.
Hamilton Lakes, 205 N.C. 514, 171 S.E. 909 (1933).
1" The constitutional determination has been more by implication than
by direct holding on the precise issue of whether the expense is a necessary
one. White v. Commissioners, 217 N.C. 329, 7 S.E.2d 825 (1940); Mc-
Alister v. Yancey County, 212 N.C. 208, 193 S.E. 141 (1937); Board of
Comm'rs v. George, 182 N.C. 414, 109 S.E. 77 (1921); Newell v. Green,
169 N.C. 462, 86 S.E. 291 (1915).
" The answer given by the court to the constitutional challenge was
that the expenditure of county funds to pay these claims was for a valid
public purpose. In re Truitt, 269 N.C. 249, 152 S.E.2d 74 (1967).
" An analysis of the basis of the dog owner's responsibility under the
statute is based on the assumption that the dog owner can be found and
is capable of reimbursing the county for the amount of damages paid out
by it. The statute, however, does call for the county's payment of claims
even where no possibility of reimbursement is present, that is, where the
owner is unknown. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 67-13 (1965).
1" See Sink v. Moore, 267 N.C. 344, 148 S.E.2d 265 (1966); Pegg v.
Gray, 240 N.C. 548, 82 S.E.2d 757 (1954); Hobson v. Holt, 233 N.C. 81,
62 S.E.2d 524 (1950); Plumides v. Smith, 222 N.C. 326, 22 S.E.2d 713
(1942); Hill v. Moseley, 220 N.C. 485, 17 S.E.2d 676 (1941); Rector v.
Southern Coal Co, 192 N.C. 804, 136 S.E. 113 (1926); State v. Smith, 156
N.C. 628, 72 S.E. 321 (1911).
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only if two essential factors are present :1 the animal that inflicts the
injury possesses a "vicious propensity,"' and the owner has actual
or constructive knowledge of such propensity.' When these two
prerequisites are established, the owner's liability is predicated on
his negligent failure to confine or restrain the dog. 9 But in many
jurisdictions negligence need not be shown, and the owner's liability
is based upon scienter alone,"0 on the theory that he is harboring a
6 Pegg v. Gray, 240 N.C. 548, 82 S.E.2d 757 (1954) ; Plumides v. Smith,
222 N.C. 326, 22 S.E.2d 713 (1942) ; Rector v. Southern Coal Co., 192 N.C.
804, 136 S.E. 113 (1926); 66 A.L.R.2d 916, 921-22 (1959). The complaint
of an injured party is fatally defective without allegation of both of these
factors. Sellers v. Morris, 233 N.C. 560, 64 S.E.2d 662 (1951).
17 The term "vicious propensity" ".... does not connote a mere play-
ful canine trickster. It connotes conduct 'producing or tending to
produce mischief or harm; injurious; deleterious; hurtful.' . . . On
the other hand, if the habit of the dog is one which is likely to cause
injury, it is immaterial that the dog was playing."
Sink v. Moore, 267 N.C. 344, 350, 148 S.E.2d 265, 269-70 (1966).
Accord, Hill v. Moseley, 220 N.C. 485, 17 S.E.2d 676 (1942).
"8 The dog is no longer entitled to one bite before the owner can be
charged with knowledge of the vicious propensity. "Under the modem view
trial courts undertake to judge [the owner's knowledge] of the vicious
propensities of animals by their behavior, although it may fall short of
actual injury." Hill v. Moseley, 220 N.C. 485, 489, 17 S.E.2d 676, 678
(1942). See RESTATEMENT, TORTS § 509, comment g (1938). Evidence of
the dog's reputation is generally admissible to establish knowledge on the
part of the dog owner of the vicious propensity, though it is inadmissible
as proof of the dog's vicious propensity. Hill v. Moseley, 220 N.C. 485,
17 S.E.2d 676 (1942).
"9 The test of liability under such an interpretation is ... whether
the owner should know from the dog's past conduct that he is likely,
if not restrained, to do an act from which a reasonable person, in the
position of the owner, could foresee that an injury to the person or
property of another would be likely to result."
Sink v. Moore, 267 N.C. 344, 350, 148 S.E.2d 265, 270 (1966); State v.
Smith, 156 N.C. 628, 72 S.E. 321 (1911). Accord, Williams v. Moray, 74
Ind. 25, 39 Am. Rep. 76 (1881); Brune v. DeBenedetty, 261 S.W. 930
(Mo. Ct. App. 1924); Moore v. McKay, 55 S.W.2d 865 (Tex. Ct. App.
1933). Other than the negligence theory, tvo other interpretations of the
scienter action have been advanced. (1) The owner is harboring a nuisance
by keeping a vicious dog. Turner v. Shropshire, 285 Ky. 256, 147 S.W.2d
388 (1941); Tidal Oil Co. v. Forcum, 189 Okla. 268, 116 P.2d 572 (1941).
(2) The owner is strictly liable for keeping a vicious dog. Zarek v. Fred-
ericks, 138 F.2d 689 (3d Cir. 1943); Brewer v. Furtwangler, 171 Wash.
617, 18 P.2d 837 (1933); RESTATEMENT, TORTS § 509 (1938); Annot., 66
A.L.R.2d 916, 922 (1959). North Carolina rejects the view that the owner's
knowledge of the vicious propensity creates strict liability, in favor of
coupling a higher standard of care, based on the owner's higher knowledge,
with the general rule that one having charge of an animal must exercise
ordinary care in keeping it restrained. Herndon v. Allen, 253 N.C. 271,
116 S.E.2d 728 (1960).
2 See notes 21 and 22 infra.
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nuisance" or that he is strictly liable. 2
The requirements for imposing liability on a dog owner in a
particular jurisdiction determine what defenses are available to the
dog owner.' Thus, in jurisdictions such as North Carolina where
the scienter action depends on the owner's negligence in failing to
restrain the dog, the injured party's contributory negligence pre-
cludes his recovery?4 However, in jurisdictions that impose liability
for keeping a vicious dog without proof of negligence in the man-
ner of keeping it,25 contributory negligence is not available as a de-
fense to the dog owner.2 Yet courts of these jurisdictions are re-
luctant to deprive the dog owner of all defenses, and they tradition-
ally bar recovery if plaintiff's conduct amounts to voluntary assump-
tion of the risk 7 or intentional provocation of the dog's attack.28
An examination of the statute29 involved in In re Truitt ° may
be helpful before an attempt is made to ascertain what relationship,
" Turner v. Shropshire, 285 Ky. 256, 147 S.W.2d 388 (1941); Tidal Oil
Co. v. Forcum, 189 Okla. 268, 116 P.2d 572 (1941).
"Zarek v. Fredericks, 138 F.2d 689 (3d Cir. 1943); Brewer v. Furt-
wangler, 171 Wash. 617, 18 P.2d 837 (1933).
" See Annot., 66 A.L.R.2d 916 (1959).
"
4A bare majority of jurisdictions take this position. E.g., Frederickson
v. Kepner, 82 Cal. App. 2d 905, 187 P.2d 800 (Dist. Ct. App. 1947);
Swerdfeger v. Krueger, 145 Colo. 180, 358 P.2d 479 (1960); Ryan v.
Marren, 216 Mass. 556, 104 N.E. 353 (1914). Though in Hill v. Moseley,
220 N.C. 485, 17 S.E.2d 676 (1942), the court expressed some doubt as to
whether knowledge of a dog's vicious propensity creates strict liability, the
strict liability theory was rejected and contributory negligence was accepted
as a defense by Hobson v. Holt, 233 N.C. 81, 62 S.E.2d 524 (1950).
25 See note 24 supra.
20 Burke v. Fischer, 298 Ky. 157, 182 S.W.2d 638 (1944) ; Tidal Oil Co.
v. Forcum, 189 Okla. 268, 116 P.2d 572 (1941); Brewer v. Furtwangler,
171 Wash. 617, 18 P.2d 837 (1933).
"'Burke v. Fischer, 298 Ky. 157, 182 S.W.2d 638 (1944); Corley v.
Hubbard, 129 Neb. 38, 260 N.W. 551 (1935); Silber v. Seidler, 19 Misc. 2d
516, 188 N.Y.S.2d 111 (Sup. Ct. 1959); Brown v. Barber, 26 Tenn. App.
534, 174 S.W.2d 298 (1943); RESTATEMENT, TORTS § 515 (1938). The
availability of the assumption of risk defense to the dog owner is limited
by the rule that a plaintiff does not assume the risk of defendant's negli-
gence. Brune v. DeBenedetty, 261 S.W. 930 (Mo. Ct. App. 1924).
8 Such a defense is applicable where plaintiff knows of the vicious pro-
pensity of a dog and wantonly excites it or unnecessarily puts himself in
the way of the animal so that he brings the injury on himself. Muller v.
McKesson, 73 N.Y. 195, 29 Am. Rep. 123 (1878). Accord, Klatz v. Pfeffer,
333 Ill. 90, 164 N.E. 224 (1928); Tidal Oil Co. v. Forcum, 189 Okla. 268,
116 P.2d 572 (1941); Brown v. Barber, 26 Tenn. App. 534, 174 S.W.2d
298 (1943); Moore v. McKay, 55 S.W.2d 865 (Tex. Ct. App. 1933).
20 N.C. GEN. STAT. § 67-13 (1965).
00269 N.C. 249, 152 S.E.2d 74 (1967).
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if any, it has to the foregoing common law principles. The statute 1
provides that upon complaint made to the county commissioners of
personal injury32 by any dog and upon satisfactory proof of the
injury, the injured party is entitled to recover damages from the
county commissioners for injuries sustained. The county commis-
sioners are then entitled to sue the owner of the dog, if he can be
found, and upon proof of payment of the injured party's claim by
the county, the owner must reimburse the county. 3 Aside from the
circuitous method by which the dog owner's liability is determined,
the statute on its face differs from the common law in three respects.
First, the scienter requirement is not mentioned by the statute; ap-
parently, it is unnecessary for the county to prove the owner knew
or had reason to know of the dog's vicious propensity in order to
hold the owner liable. Second, there is nothing in the statute indi-
cating that an inquiry into the nature of the conduct of the injured
party would be relevant, either by the county commissioners or by
the dog's owner; in other words, the statute on its face preserves no
common law defenses. Third, it is possible that the injured party is
given by this statute an absolute right to recover his damages, and
the dog's owner is placed under an absolute obligation to reimburse
the county. The obvious question posed is whether or not these
differences signify a legislative intent to abrogate, by statute, the
common law principles of liability and to create an entirely new basis
of liability and recovery.
A possible interpretation of the statute34 is that it indicates a
legislative intent to ease the burden of proof of the injured party
and to provide him with a ready and speedy recovery, rather than
an intent to change the negligence basis of liability. This interpreta-
tion is achieved by emphasizing the absence of a scienter require-
ment in the statute and the fact that the recovery is available from
the county. By suing under the statute, an injured party is relieved
of both the delay and expense involved in a suit under the common
law. As soon as he is able to prove a valid claim, he can recover
his damages from the county, thus leaving the burden on the county
to find the dog's owner and to make him pay. The position that the
"
1 N.C. GEN. STAT. § 67-13 (1965).
" The statute also applies to "injury to or destruction of property by
any dog.... ." N.C. GEN. STAT. § 67-13 (1965).
" N.C. GEN. STAT. § 67-13 (1965).
' N.C. GEN. STAT. § 67-13 (1965).
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absence of a scienter requirement manifests legislative intent to ease
the claimant's burden of proof is consistent with the wide-spread
legislative erosion of unduly restrictive common law recovery
theories. "" Many states have enacted so-called "dog bite" statutes that
eliminate the necessity of the injured party's proving scienter on the
part of the dog's owner.3 6 The purpose of abolishing the scienter
requirement in these statutes was not to heighten the responsibility
of the dog owner, that is, to change the basis of common law
liability, but merely to abolish the common law scienter requirement
that frequently imposed on the claimant a burden of proof unduly
restricting recovery. T
Aside from the fact these statutes ease the burden of proof by
abolishing the scienter requirement, some of them, like the North
Carolina statute, do not expressly provide for retention of any of
the common law defenses ;"' others limit the defenses available to in-
tentional provocation of the dog by the injured party,39 or the in-
jured party's tortious conduct,4°or both.41 Yet even in suits under
"5 See notes 36 and 37 infra. See generally 1960 DuxE L.J. 146 (1960).
" ALA. CODE tit. 3, § 102 (1960); ARiz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 24-521
(1956); CAL. CIV. CODE § 3342; CONN. GEN. STAT. REv. § 22.357 (1958);
FLA. STAT. ANN. § 767.04 (1964); ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 8, § 12d (1966); IND.
ANN. STAT. § 16-214 (1964); IOWA CODE ANN. § 351-28 (1949); MASS.
GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 140, § 155 (1965); Mica. STAT. ANN. § 12.544
(1958); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 347.22 (1957); MONT. REV. CODES ANN. § 17-
409 (1955); NEB. REV. STAT. § 54-601 (1960); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §
466:19 (1955); N.J. R1v. STAT. ANN. § 4:19-16 (1959); OHIo REV. CODE
ANN. § 955.28 (1954); Ox"a STAT. ANN. tit. 4, § 42.1 (1964); R.I.
GEN. LAWS ANN. § 4-13-16 (1956); TENN. CODE ANN. § 44-101 (1964);
UTAH CODE ANN. § 18-1-1 (1953); WASH. REv. CODE ANN. § 16.08.040
(1962); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 19-20-13 (1966); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 174.02
(1957). Alabama, however, allows the owner to plead in mitigation of
damages his lack of scienter of the vicious propensity of the dog. ALA.
CODE tit. 3, § 103 (1960).
"' Ellsworth v. Elite Dry Cleaners, 127 Cal. App. 2d 479, 274 P.2d 17
(Dist. Ct App. 1954); Vandecar v. David, 96 So. 2d 227 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 1957); Wojewoda v. Rybarczyk, 246 Mich. 641, 225 N.W. 555 (1929);
Foy v. Dayko, 82 N.J. Super. 8, 196 A.2d 535 (1964) ; Nelson v. Hansen, 10
Wis. 2d 107, 102 N.W.2d 251 (1960).
"a CAL. CIV. CODE § 3342; NEB. REv. STAT. § 54-601 (1960); R.I. GEN.
LAWS ANN. § 4-13-16 (1956); TENN. CODE ANN. § 44-101 (1964); UTAH
CODE ANN. § 18-1-1 (1953); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 19-20-13 (1966); Wis.
STAT. ANN. § 174.02 (1957).
"9ALA. CODE tit. 3, § 102 (1960); ARIz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 24-523
(1956); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 767.04 (1964); ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 8, § 12d
(1966); IND. ANN. STAT. § 16-214 (1964); Mica. STAT. ANN. § 12.544(1958); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 347.22 (1957); MONT. REV. CODES ANN.§ 17-409 (1955).
'IOWA CODE ANN. § 351.28 (1949); N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 466:20
(1955); N.J. REv. STAT. ANN. § 4:19-16 (1959).
'" CONN. GEN. STAT. Rv. § 22-357 (1958); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch.
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these statutes with limited or no defenses, courts indicate a decided
reluctance to hold the dog's owner liable when the injured party is
guilty of intentional fault.' The common law inquiry into the na-
ture of the injured party's conduct remains intact, at least to the
extent of assumption of the risk and intentional provocation of the
dog.
43
Thus the differences between the common law and the North
Carolina statute do not necessarily warrant the interpretation that
a new basis of liability is created by the statute. Assuming that the
statute does not change the North Carolina negligence theory of
recovery, the significance of the differences between the common law
140, § 155 (1965); OHIo REv. CODE ANN. § 955.28 (1954); OICLA. STAT.
ANN. tit. 4, § 42.1 (1964).
42 Under a statute which did not expressly provide for retention of any
common law defenses, the California Court stated:
We entertain no doubt that in adopting the Statute here in question
the Legislature did not intend to make the liability of the owner abso-
lute and render inoperative certain principles of law such as assump-
tion of risk or wilfully inviting injury. . . . While the Dog Bite
Statute does not found the liability on negligence, good morals and
sound reasoning dictate that if a person lawfully upon the portion of
another's property where the biting occurred should kick, tease, or
otherwise provoke the dog, the law should and would recognize the
defense that the injured person by his conduct invited injury and
therefore, assumed the risk thereof....
Smythe v. Schacht, 93 Cal. App. 2d 315, 209 P.2d 114, 118 (Dist. Ct. App.
1949). Accord, Ellsworth v. Elite Dry Cleaners, 127 Cal. App. 2d 479, 274
P.2d 17 (Dist. Ct. App. 1954); Kowal v. Archibald, 148 Conn. 125, 167
A.2d 859 (1961); Josephson v. Sweet, 173 So. 2d 463 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1964); Vandecar v. David, 96 So. 2d 227 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1957);
Koller v. Duggan, 346 Mass. 270, 191 N.E.2d 475 (1963); Wojewoda v.
Rybarczyk, 246 Mich. 641, 225 N.W. 555 (1929); Lavalle v. Kaupp, 240
Minn. 360, 61 N.W.2d 228 (1953); Gagnon v. Frank, 83 N.H. 122, 139
Atl. 373 (1927); Colby v. Lee, 83 N.H. 303, 142 Atl. 115 (1928); Foy v.
Dayko, 82 N.J. Super. 8, 196 A.2d 535 (1964); Peck v. Williams, 24 R.I.
583, 54 Atl. 381 (1903); Nelson v. Hansen, 10 Wis. 2d 107, 102 N.W.2d
251 (1960); Schraeder v. Koopman, 190 Wis. 459, 209 N.W. 714 (1926);
Legault v. Malacker, 166 Wis. 58, 163 N.W. 476 (1917).
Some jurisdictions, however, require that the fault of the injured party
must amount to assumption of risk or intentional provocation of the dog,
and not just contributory negligence, before his conduct will bar his re-
covery. Doerfler v. Redding, 2 Conn. Cir. 694, 205 A.2d 502 (Cir. Ct. App.
(1964); Duell v. Coyle, 22 Conn. Supp. 332, 171 A.2d 427 (Super. Ct.
1961); Knapp v. Ball, 175 So. 2d 808 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1965); Miles v.
Schrunk, 139 Iowa 563, 117 N.W. 971 (1908); Siegfried v. Everhart, 55
Ohio App. 351, 9 N.E.2d 891 (1936); McCarthy v. Daunis, 167 Atl. 918
(Conn. Sup. Ct. Err. 1933).
,' Quaere whether there is any significance in the fact that in the princi-
pal case counsel for the county was allowed without objection to question
the brother of the injured party with respect to the conduct of the children
around the dog immediately before the injury took place. See Record, p. 26.
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and the statute can be interpreted as follows: the lack of the scienter
requirement in the statute means that the injured party has an easier
burden of proof ;44 the lack of any express retention of common
law defenses means that all defenses4" not expressly abolished by
the statute are retained;46 and the fact the injured party can sue
the county means he can recover his damages quickly. The county's
obligation to pay the injured party's claim and to sue the owner of
the dog would then seem to be based on subrogation principles; only
where the injured party has a valid claim and the owner has no
valid defense would the county pay the claim and seek reimburse-
ment.47
On the other hand, by concentrating solely on the language in
which the dog owner's liability is phrased in the statute, the con-
clusion may also be drawn that the legislature did intend to change
the underlying basis of the dog owner's responsibility to that of
strict liability. The statute plainly provides that the injured party
who can prove his damages shall be compensated for that amount ;48
similarly, the owner of the dog ". . . shall reimburse the county to
the amount paid out [by the county to the injured party] for such
injury. . .. '4" Nowhere in the statute is there express recognition
that any of the common law defenses would be applicable in a suit
under the statute. Such absolute phraseology is characteristic of
"See notes 36 and 37 supra and accompanying text.
"That is, contributory negligence, assumption of risk, and intentional
provocation of the dog.
" See note 42 supra, and especially Nelson v. Hansen, 10 Wis. 2d 107,
102 N.W.2d 251 (1961). So much of the common law as has not been abro-
gated or repealed by statute is in full force and effect in North Carolina.
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 4-1 (1953).
"" "Legal subrogation . . . is a device adopted by equity to compel the
ultimate discharge of an obligation by him who in good conscience ought to
pay it. It arises when one person has been compelled to pay a debt which
ought to have been paid by another and for which the other was primarily
liable." Beam v. Wright, 224 N.C. 677, 683, 32 S.E.2d 213, 218 (1944). The
chance that an injured party could be compensated by the county for a
claim to which the dog owner has a valid defense (which would only be
raised later, in the county's suit against the dog owner) could be eliminated
by joining the dog owner in the proceeding by the injured party against
the county.
""Upon proof of the amount of damages done, "the said county com-
missioners shall order the same paid out of any moneys arising from the tax
on dogs.... ." N.C. GEN. STAT. § 67-13 (1965). Mandamus lies to compel
the county to consider an injured party's claim. White v. Commissioners,
217 N.C. 329, 7 S.E.2d 825 (1940).
" N.C. GEN. STAT. § 67-13 (1965). [Emphasis added.]
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many "dog bite" statutes ;50 yet the courts, excepting only those of
Ohio,5'1 consistently refuse to hold the dog owner liable under these
statutes if the injured party's conduct amounts to assumption of the
risk or to intentional provocation of the dog,52 and in some cases, if
the conduct amounts to contributory negligence. 53 Whether or not
the North Carolina court would follow these states and read de-
fenses into the North Carolina statute is speculative. But the North
Carolina court has indicated, in at least one case,54 that the only
relevant questions in suits under the statute are first, is the defen-
dant (in the county's suit against the dog owner) the owner of the
dog, and second, is the damages award to the injured party reason-
able in amount.55 If this is the extent of the inquiry, then upon
"0 CAL. Civ. CODE § 3342; NEB. REv. STAT. § 54-601 (1960); R.I. GEN.
LAWS ANN. § 4-13-16 (1956); TENN. CODE ANN. § 44-101 (1964); UTAH
CODE ANN. § 18-1-1 (1953); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 19-20-13 (1966); Wis.
STAT. ANN. § 174.02 (1957).
" Inasmuch as contributory negligence of plaintiff, as a defense to an
action, presupposes the existence of negligence upon the part of de-
fendant, and inasmuch as the liability of the owner or harborer of a
dog to one proximately injured by such dog is predicated solely upon
the statute... and not upon the negligence of the owner or harborer
of such dog, contributory negligence of plaintiff, as such, is not a de-
fense to an action for damages brought under the statute for in-juries proximately caused by such dog.
Siegfried v. Everhart, 55 Ohio App. 351, 9 N.E.2d 891, 891 (1936).
Dragonette v. Brandes, 135 Ohio St. 223, 20 N.E.2d 367 (1939).
2 The comment of the California Court is typical: "In adopting section
3342 of the Civil Code, the Legislature did not intend to render inapplicable
such defenses as assumption of risk or wilfully invited injury. Therefore,
those defenses are available in all proper cases." Gomes v. Byrne, 51 Cal.
2d 418, 333 P.2d 754, 755 (Sup. Ct 1959). See, e.g., Vandecar v. David,
96 So. 2d 227 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1957); Foy v. Dayko, 82 N.J. Super. 8,
196 A.2d 535 (1964); Nelson v. Hansen, 10 Wis. 2d 107, 102 N.W.2d 251
(1960).
"' See, e.g., Colby v. Lee, 83 N.H. 303, 142 AtI. 115 (1928); Foy v.
Dayko, 82 N.J. Super. 8, 196 A.2d 535 (1964); Schraeder v. Koopman, 190
Wis. 459, 209 N.W. 714 (1926).
"'Board of Comm'rs v. George, 182 N.C. 414, 109 S.E. 77 (1921).
"
5In a suit by the county commissioners against the dog owner, the
dog owner unsuccessfully contended that the statute denied him his right
to trial by jury. In holding the owner was not so deprived, the court stated:
Upon the trial [in the county's suit against the dog owner] it would
be incumbent upon the commissioners to show by the preponderance
of the evidence that the defendant was the owner of the dog, as well
as the amount of damage; and it would be open to the defendant to
rely upon failure of the plaintiff's proof and, if necessary, upon evi-
dence offered in rebuttal.
Board of Comm'rs v. George, 182 N.C. 414, 418, 109 S.E. 77, 78-79 (1921).
Presumably, the "evidence offered in rebuttal" can only be in rebuttal to
the fact of ownership and to the amount of damage.
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proof of the ownership of the dog and of the reasonableness of the
amount of the damages, the dog owner's obligation to reimburse the
county becomes absolute. No defense he could raise at common
law against the injured party could bar recovery against him in a
suit by the county. Similarly, in the injured party's suit against
the county, the county would be totally unconcerned with whether or
not the conduct of the injured party amounted to contributory negli-
gence, assumption of the risk, or intentional provocation of the dog.
Thus it seems that an injured party, unable to recover at common law
because he assumed the risk or intentionally provoked the attack,
would always elect56 to sue under the statute in order to be compen-
sated for his injuries. In turn the county would sue the dog owner
who is now placed in the position of an insurer for the conduct of
his dog, but only because the injured party elected to sue under the
statute instead of the common law. Thus the statute becomes an
avenue for the payment of claims uncompensable by common law
standards and for the imposition of liability on the dog owner where
the injured party voluntarily incurred his injury. Yet by interpret-
ing the statute literally, no conclusion can be reached other than
that it creates absolute liability.57
Therefore, because the counties to which the statute applies will
continue to be called upon to pay claims of injured parties, and be-
cause the basis of liability of the dog owner is susceptible to con-
flicting interpretations, legislative or judicial clarification of exactly
what was intended by the statute would seem to be in order. Al-
though both interpretations advanced for the basis of liability of the
dog owner result in the dog tax fund's being reimbursed for every
claim paid out by the county (except where the dog owner cannot
be found or where he is judgment-proof), the first interpretation,
that the statute does not create strict liability, unlike the second,
would not require the county to compensate the claims of parties
voluntarily incurring their injuries. Arguably, the public purpose of
such a statute would be more consistently served under the first
" Board of Comm'rs v. George, 182 N.C. 414, 109 S.E. 77 (1921), indi-
cates that an injured party can elect to sue either at common law or under
the statute.
' " 'Where the language of a statute or ordinance is clear and its mean-
ing unmistakable, there is no room for construction, but we merely follow
.the intention as thus plainly expressed.'" Perrell v. Beaty Service Co., 248
N.C. 153, 160, 102 S.E.2d 785, 790 (1958). Accord, Siegfried v. Everhart,
55 Ohio App. 351, 9 N.E.2d 891 (1936).
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interpretation, as parties would not be allowed to profit at public and
private expense from their own intentional acts. A definitive de-
termination of the uncertainties58 now existing in the statute would
allow more effective administration of the statute, would give the
dog owner more adequate notice of the degree of responsibility
placed on him by the statute, and would enable the county, because
the basis of the dog owner's liability is made clear, to defend and
prosecute more effectively suits under the statute.
SUSAN H. EHRINGHAUS
Torts-Rights of Servicemen under Federal Torts Claim Act
Of the enumerated exceptions to the Federal Tort Claims Act,'
none have created more litigation than the judicially imposed bar
to members of the armed forces prohibiting their suits against the
United States for injuries incurred incident to service. Since 1950
when the Supreme Court handed down the decision in Feres v.
United States,2 the courts have dogmatically rejected such suits by
servicemen.' With some degree of boldness, Judge Gray in the
United States District Court for the Central District of California
denied the government's motion to dismiss an action admittedly fall-
ing within the prohibition enunciated in Feres, i.e., actions "for in-
juries to servicemen where the injuries arise out of or are in the
course of activity incident to service."'4 In this case, Lee v. United
States,5 Judge Gray reasoned that by its decisions in a series of re-
cent cases the Supreme Court has vitiated its grounds for precluding
actions by servicemen for injuries incident to service wherein the
" There are procedural uncertainties in the statute as well as substantive
ones. The statute is silent on what would happen should the dog tax fund
be insufficient to discharge all the claims coming before the county, as well
as on the point in time at which the dog tax fund, after payment of claims,
is released to the schools.
128 U.S.C. §§ 1346(b), 2671-80 (1964).
2340 U.S. 135 (1950).
'E.g., United Airlines, Inc. v. Wiener, 335 F.2d 379 (9th Cir. 1964)
cert. dismissed, 379 U.S. 951 (1964) (servicemen travelling in line of duty
on airline which collided with Air Force jet fighter); Buer v. United States,
241 F.2d 3 (7th Cir. 1956) (serviceman injured by negligence of army
surgeon while in "sick in hospital" status); Kilduff v. United States, 248
F. Supp. 310 (E.D. Va. 1960) (serviceman's injury based on government's
negligent failure to disclose results of physical examination).
'340 U.S. 135, 146 (1950).
'261 F. Supp. 252 (C.D. Cal. 1966).
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injuries do not stem from activities that involve an official military
relationship between the negligent government employee and the
claimant. In Lee, plaintiffs alleged negligence by the Federal Avia-
tion Agency, not part of the military, for causing the aircraft crash,
and the resulting injuries. The historical development behind the
Feres exception to Tort Claims Act liability takes on interesting
significance in light of Judge Gray's conclusion that Feres is no
longer a correct statement of the law.
The Supreme Court accepted the common law doctrine of sover-
eign immunity from suits by citizens early in its history.' The in-
justice of this doctrine was mitigated in a series of legislative acts
granting relief.' Of special importance, the Tucker Act of 18878
waived sovereign immunity for actions "not sounding in tort." But
until the enactment of the Federal Tort Claims Act in 1946, private
bills in Congress provided the only means of compensation for citi-
zens wrongfully injured by federal employees.' The Tort Claims
Act waived the sovereign immunity of the United States from tort
liability for injury or damages caused by negligence or wrongful act
or omission of any employee of the government, while acting
within the scope of his office or employment, under circumstances
where the United States, if a private person, would be liable to the
claimant in accordance with the law of the place where the act oc-
curred. 10 The statute also grants authority for administrative settle-
ment of claims of 2,500 dollars or less by the head of the federal
agency affected."'
The statute precludes recovery in thirteen enumerated excep-
tions.' 2 Among the excluded, were claims "arising in a foreign
' Gibbons v. United States, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 269 (1868); Chisholm
v. Georgia, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419 (1792).
'E.g., Act of June 25, 1910, 36 Stat. 851, as amended, 28 U.S.C. § 1498
(1964) (waived immunity for patent infringement); Federal Employees
Compensation Act, 39 Stat. 742 (1916), as amended, 5 U.S.C. § 751 (1964)
(provided comprehensive benefits for injured federal employees); Public
Vessels Act of March 3, 1925, 43 Stat, 1112, as amended, 46 U.S.C. §§
781-90 (1964) (allowed libels in personam against United States for damage
caused by its vessels).
828 U.S.C. §§ 507, 1402, 1491, 1496-7, 1501, 1503, 2071, 2072, 2411,
2501, 2512 (1964).
' See United States v. Muniz, 374 U.S. 150, 154 (1963).1028 U.S.C. § 1346(b) (1964).
1128 U.S.C. § 2672 (1964).
1" See 28 U.S.C. § 2680 (1964). Of the enumerated exceptions, § 2680(h)
which bars recovery against the United States for intentional torts of its
employees, such as assault, battery, and slander, is of particular significance.
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country,"' 3 and claims "arising out of combatant activities"'1 of the
armed forces. Otherwise, the serviceman was not specifically ex-
cluded from benefits of the Act. During the years preceding enact-
ment of the Tort Claims Act, a number of bills were introduced in
Congress to waive the immunity of the government from general
tort liability.'5 Most of these bills provided that cases covered by
Federal Employees Compensation Act, 6 or the World War Veter-
ans Act of 1924,"7 were excepted. The obvious intent was to exclude
claims by federal employees or military personnel who were pro-
vided other statutory means of relief. Upon the enactment of the
Tort Claims Act, this exception was omitted. It must be concluded
that Congress was aware of this omission since the bill as originally
introduced excluded any claim arising out of activities of the armed
forces during time of war but was amended before passage to ex-
clude only combatant activities.' The omission must mean either
that servicemen were intended to acquire benefits under the Act, or
that Congress believed such specification unnecessary in light of the
generally accepted common law barring such suits. Legislative his-
tory of the Act provides no explanation for the omission.
The first case to reach the Supreme Court concerning the rights
of servicemen to sue the United States for injuries incurred during
military service was decided in 1948. This case, United States v.
Brooks,'9 involved the death of one serviceman and injury to an-
other in an automobile accident while on furlough. The injuries
were caused by the negligence of a civilian employee of the Army
driving a United States Army truck. The Court held that servicemen
were permitted to bring suit against the government for injuries
sustained while on authorized leave from duty and not incident to
service. Justice Murphy, speaking for the Court, noted, "where the
accident incident to the Brooks' service, a wholly different case
would be presented."20
The "wholly different case" was presented to the Supreme Court
1528 U.S.C. § 2680(k) (1964).
1428 U.S.C. § 2680(j) (1964).
1 See United States v. Brooks, 337 U.S. 49, 51-2 (1949); Note, 1 SYRA-
CUSE L. REv. 87, 90-1 (1949).1'39 Stat. 742 (1916), as amended, 5 U.S.C. § 751 (1964).
1'43 Stat. 607 (1924).
", See United States v. Brooks, 169 F.2d 840, 848 n.5 (4th Cir. 1948).
19337 U.S. 49 (1949); 50 COLUm. L. REv. 827 (1950); 35 CORNELL
L.Q. 233 (1949).
20337 U.S. 49, 52 (1949).
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one year later in Feres v. United States.2' In Feres, the Court con-
sidered three cases22 presenting a common issue of "whether the
Tort Claims Act extends its remedy to one sustaining 'incident to
the service' what under other circumstances would be an actionable
wrong." In Feres, the decedent perished by fire in an Army bar-
rack while on active military duty. Negligence was alleged in allow-
ing him to be quartered in barracks known or that should have been
known to be unsafe because of a defective heating plant and in
failing to assure an adequate fire watch. In affirming dismissal of
the action the Court recognized that the enumeration of specified
exceptions "might also imply inclusion of claims such as we have
here, '24 but felt the necessity to construe the statute to fit "into the
entire statutory system of remedies against the Government to make
a workable, consistent and equitable whole, ' 25 to be an overriding
consideration. The primary purpose of the Act was to provide a
remedy for the remediless. This did not include servicemen who
were provided other relief. The Court noting the statutory lan-
guage, "The United States shall be liable... as a private individual
under like circumstances ,"26 found no analogous circumstances
to meet the statutory requisite. The liability assumed by the govern-
ment is created by all the circumstances, "not that which a few of the
circumstances might create." 27 Hence, the landlord-tenant circum-
stance in Feres could not be isolated from the broader sovereign-
soldier relationship. Since the serviceman was not free to choose
his location, the Court did not believe that Congress intended a cause
of action for him which would fluctuate with the various state laws.
The Court also noted the distinctly federal character of the rela-
tionship between a member of the armed service and his govern-
ment.2 s The legal incidents of such relationship can be derived only
21340 U.S. 135 (1950); 3 ALA. L. Rav. 429 (1951); 31 B.U.L. REV. 221
(1951).
2 Feres v. United States, 177 F.2d 535 (2d Cir. 1949); Jefferson v.
United States, 178 F.2d 518 (4th Cir. 1949) (injury caused by negligence
of army surgeon); United States v. Griggs, 178 F.2d 1 (10th Cir. 1949)(death of army officer through negligent medical treatment by army sur-
geons).
"2340 U.S. 135, 138 (1950).
24Ibid.
25 Id. at 139.2828 U.S.C. § 2674 (1964).
27340 U.S. 135, 142 (1950).
"The Court referred to its prior recognition of the relationship as "dis-
1132 [Vol. 45
FEDERAL TORT CLAIMS ACT
from federal sources and governed by federal authority. Further,
the Court seemed strongly persuaded by the comprehensive benefits
provided for the injured serviceman under prior statutes. In con-
cluding, the Court held that: "The Government is not liable under
the Federal Tort Claims Act for injuries to servicemen where the
injuries arise out of or are in the course of activity incident to ser-
vice."' 9 It was this statement of the law that Judge Gray in Lee v.
United States"3 felt was no longer authoritative.
In Lee v. United States,1 two marines on active duty were being
transferred by air from a California station to Viet Nam. The air-
craft, operated by the Military Air Transport Service, United States
Air Force, crashed in departure for the overseas flight. The two
marines, and others, were killed. The plaintiffs made no charge
against the Marine Corps or the Air Force, but alleged negligence
on the part of the Federal Aviation Agency in operating, maintain-
ing and controlling the departure of the aircraft from the ground
and in giving inadequate terrain clearance information. The gov-
ernment moved to dismiss on the ground that, as a matter of law,
the facts preclude recovery under the Tort Claims Act. This motion
was denied.
First commenting on the lack of any language in the Tort Claims
Act which would indicate that servicemen are to be deprived of the
benefits of the Act in the circumstances in point, Judge Gray quoted
from the decision in United States v. Brooks by Justice Murphy:
We are not persuaded that "any claim" means "any claim
but that of servicemen." ... It would be absurd to believe that
Congress did not have the servicemen in mind in 1946, when this
statute was passed. The overseas and combatant activities ex-
ceptions make this plain.3 2
This argument appears less viable today. Accepting that the omis-
sion of any specified exception for servicemen may have indicated
some Congressional intent to allow their suits, Congress has had
ample time since the Feres decision in 1950, to correct a misinterpre-
tation of the statute. Congress has remained silent since Feres con-
tinctly federal in character" in United States v. Standard Oil Co., 332 U.S.
301 (1947).
9 340 U.S. 135, 146 (1950).
261 F. Supp. 252 (C.D. Cal. 1966).
'
1 Ibid.
22337 U.S. 49, 51 (1949).
1133
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
strued the Act disallowing servicemen's suits. In fact, the Act was
amended in 1959 to add the thirteenth exception to the list.3 No
indication is evident that Congress is displeased with prior judicial
construction of the Act. Judge Gray's inference of legislative intent
to allow servicemen's suits does not seem to overcome the presump-
tion of approval of the Feres prohibition of such suits found in
seventeen years of Congressional silence.
Taking each of the three assigned grounds for the conclusion
in Feres which would defeat the plaintiffs in Lee, Judge Gray re-
jected them in orderly succession as having been abandoned by later
decisions. Following is a closer look at the respective arguments
and a consideration of their validity.
1-To the argument that the serviceman already had a compre-
hensive system of relief and therefore was not intended to benefit
from the Act, the court cited United States v. Brown.4 In this
case, a veteran receiving compensation for a service-connected in-
jury to his knee, was further negligently injured by an operation
performed in a Veterans Administration hospital. The Brown
Court held that disability compensation under the veterans acts was
not an exclusive remedy and would not preclude recovery under the
Tort Claims Act. The Court distinguished the Brown facts from
Feres in that the injury for which recovery is sought occurred when
the claimant was not a member of the armed service. Hence, the
"distinctly federal character""5 of the relationship was lacking. As-
suming that Congress might have intended to exclude recovery un-
der the Act to servicemen injured while on active duty, the Court
recognized that there was no blanket exclusion intended for claim-
ants not members of the service at the time injured, who might be
receiving some form of federal compensation. Brown was explained
thusly, and specifically adhered to the Feres "incident to service"
test."8 The Lee court also cited United States v. Muniz, 37 in which
two inmates of a federal penitentiary sued under the Tort Claims
Act for injuries sustained due to the negligence of supervisory per-
sonnel. Relying on Brown, Chief Justice Warren in Muniz stated
" Act of August 18, 1959, 73 Stat. 389, 28 U.S.C. § 2680(n) (1964)
(claims arising from the activities of federal banks).
'348 U.S. 110 (1954).
' See note 28 supra and accompanying text.
13348 U.S. 110, 113 (1954).
13374 U.S. 150 (1963).
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that "the presence of a compensation system, persuasive in Feres,
does not of necessity preclude a suit for negligence"3 8 under the
Tort Claims Act. Two aspects of Muniz distinguish it from the Lee
and Feres fact situations, and, to a degree, detract from the signifi-
cance of the Chief Justice's statement. 1) The "distinctly federal
character" of the sovereign-soldier relationship relied upon in Feres
is lacking. 2) There was no compensation system available to
Muniz 3 9 Under the Muniz circumstances, recovery under the Tort
Claims Act was the sole remedy available for the wrongful injury.
Hence, the above quoted statement from Muniz was dictum.
Reconciling Brown and Muniz with Feres is made less difficult
by the rationale of a case handed down by the Supreme Court on
December 5th, 1966, only seven days before the Lee decision. This
case, United States v. Demko,4° held that the claimant who was re-
ceiving compensation for injuries sustained while an inmate in a
federal penitentiary was precluded from recovery under the Tort
Claims Act. The Court adhered to the rule laid down in Johansen
v. United States,41 that where "the government has created a com-
prehensive system to award payment for injuries, it should not be
held to have made exceptions to that system without specific legisla-
tion to that effect." 42 Demko distinguished Muniz in that the claim-
ant there was not eligible for the compensation received by Denko.43
A dissent in Demko was based on the grounds that the benefits re-
ceived by the claimant were too limited and that the statute provid-
ing compensation for prisoners was not sufficiently comprehensive.44
2-Judge Gray effectively countered the Feres argument that
28 Id. at 160.
'9 Ibid. See note 43 infra.
,0385 U.S. 149 (1966). judge Gray cited this case without comment.
261 F. Supp. 252, 255 (C.D. Cal. 1966).
41343 U.S. 427 (1952). The Court in Johansen held that the existence
of a remedy under the Federal Employees Compensation Act precluded a
suit for damages under the public Vessels Act.
42343 U.S. 427, 441 (1952).
"Demko was awarded $180 per month to start upon discharge from
prison and to continue so long as the disability continued, under the Act of
June 23, 1934, 48 Stat. 1211, as amended, 18 U.S.C. § 4126. The Act pro-
vides compensation for "injuries suffered in any industry or in any work
activity in connection with the maintenance or operation of the institution
where confined." Demko fell within this provision; Muniz did not.
" Mr. Justice White noted in the dissent that the compensation under
the Act was permissive not mandatory, that compensation did not become
a vested right, and that the amount rested within the discretion of the
Attorney General. 385 U.S. 49, 155-6 (1966).
1967] 1135
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
there were no analogous circumstances for a private individual's
liability as a prerequisite to United States' liability by citing Indian
Towing Co. v. United States.4 5 There, the Supreme Court allowed
recovery for damages resulting from the grounding of a tug due to
the negligence of the Coast Guard in the operation of a lighthouse.
In a subsequent decision, Rayonier Inc. v. United States,46 the Court
found that an injury caused by the negligence of firefighters em-
ployed by the government was actionable under the Tort Claims
Act. In neither case did the activity, operating lighthouses for
navigation and fighting forest fires, have "analogous circumstances"
in the non-governmental area. The Court established that govern-
mental liability under the Tort Claims Act does not require that the
total circumstances under which the injury occurred be paralleled in
private activity.47 If the activity might conceivably be privately per-
formed, liability may be imposed.4"
3-As to the argument that the servicemen should not be left
victim to the varying state laws where injuries occur inasmuch as
he has no control over where his military duties might take him,
Judge Gray again cited Muniz. Commenting that prisoners likewise
have little discretion as to the state in which they dwell and hence
might be prejudiced, the judge quoted Chief Justice Warren in
Muniz, ". . . it nonetheless seems clear that no recovery would
prejudice them even more."4 It is significant to note that, in Muniz,
recovery under the Tort Claims Act was the only alternative and
the quoted statement was appropriate, but its validity is question-
able when placed in the context of Lee wherein a comprehensive
compensation system is available.
Judge Gray concludes from his survey of cases that the service-
man would not be precluded from recovery under the Tort Claims
Act when the official activities of the negligent party and those of
the injured parties are entirely unrelated. The decision implies
agreement with the views of several Supreme Court opinions50 that
"350 U.S. 61 (1955). See Note, 70 HARv. L. REv. 134 (1956); Note,
54 M CH. L. REV. 875 (1956).
1-352 U.S. 315 (1957). See Note, 33 IND. L.J. 339 (1958); Note, 8
SYRAcusE L. REv. 277 (1957).
"See 352 U.S. 315, 318 (1957); 350 U.S. 61, 66-7 (1955).
" See 350 U.S. 61, 68 (1955).
" 374 U.S. 150, 162 (1963).
"United States v. Brown, 348 U.S. 110 (1954) ; Feres v. United States,
340 U.S. 135 (1950); United States v. Brooks, 337 U.S. 49 (1949).
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the significance of the judicially imposed exception lies primarily in
prohibiting suits involving "a battle commander's poor judgment,
an army surgeon's slip of hand, a defective jeep which causes in-
jury. ,51
The rule of recovery formulated by the Brooks and Feres de-
cisions has left an uneasy sense of dissatisfaction and uncertainty..
The case by case determination of whether the claimant's injury
was incident to service has not proved to be an easy task. A naval
reservist was allowed recovery under the Tort Claims Act for injury
in a Navy aircraft accident enroute to the station where active duty
was to begin.2 The court found the activity was not incident to
service. Recovery was allowed where an enlisted seaman on shore-
leave was drowned because of the negligent maintenance of a swim-
ming pool on a naval station.53 The activity was found not incident
to service. Injuries sustained through alleged negligence in a gov-
ernnent hospital were found not incident to service, and recovery
was allowed for a former member of the Women's Army Auxil-
iary.54 An Army nurse was denied recovery on a finding that the
injury was incident to service where the injury occurred in a Vet-
erans Administration hospital four years after her discharge. 55 A
sergeant injured while on a three day pass by an explosion demolish-
ing his on-base quarters was denied recovery,56 whereas recovery has
been allowed where the injuries were sustained in quarters off-
base.5 7
It is submitted that the Lee "official relationship" test will be
subject to the same difficulty of application. At what point would
the relationship take on sufficient "officialdom" to bar recovery?
The rule would essentially prevent recovery under the Tort Claims
Act only where there exists an official relationship between the ac-
tivities of the negligent party and those of the injured party. To
accept this rule would lead to undesirable discrimination. A large
portion of the present military force is stationed in foreign coun-
tries. These servicemen would be automatically barred from re-
"United States v. Brooks, 337 U.S. 49, 52 (1949).
" Carroll v. United States, 247 F. Supp. 703 (E.D. Mo. 1965).
" Brown v. United States, 99 F. Supp. 685 (S.D. W. Va. 1951).
"Herring v. United States, 98 F. Supp. 69 (D. Col. 1951).
"Pettis v. United States, 108 F. Supp. 500 (N.D. Cal. 1952).
"Gursley v. United States, 232 F. Supp. 614 (D. Col. 1964).
"Sapp v. United States, 153 F. Supp. 496 (W.D. La. 1957).
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covery by section 2680(k) of the Tort Claims Act if the injury
occurred therein. Had the traffic controller's negligence in Lee
caused the crash in Thailand instead of California, there would be
no recovery. An increasing number of military personnel are en-
gaged in combatant activities, and are thus precluded from recovery
by section 2680(j) of the Act. Assuming wrongful injuries caused
by federal employees without an official military relationship to the
injured, it is difficult to infer Congressional intent to allow recovery
for all servicemen except combatants or foreign-stationed personnel.
In light of the Demko decision barring recovery to a prisoner
due to the comprehensive compensation system available to him
otherwise, a brief examination of the compensation provided for
the injured serviceman is helpful.
Title 38 of the United States Code is devoted entirely to the
administration of veterans' benefits. The benefits include compensa-
tion for disability or death; hospitalization, medical treatment, and
domiciliary care; burial allowance; loan guaranty for home, farm,
business or trade; educational assistance and others. For the dis-
abled veteran, the statute provides for compensation in accordance
with the degree of disability.5" The monthly compensation payments
may range from 17 dollars for peacetime disabilities rated at 10 per
cent,59 to 600 dollars for total disability under certain circum-
stances."0 Additional compensation provided for dependents of the
disabled veteran may range from 20 dollars per month for a wife,
to 68 dollars per month for a wife and three children plus 13 dollars
for each child in excess of three."' Death benefits to a widow are
determined by a formula based upon the serviceman's base pay.6 2
Provisions are also made for children and dependent parents upon
the death of a serviceman.6 3 An immediate death gratuity equal to
six months pay, not more than 3000 dollars nor less than 800 dol-
lars, is payable to dependents.6
A service-connected injury severing the right arm of an Army
Captain, age 30, would be rated as an approximate 80 per cent dis-
5838 U.S.C. §§ 314, 334 (1964).
'"38 U.S.C.A. § 314(a) (Supp. 1966); 38 U.S.C.A. § 334 (1959).0 U.S.C.A. §§ 314(o), (p) (Supp. 1966).
8138 U.S.C.A. §§ 314(o), (p) (Supp. 1966).
02 38 U.S.C. § 411 (1964) (establishes a monthly rate equal to $120 plus
12 per cent of the deceased husband's base pay).03 38 U.S.C.A. §§ 413-16 (Supp. 1966).
0, 10 U.S.C. §§ 1475-80 (1964).
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ability by the Veterans Administration regulations. 5 Assuming that
this is a peacetime injury and that the Captain has a wife and one
child, age 6, disability payments per month would amount to 213
dollars until the child reached age 21, and 202 dollars thereafter.6 "
Should the Captain live for his expected life span,67 he will receive
in excess of 98,000 dollars for disability payments alone. The death
of this same Captain, assuming the above stipulations plus eight
years in service, from service-connected injuries, would entitle his
widow to compensation of 176 dollars per month. 8 Including an
immediate death gratuity payment of 3000 dollars,69 she can expect
during her normal life expectancy"0 aggregate compensation in ex-
cess of 84,000 dollars. In both illustrations, hospitalization, medical
treatment, and domiciliary care would be provided by the govern-
ment.71
Comparing recovery under the Tort Claims Act with the statu-
tory benefits available to the veteran, the Court in Feres took note
that in the companion cases, Jefferson would receive approximately
35,000 dollars, and Grigg's widow in excess of 22,000 dollars, under
the veterans compensation system at that time.72 The widow's maxi-
mum recovery by wrongful death action was limited to 15,000 dol-
lars by Illinois statute.73 Thirteen states by statute still limit the
amount of recovery for wrongful death actions.74 The median
maximum among these states is approximately 25,000 dollars. In
the prior illustration of the Army Captain, a considerable amount
in excess of this limitation would have been recovered under the
veterans' acts without the accompanying expense of litigation.
The serviceman will receive compensation under the veterans'
acts whenever the injury is determined to be service-connected, that
" 38 C.F.R. § 471(a) (1966).
6638 U.S.C.A. §§ 314(h), (k), 315 (Supp. 1966; 38 U.S.C.A. §§ 334-35
(1959).
", See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 8-46 (Supp. 1965), where by the mortuary
table therein, the Captain would have an expected life span of 40.39 addi-
tional years at age 30.
6838 U.S.C.A. § 411 (1959); 37 U.S.C.A. § 203 (Supp. 1966).
S10 U.S.C. § 1478 (1964).
"See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 8-46 (Supp. 1965), where at age 30, the widow
would expect to live 40.39 years longer.
"38 U.S.C. §§ 610-16 (1964).
"340 U.S. 135, 145 (1950).
" Ibid.
"See Comment, 44 N.C.L. Rav. 402, 426-7 (1966).
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is, an injury sustained in the line of duty.75 Any injury or disease
incurred by military personnel while on active duty status is deemed
to have been incurred in line of duty as long as it is not the result
of his own wilful misconduct.76 Active duty status expressly in-
cludes periods of authorized leave.7
The most compelling reason for not adopting the Lee extension
of liability under the Tort Claims Act lies in the policy objective of
arriving at a just, consistent, and rational rule to govern service-
men's suits. The only viable alternative to the present milieu of con-
flicting decisions and continuing litigation appears to be an accep-
tance of the availability of statutory compensation as an exclusive
remedy for the serviceman. He is now provided with an adequate,
fixed and certain scale of benefits for service-connected injury or
death. In view of the special relationship between the sovereign and
soldier, and the particular hazards of military life, the government
has provided adequate protection against injury or death for mili-
tary personnel. This protection is now provided without the expense
and uncertainty of litigation under the Tort Claims Act. To hold
that, where applicable, the statutory compensation system available
to members of the armed services is their exclusive remedy would
not prejudice their rights.
Congress has not spoken on the instant problem. Until it does,
the courts are responsible for formulating a just and equitable rule
of law. An appeal from the Lee decision will provide the 9th Cir-
cuit Court of Appeals an opportunity to apply the Dernko rationale
in the sovereign-soldier context. In light of the conflicts and prob-
lems resulting from the Brooks and Feres decisions and the approach
recently applied in Demko, there is reason to believe that the Supreme
Court may accept a rule formulated to exclude servicemen's Tort
Claims Act suits where veterans' compensation is available to the
claimant.
GERALD M. MAYO
'38 U.S.C. § 101(16) (1964).
7838 U.S.C. § 105 (1964).
Ibid.
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DUTY OF LOYALTY
Trusts-The North Carolina Fiduciary Powers Act and the
Duty of Loyalty
I In 1965 the North Carolina General Assembly enacted the fidu-
ciary powers act.1 The act contains a list of thirty powers which
are generally desirable in trust and estate management and which
can be conveniently incorporated by reference into a trust instru-
ment.2 More important the draftsman is provided with a clear
guide to powers available to the trustee which will eventually be-
come well defined by case law. Use of the act will undoubtedly
reduce the number of situations in which a trustee fails to act for
fear of exceeding his authority and the necessity of applying to the
court for instructions, often a time consuming and expensive pro-
cess.8 Despite these conveniences the act has created a number of
problems4 arising from the difficulty of striking a proper balance
between the need for adequate powers in the trustee and adequate
protection for the beneficiary. The purpose of this discussion is to
analyze two of the North Carolina trustees' powers in light of tradi-
'N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 32-25 to -27 (1966). For examples of similar legis-
lation see AuK. STAT. ANN. §§ 58-114 to -116 (Supp. 1965) and TENN.
CODE ANN. §§ 35-616 to -618 (Supp. 1966).
'The incorporation by reference type statute should be distinguished
from a statute like the Uniform Trustee's Powers Act under which enume-
rated powers are automatically incorporated into all trust instruments unless
specifically excluded. For a thorough analysis of the latter act see Horowitz,
Uniform Trustees' Powers Act, 41 WASH. L. REv. 1 (1966) [hereinafter
cited as Horowitz]. To the effect that the incorporation by reference type
statute is inadequate to solve present day administrative problems see
Fratcher, Trustees' Powers Legislation, 37 N.Y.U.L. Rnv. 627, 659 (1962).
-'North Carolina is in accord with the well established rule that the
courts will allow the trustee to deviate from the terms of the trust where
due to circumstances not anticipated by the settlor compliance would defeat
or substantially impair the purposes of the trust. RESTATEMENT (SECOND),
TRusTs § 167 (1959). Accord, Trust Co. v. Johnston, 269 N.C. 701, 153
S.E.2d 449 (1967); Bank v. Broyhill, 263 N.C. 189, 139 S.E.2d 214
(1964); Cocke v. Duke Univ., 260 N.C. 1, 131 S.E.2d 909 (1963); Blades
v. Spitzer, 252 N.C. 207, 113 S.E.2d 315 (1960).
"N.C. GEN. STAT. § 32-26(b) (1966) creates an obvious problem which
is beyond the scope of this discussion. Briefly, this section states that no
power shall be exercised in such a manner as to deprive the trust or estate of
an otherwise available tax exemption. First, it is not at all clear whether an
exercise of power in violation of this provision would render the act of the
trustee void or whether such exercise would constitute a breach of trust.
More important it is not clear whether the Commissioner would honor this
provision as a savings clause for federal estate tax purposes. See note 19
infra for a situation in which this becomes extremely important. For an
analysis of a similar provision in the Uniform Trustees' Powers Act see
Horowitz 13.
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tional fiduciary principles of loyalty. Through this analysis the possi-
ble consequences of incorporation and the need for thoughtful
draftsmanship will become apparent.
The requirement of loyalty of a trustee is derived from the
most intense fiduciary relationship in our law.5 Basically this duty
requires the trustee to subordinate his personal interests and act
solely in the interest of the beneficiary. Whenever it appears that
the trustee's personal interest may have been a factor, the courts
have consistently fixed an extremely high and strict standard for
his conduct.7 The duty of loyalty requires, however, more than
mere subordination of personal interest since it is unrealistic to
assume that opportunity for personal benefit will be consistently
disregarded. Thus the law attempts to eliminate all possibilities of
personal profit by preventing the trustee from occupying a position
in which his interest could possibly conflict with that of the bene-
ficiary.' This requirement is not founded on a basic distrust of the
trustee, but on the realistic premise that a man cannot possess total
detachment from his own interests. The conflict may be so subtle
that even the trustee is unaware of its effect on his judgment.
Through the application of the rule of undivided loyalty the trustee
has been prevented from buying trust property at his own sale,'
selling his individual property to himself as trustee, 0 using the trust
property for his own benefit,"1 depositing trust funds in its own
banking department,12 purchasing an adverse interest from a third
party,13 and receiving a commission on a transaction in performance
of the trust. 4 North Carolina is in accord with the above princi-
ples 5 and in addition has codified the rule against self-dealing in a
'2 Scorr, TRuSTS § 170 (1956).
'Ibid.; BOGERT, TRusTs § 95 (4th ed. 1963).
See Scott, The Trustee's Duty of Loyalty, 49 H!v. L. REV. 521 (1936).
' See note 6 supra.
2 ScoTr, TRUsTs § 170.1 (1956).1oId. § 170.12.11Id. § 170.17.1 Id. § 170.18.1oId. § 170.21.1
,Id. § 170.22.
"See Trust Co. v. Johnson, 269 N.C. 701, 153 S.E.2d 449 (1967)
where the court recognized "that one of the most fundamental duties of the
trustee throughout the trust relationship is to maintain complete loyalty to
the interests of his cestui que trust." Id. at 711. The court continued by
stating that "[i]n this jurisdiction there have been few inroads on the rule
regarding the duty of loyalty by the trustee to the interests of the cestuis que
trust." Id. at 711. Accord, Morehead v. Harris, 262 N.C. 330, 137 S.E.2d
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number of specific areas.'
A number of the powers set out in the North Carolina act are
quite broad. These powers allow the trustee great leeway in the
administration of the trust and permit him to occupy positions that
are inconsistent with the fiduciary principles outlined above. Yet
this fact does not in itself present a problem, for it is widely held
that the undivided loyalty rule may be waived by the settlor and in
certain circumstances by the beneficiary.' 7 As will be pointed out
below, the incorporation of at least one power in the North Carolina
act will result in such a waiver by the settlor. 8 Since the draftsman
can, however, refuse to incorporate a power if not in accord with
the settlor's intent, and since even the broadest power may be de-
sirable in certain situations, the new act can be utilized to its fullest
extent with a minimum of problems through prudent and responsi-
ble draftsmanship. Yet despite the opportunity for selective incor-
poration, it should be recognized that as a practical matter the vast
majority of trust instruments handled by corporate trustees in North
Carolina incorporate the act in toto.'9 This fact makes it necessary
to determine whether the powers analyzed are appropriate in prac-
174 (1964) ; Miller v. McLean, 252 N.C. 171, 113 S.E.2d 359 (1960) ; Trust
Co. v. Barrett, 328 N.C. 579, 78 S.E.2d 730 (1953); Erickson v. Starling,
233 N.C. 539, 64 S.E.2d 832 (1951); Hatcher v. Williams, 225 N.C. 112,
33 S.E.2d 617 (1945); Williams v. Hooks, 199 N.C. 489, 154 S.E. 828(1930) ; Carter v. Young, 193 N.C. 678, 137 S.E. 875 (1927) ; North Caro-
lina R.R. v. Wilson, 81 N.C. 223 (1879); Freeman v. Cook, 41 N.C. 373
(1849).
6 See N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 36-26 to -30 (1966). The latter subsection
which prevents a corporate trustee from purchasing its own stock should be
kept in mind throughout the following discussion of the power of the cor-
porate trustee to retain its own shares. Note that a number of these prohibi-
tions cannot be waived by the settlor in the terms of the trust nor by the
consent of the beneficiary. Purchase of its own stock by a corporate trustee
is included in these non-waiver provisions. See N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 36-40,
41 (1966). A court of competent jurisdiction may, however, relieve the
trustee from these restrictions. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 36-42 (1966).
"' See BOGERT, TRUSTS § 95 (4th ed. 1963); 2 ScoTT, TRusTs §§ 170,
170.9 (1956).
1" See note 30 infra and accompanying text.
" This fact was determined by personal communication with trust offi-
cers of well known North Carolina corporate trustees. Note, however, that
a power or powers may be excepted due to potential adverse tax conse-
quences. For example, the trustee is given a very broad power in N.C. GEN.
STAT. § 32-27(29) (1966) to determine what is principal and what is in-
come of the trust. This broadness would seem to jeopardize the qualification
of the property for the marital deduction and consequently a number of
corporate fiduciaries urge the exclusion of this power. See Treas. Reg.
§ 20.2056(b)-5(f)(4) (1958).
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tically all situations and whether it can realistically be said that the
settlor intended the consequences which flow from such incorpora-
tion.
The first power that may be incorporated permits the trustee:
to retain for such time as the fiduciary shall deem advisable any
property, real or personal, which the fiduciary may receive, even
though the retention of such property by reason of its character,
amount, proportion to the total estate or otherwise would not be
appropriate for the fiduciary apart from this provision.20
The rule of undivided loyalty in respect to a retention power gen-
erally arises where the trust estate originally consists in part or in
whole of the corporate trustee's own stock.2 Unless authorized to
retain such stock by the trust instrument, retention by the corporate
trustee is a breach of trust due to the potential conflict of interest
between the trustee and the beneficiary. 22 The possibility of an ac-
"N.C. GEN. STAT. § 32-27(1) (1966).
"Only the consequences of the incorporation of this provision as to the
duty of loyalty will be discussed.
It should be noted, however, that in addition to loyalty restrictions the
trustee is required to exercise a certain standard of care and will be held
liable despite the power to retain if this standard is not met. See 3 ScoTT,
TRUSTS § 230.1 (1956). Apparently North Carolina has adopted the "pru-
dent man rule" as to investments and would apply it to acts of retention
authorized by the above power. See Sheets v. Tobacco Co., 195 N.C. 149,
141 S.E 355 (1928) where the court relied on the traditional statement that
the trustee
is to observe how men of prudence, discretion and intelligence man-
age their own affairs, not in regard to speculation, but in regard to
permanent disposition of their funds, considering the probable income
as well as the safety of the capital to be invested. Id. at 152, 141 S.E.
at 357, quoting from Harvard College v. Amory, 26 Mass. (9 Pick.)
446, 461 (1830).
For a review of early cases dealing with the investment power and the
prudent man rule in North Carolina, see Comment, 14 N.C.L. REv. 160(1936).
Although it is possible for the settlor to waive the requirement of reason-
ableness, it is doubtful that incorporation of this power would have such
a result. The power gives the trustee broad discretion, but generally it is
necessary to give "absolute" or "unlimited" discretion in order to waive
this requirement. See RESTATEMENT (SEcoND), TRUSTS § 187, comment i
(1959). For a recent North Carolina case in which the prudent man rule
was not applicable due to the grant of "sole" discretion to the trustee, see
Lichtenfels v. Bank, 268 N.C. 467, 151 S.E.2d 78 (1966). In this case the
court gave great weight to the fact that the power was expressly set out in
the trust instrument. Quaere whether a power that is incorporated and
thus made express should receive the same weight in light of the wholesale
incorporation evident in North Carolina?
22 BOGERT, TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES § 543 (2d ed. 1960); 2 ScoTT, TRusTs
§ 170.15 (1956). See generally Annot. 47 A.L.R.2d 187 (1956); Annot. 157
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tual conflict in this situation is obvious since the corporation's offi-
cers may hesitate, consciously or unconsciously, to sell the shares
where such a sale might depress the market value of the stock.2"
Also the sale of the corpus may compete with the desire of the offi-
cers to sell their own stock if there is a limited market.4 This
reluctance to sell may be compounded where the voting power repre-
sented by such shares is in the control of the corporate trustee.25
It is well settled, however, that the retention of such shares may be
authorized by the settlor,2' and there is little doubt that the above
power of retention, if incorporated, would serve as such an authori-
zation." Even though this power does not specifically mention
shares of the corporate trustee, the majority of courts hold that
such a general authorization to retain original investments is suffi-
cient to cover this situation.m It is said that since the settlor was
aware that he owned such shares, it is reasonable to infer that he
intended the general authorization to cover them.2 9 The validity of
this rationale seems questionable unless there is evidence that the
corporate trustee informed the settlor of the potential conflict of
interest created by such a power. It seems highly doubtful that the
A.L.R. 1429 (1945); Annot. 134 A.L.R. 1324 (1941); Scott, Retention of
Its Own Shares by a Corporate Trustee, 57 HAav. L. REv. 601 (1944).
2" See 2 ScoTT, TRUSTS § 170.15 (1956).
2 See Hallgring, The Uniform Trustees' Powers Act and the Basic Princi-
ples of Fiduciary Responsibility, 41 WAstH. L. Rav. 801, 813 (1966). [here-
inafter cited as Hallgring].
2" See 2 ScoTT, TRUSTS § 170.15 (1956).
"
8 RESTATEMENT (SECOND), TRUSTS § 170, comment n (1959), 2 ScoTT,
TRUSTS § 170.15 (1956).
" There has been ver j little litigation in North Carolina involving
powers of retention. However, the court did evidence a liberal attitude
toward such a power in Young v. Hood, 209 N.C. 801, 184 S.E. 823 (1936).
The testator desired that certain bank stock be retained by the corporate
trustee and authorized such retention by an express provision in the trust
instrument. By a subsequent merger with this bank the corporate trustee
held its own stock under the trust. Since the trust did not originally include
the trustee's own stock, it cannot be said that by the express authorization
the testator intended to waive the rule of undivided loyalty. The court held,
however, that the trustee was not subject to surcharge despite the decline
in value of the stock. Although the testator did desire the retention of the
stock, this case does not seem to be particularly well reasoned from a duty
of loyalty standpoint since the conflict of interest arose subsequent to the
creation of the trust.
The liberality of this decision alone would seem to indicate that North
Carolina will follow the majority in construing a general authorization to
retain original property. See note 26 supra and accompanying text.
2" See note 26 supra.
292 Scor, TRUSTS § 170.15 (1956).
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typical settlor intends to waive the rule of undivided loyalty in the
normal situation, yet this is precisely the result of such an incorpora-
tion.10 Waiver of this rule should not, however, be understood as
allowing self-dealing by the trustee. Technically the only conse-
quence of such waiver is that the trustee is allowed to occupy a
position in which there is a potential conflict of interest. But even
though the trustee is prevented from acting in his own interest
despite waiver, the practical affect of the waiver places the bene-
ficiary in a precarious position. The rule of undivided loyalty be-
comes sterile to a large extent where the trustee is permitted to
occupy a position of potential conflict because of the difficulty en-
countered in proving or even in detecting self-dealing. It would be
an unusual case indeed if the trustee could not make an after-the-
fact explanation consistent with the duty of loyalty.
Thus in a very real sense the incorporation of the above power
of retention places the corporate trustee in a totally unrestrained
position. It is true that the large and well known corporate trustee
employs internal sanctions to combat this danger."' Also there is
no actual conflict in the usual case. Yet these facts do not justify
incorporation of such a provision in all or even in the majority of
trust instruments. Where the settlor desires that the corporate trust-
ee hold its own stock," it is likely that he will be more aware of
the potential consequences of such incorporation and will communi-
cate his desire for retention directly to the corporate trustee. But
can it be realistically assumed that in every trust handled by a cor-
porate trustee in North Carolina, the settlor was aware of a potential
conflict of interest yet intended that the stock be retained whether or
" See Annot. 47 A.L.R.2d 187, 268 (1956) ; 90 C.J.S. TRusTs § 248(e)
(1955); see generally Scott, Retention of Its Own Shares by a Corporate
Trustee, 57 HA.v. L. Rav. 601 (1944).
"For examples of suggested guidelines see Aartsen, Statement of Poli-
cies on Conflict of Interest of Corporate Fiduciaries, 103 TRusTs & EsTATEs
379 (1964). Note that Wachovia Bank & Trust Company has employed a
safeguard through which the primary objections to a general authorization
to retain are eliminated. Whenever it appears that Wachovia may have to
hold its own stock in trust, it requests that a specific authorization to do so
be placed in the trust instrument. This is done in spite of the incorporation
of the general power to retain under the North Carolina Act. [This fact
was determined by personal communication with a trust officer of the
Wachovia Bank & Trust Company.]
"For example, the settlor may desire to give the corporate trustee such
a power where the corporate trustee is a close corporation. In this situation
retention of the stock may be very desirable for control purposes and would
act much the same as a stock transfer restriction.
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not administration of the trust is affected by self-interest? The
answer is obvious. Thus it would seem to be arguable that in the
loyalty area an incorporated power should not be accorded the same
weight as a power expressly set out in the trust instrument.
By incorporation into the trust instrument the trustee may also
be given the power
to pay taxes, assessments, compensation of the fiduciary, and
other expences incurred in the collection, care, administration,
and protection of the trust or estate.33
Under this section the trustee is given powers essential to the effi-
cient administration of the trust estate. Clearly the prudent drafts-
man would be expected to incorporate such powers. Yet the refer-
ence made in this power to compensation is somewhat questionable
in light of North Carolina law.
Under the English rule the trustee is not entitled to any com-
pensation for his services unless such compensation is expressly set
out in the trust instrument.3 4 The early North Carolina rule was in
accord with the English view.3 5 Under the modern rule in this coun-
try both corporate and individual trustees are entitled to compensa-
tion whether or not it is provided for in the trust.3 6 The majority
of states, including North Carolina, have enacted statutes that fix
standards under which the trustee is to be compensated. 7 Those
states that have no statute apply the general rule that the trustee is
"N.C. GEN. STAT. § 32-27(9) (1966). [Emphasis added]. This power
is substantially the same as that set out in the UNirORm TRusTEEs' PowERS
ACT § 3(c) (20). For a detailed analysis and criticism of this power under
the Uniform Act see Hallgring 816.
"3 ScoTT, TRusTs § 242 (1956).
See Boyd v. Hawkins, 17 N.C. 160 (1832), where the court rejected
the argument that trustees were entitled to compensation above reimburse-
ment for expenses. The court recognized that compensation could be ex-
pressly stated in the trust instrument, but such amount was to be taken only
as evidence that the parties did not intend the services to be gratuitious.
Such express provision for compensation was to be disregarded and a
reasonable amount set by the court. In this case the court feared that the
"trustee would take what he pleased of the estate . . . under the name of
compensation, and every abuse would follow." Id. at 174.
" BOGERT, TRusTs § 144 (4th ed. 1963) ; 3 ScoTT, TRUSTS § 242 (1956).
"7 See N.C. GEx. STAT. § 28-170 (1966), which provides, in part, that
[e]xecutors, administrators, testamentary trustees, collectors or other
personal representatives or fiduciaries shall be entitled to commissions
to be fixed in the discretion of the clerk not to exceed five per cent
upon the amount of receipts . . . and upon the expenditures made in
accordance with the law. ...
Ibid. [Emphasis added.]
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to receive reasonable compensation as determined by the courts."8
Yet despite the traditional judicial and legislative control over fidu-
ciary compensation, a reasonable interpretation of the above power
results in the conclusion that it authorizes the trustee to fix his own
compensation. 9 The existence of a statutory scheme dealing with
fiduciary compensation in North Carolina raises a question as to
whether a trustee could, under the above power, set his compensation
above the statutory maximum of five per cent. Even if he could
not, the question remains whether compensation set by the trustee
within the maximum is entitled to an initial presumption of valid-
ity.40 Seemingly Trust Co. v. Waddel4' would require a negative
answer to the latter question and perhaps to the former. The court
stated in this case that "an executor has no right to fix and deter-
mine the compensation to be received by him.' 42 From this case it
seems to be well settled in North Carolina that unless set by the set-
tlor, the maximum compensation to be received by a fiduciary is
fixed by the statute with the actual amount determined only by the
clerk of court.43 In light of this decision it is difficult to see what
affect incorporation of the above power could have in North Caro-
lina. In addition the power is inherently violative of the duty of
loyalty. It is impossible to conceive of a more obvious case of con-
flict between the interest of the trustee and that of the beneficiary.
It has been appropriately asked: "What trustee will not judge that
his own skills are beyond compare, his energies inexhaustible, and
his difficulties the most vexatious?"" Even a mere presumption of
validity becomes undesirable in light of the obvious self interest and
vague standards applied to determine compensation.45 It should be
"3 ScoTT, TRUSTS § 242 (1956).
"See Horowitz 23.
o See Hallgring 818 where it is suggested that such prima facie validity
may be found by a court supervising the exercise of this power under the
Uniform Trustees' Powers Act.
"' 237 N.C. 342, 75 S.E.2d 151 (1953).
"Id. at 345, 75 S.E.2d at 153.
"Note that this statement is not meant to cover situations in which the
settlor or testator set the trustee's compensation in the terms of the trust. In
such a situation compensation exceeding the statutory maximum would be
allowed. See Trust Co. v. Waddell, 237 N.C. 342, 75 S.E.2d 151 (1953).
"Hallgring 818.
"Under the North Carolina compensation statute the clerk is to consider
"time, responsibility, trouble and skill involved in the management of the
estate. . . ." N.C. GEN. STAT. § 28-170 (1966).
For factors generally considered in the absence of a statute see RESTATE-
MENT (SECOND), TRUSTS § 242, comment b (1959).
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noted, however, that as a practical matter this problem exists only
as to the individual trustee. The corporate trustee generally uses a
schedule of compensation that is written into the trust instrument.46
The percentages in such a schedule are set primarily by competition
and are well below the statutory maximum. It is clear that even if
the corporate trustee had the power to set its compensation above
that allowed by the statute, it would probably not do so due to the
competitive restraint. But the same is not true of the individual
trustee who could reward himself handsomely. Again, the trustee
would have little difficulty showing reasonableness on an after-the-
fact inquiry. In the final analysis it seems, however, that the North
Carolina compensation statute and the difficulties encountered as to
the duty of loyalty would prevent the trustee from fixing his own
compensation despite incorporation of this power. If this is correct,
the power should be deleted from the fiduciary powers statute. If
not, North Carolina has departed sharply from duty of loyalty prin-
ciples and the considerations deemed decisive against such a power
in the vast majority of states.
The propriety of these powers47 should also be considered in
' 
8 For example, the basic schedule used by the Wachovia Bank & Trust
Company for trustees is as follows:
Annual principal charge: (Based on current market value)$2.00 per $1,000 for the first $100,000
$1.00 per $1,000 for the next $400,000
$0.50 per $1,000 for all over $500,000
Annual income charge: (Based on income received)
5% or the first $10,000
2y2% of all over $10,000
'
7 Although the majority of the powers set out in the North Carolina
Act are not overly broad and do not present fiduciary problems, there are
at least two, other than those discussed above, that should be briefly men-
tioned. Both involve the duty of care.
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 32-27(4) (1966) allows the trustee to invest without
diversification. This power is in conflict with the general rule that requires
the trustee to spread investments so as to lessen the risk of loss. See 3
ScoTr, TRUSTS § 228 (1956). Thus the incorporation of this power would
not seem desirable unless the settlor specifically intends to limit the field of
investments.
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 32-27(24) (1966) enables the trustee to employ and
compensate agents deemed necessary to advise or assist him and to do so
without liability for any neglect provided the trustee selects and retains the
agent with due care. It is not yet clear how far the trustee could go in
delegating his duties to agents under this section. However, the power
seems to be sufficiently broad to raise some question in light of the general
rule that the trustee cannot delegate acts which he may reasonably be ex-
pected to perform. See 2 ScoTT, TRUSTS § 171 (1956). For a detailed analy-
sis of the duty not to delegate and a criticism of a power similar to that in
the North Carolina Act see Hallgring, 831.
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light of the nature of the modem corporate trustee. The profession-
al fiduciary is replacing the trusted family confidant as trustee in
the modern business world. Despite a general realization that "the
striving for profitability ... should not obscure the traditional prin-
ciples and ideals of trusteeship,"4 the corporate trustee's relation-
ship with the settlor and the beneficiary is becoming increasingly
distant. The primary responsibility for maintaining the standard of
loyalty clearly rests with the corporate trustee and most have set
forth guidelines by which fiduciary principles are strengthened.49
But it is also true that
those entrusted with the responsibility for establishing legal rules
must recognize that the trustee's pursuit of profit necessarily
casts him in a commercial, arms-length, and to some degree ad-
versary, relationship to settlors and beneficiaries; that under con-
temporary conditions, the maintenance of high standards of
fiduciary conduct requires vigilance. 0
The courts and legislatures in responding to the modem trustee's
need for flexibility must not inadvertantly lift fiduciary restrictions.
The same conditions and considerations which demand a broadening
of the trustee's power also demand a strict concept of fiduciary
responsibility. Without the latter the entire concept of the trust
devise will fail. As one authority observed in speaking of an early
financial era,
[M]ost of its mistakes and its major faults will be ascribed to
the failure to observe the fiduciary principle, the precept as old as
the holy writ, that a man cannot serve two masters. . . . No
thinking man can believe that an economy built upon a business
foundation can permanently endure without some loyalty to that
principle.r1
This statement is equally applicable to the present trust era.
The problems discussed above are merely representative of those
that may arise in the loyalty area. The majority of these problems
can be eliminated by responsible and prudent draftsmanship and a
general awareness on the part of the judiciary and legislature that
such problems do exist. The broadness of these powers can be
mitigated without placing undue restraint on the trustee by main-
"Newsoraina, 103 TRuSTS & ESTATES 316 (1964).
"See note 31 supra.5oHallgring 827.
Stone, The Public Influence of the Bar, 48 HARV. L. REv. 1, 8-9 (1934).
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taining high and clear standards under which they must be exercised.
It is in the interest of the settlor, the trustee, and the beneficiary
that a proper balance be maintained. Codification of such standards
with special emphasis on the corporate trustee52 would aid in achiev-
ing such balance."
JOHN G. ALDRiDGE
Usury-Usury as Applied to Credit Transactions
In Biblical times1 and at the early common law2 the taking of
any interest or compensation for the use of money, whether moder-
ate or excessive, was considered usurious. Laws were later passed
that allowed, but limited, the amount of interest a party could
charge on a loan or forebearance of money.3 In 1821, the case of
Beete v. Bidgood4 established the rule in England that a sale on
credit was not a loan or forebearance of money and hence the laws
against usury did not apply. This view was soon thereafter adopted
in practically all the American courts.' This doctrine allows a ven-
dor to charge one price for a cash transaction and a higher price for
the sale of the same goods on credit. The fact that the credit price
"' Due to the nature of the modem corporate trustee the need to set
separate and higher standards is becoming greater. This need has been
recognized to some extent by those authorities that require a higher degree
of care for the corporate trustee. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND), TRUSTS
§ 174 (1959). Little attempt has been made, however, to set higher stan-
dards of loyalty due to the difficulty of framing such a standard. Thus day-
to-day restraints are usually imposed by the corporate trustee itself. Yet
despite this difficulty it seems that the loyalty concept merits more attention
by law making bodies than it has received.
"As to the duty of care, both Tennessee and Arkansas have codified
the "prudent man rule" as to investments and refer specifically to this stan-
dard in their powers acts. See ARK. STAT. ANN. § 58-302 (Supp. 1965);
TENN. CODE ANN. § 35-320 (1955).
The Uniform Trustees' Powers Act in addition to adopting the prudent
man rule in § 3(a), states in § 5(b) that if the duty of the trustee and his
individual interests conflict in the exercise of a power, such power may be
exercised only by authorization of the court. This restriction excludes, how-
ever, certain powers which are violative of fiduciary principles. For a criti-
cism of these exclusions see Hallgring 812.
'Consolidated Police & Fireman's Pension Fund Comm'n v. Passiac, 23
N.J. 645, 652, 130 A.2d 377 (1957).
'Natonal Bank v. Mechanics' Nat'l Bank, 94 U.S. 437, 438 (1876).
* An Act Against Usury, 1570, 13 Eliz. I, c. 8, § IX.
'7 Barn & Cress 453, 108 Eng. Rep. 792 (K.B. 1821).
'E.g., Hogg v. Ruffner, 66 U.S. (1 Black) 38 (1861); Carolina Indus-
trial Bank v. Merriman, 260 N.C. 335, 132 S.E.2d 692 (1963).
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exceeds the cash price by a greater percentage than the legal rate
of interest is of no consequence since the transaction is held to be
outside the usury law. The courts predicated this doctrine on the
basis that a vendor can charge whatever price he pleases. Further-
more, the vendee is free to accept or reject the vendor's offer. On
the other hand, it is true a borrower in need of financial assistance
has no choice but to accept a loan on the lender's terms.
The modern adherance to this doctrine is typified by the North
Carolina Supreme Court in Michigan Natl Bank v. Hanner,0 where
Justice Branch, speaking for the court said: "The plaintiff's plead-
ings make out a sale and installment credit transaction, not a loan.
Thus there can be no action for usury. ''7
In Hanner the defendant agreed to purchase an airplane from
Graubart Aviation Inc. for a purchase price of 59,520 dollars and
made a partial payment of 5,000 dollars by trading in a used plane.
The defendant signed in blank a conditional sales contract and note
and left them with Graubart. Later Graubart filled in the contract,
raising the sales price to 69,500 dollars and adding a finance charge
of 19,365 dollars. The defendant took possession of the plane in
January 1963 and used it until April 1963 at which time he re-
linquished it to the vendor. The plane was then sold at public auc-
tion for 40,000 dollars and the plaintiff, who was an assignees of
the conditional sales contract and note, sued for the remainder of the
unpaid purchase price and the unpaid finance charges. The defendant
- 268 N.C. 668, 151 S.E.2d 579 (1966).
71d. at 673.8 There is a divergence of opinion as to whether a finance company who
is an assignee of a conditional sales contract can be a holder in due course.
For the proposition that it is not see Griffin v. Baltimore Savings & Loan
Ass'n, 204 Md. 154, 109 A.2d 804 (1954). See also Commercial Credit
Co. v. Childs, 199 Ark. 1073, 137 S.W.2d 260 (1940) discussed in 53
H~Av. L. REv. 1200 (1940) and 20 U. CiNc. L. REv. 123 (1951). These
courts base their decisions on the theory that the finance company was a
party to the transaction in and of itself; cf. Palmer v. Associate Discount
Corp., 124 F.2d 225 (D.C. Cir. 1941) (relying on the agency theory).
Typical of the view that a finance company under such conditions may be a
holder in due course is White System of New Orleans v. Hall, 219 La.
440, 53 So. 2d 227 (1951).
A majority of the courts hold that the defense of usury is a real rather
than a personal defense and even a holder in due course holds a usurious
note subject to the usury defense. See Gilden v. Hearne, 79 Tex. 120, 14
S.W. 1031 (1890). This was reaffirmed in Lydick v. Stamps, 316 S.W.2d
107 (Ft. Worth Ct. Civ. App. 1958). The North Carolina Court seems to
have adopted this view in Overton v. Tarkington, 249 N.C. 340, 106 S.E.2d
717 (1959) (the court spoke of assignment of the debt).
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asserted the defense of usury in the nature of a counterclaim9 for
twice the amount he alleged had been charged in violation of usury
laws. The North Carolina court held that the transaction was a
sale on credit and not subject to the North Carolina usury law."0
Prior to Hanner the North Carolina court had enumerated the
elements that must be present in order that there be a violation of
the usury laws." They are: (1) A loan expressed or implied, or a
forebearance of money; (2) An understanding that the money lent
was to be returned; (3) A greater rate of interest than the legal
rate; and (4) A corrupt intent to take more than the legal rate of
interest.'2 These seem to be the same essential factors that other
courts look for in determining whether usury laws have been vio-
lated.'3
Courts consistently state that they will look to the true nature of
a transaction and not allow a subterfuge to conceal an exaction of
more than the legal rate of interest.'4 The North Carolina Supreme
Court found such a subterfuge in Ripple v. Mortgage & Acceptance
Corp.'5 There an automobile manufacturer sold automobiles to a
dealer who paid for them with his own draft and the titles to the
automobiles were put in the name of the dealer. A mortgage com-
pany was designated as vendor on conditional sales contracts. The
' See Commercial Credit Corp. v. Robeson Motors, Inc., 243 N.C. 326,
90 S.E.2d 886 (1956). When sued on a contract a defendant may assert a
counterclaim based on usury.
20 268 N.C. at 673, N.C. GEN. STAT. § 24-2 (1964) regulates the amount
of interest that a party can charge. It states that the legal rate of interest in
North Carolina is six per centum per annum and that the penalty for
violation is the forfeiture of the entire interest and in case a greater rate of
interest has been paid the person so paying may recover back twice the
amount paid. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 53-43 (1964) allows commercial banks to
charge interest in advance even though the debt is to be paid in installments.
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 53-141 (1964) gives the same privilege to Industrial
banks.
N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 53-164 to -191 (1964) entitled "The Consumer Fi-
nance Act" provides for the licensing of small loan companies and sets out the
amount of interest they can legally charge.
" Doster v. English, 152 N.C. 339, 341, 67 S.E. 754 (1910).
"
2The corrupt intent element is satisfied by the charging of a higher
interest rate than the law allows. See Associated Stores Inc. v. Industrial
Loan & Inv. Co., 202 F. Supp. 251 (E.D.N.C. 1962).
"In re Bibbey, 9 F.2d 944, 945 (8th Cir. 1925) ; Loucks v. Smith, 154
Neb. 597, 599, 48 N.W.2d 722 (1951); Hafer v. Spaeth, 22 Wash. 2d 378,
156 P.2d 408 (1945).
"' E.g., Dunn v. Midland Loan Fin. Corp., 266 Minn. 550, 289 N.W. 411
(1939).
1193 N.C. 422, 137 S.E.2d 156 (1927).
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court held that since the titles to the automobiles were never in the
name of the mortgage company, it could not be a vendor, and the
transaction could not possibly be a sale but was a loan of the pur-
chase price.-"
In comparing Ripple with Hanner it seems apparent that the
North Carolina court concerns itself with form rather than sub-
stance when determining the true nature of the transaction in ques-
tion. There is little substantive difference between a loan of 55,000
dollars with a charge of 30 thousand dollars interest and a sale of
an item priced at 55,000 dollars and a subsequent additional charge
of 30,000 dollars. No better statement concerning the lack of a
substantial difference in such transactions can be found than the
following by Judge Tomkins in Failing v. National Bond & Inv.
Corp.'7 He said:
In construing a statute, its purpose may not be ignored, its ob-
ject should be the polar star of the court, when the course has
become obscured by decisions where, manifestly, the port for the
time, has been lost.... If it is the needy individual whose pro-
tection usury laws are inacted to guard, is the need of him who
borrows that he may buy for cash, greater than his, who pur-
chases on credit?... Tweedledum and tweedledee have no place
in the law today, which professes to seek the truth; whose aim
is justice.' 8
The attitude of the North Carolina court seems to be shared by the
vast majority of the state and federal courts, which, though they
state that they will examine the transaction, rarely find anything but
a bona fide credit sale transaction. 9
The courts of Arkansas20 and Nebraska2' have realized the futil-
18Id. at 427.
17 108 Misc. 617, 6 N.Y.S.2d 67 (Rochester City Ct. 1938) rev'd at 12
N.Y.S.2d 260 (Monroe County Ct. 1938) reversal aff'd at 14 N.Y.S.2d 1011
(App. Div. 1939).186 N.Y.S.2d at 71, 72.
"E.g., Rose v. Wheeler, 35 P.2d 220 (Cal. 1934); Wyatt v. Commercial
Credit Corp., 341 S.W.2d 348 (Mo. 1950); Yeager v. Ainsworth, 202 Miss.
747, 32 So. 2d 548 (1947) (proof of usury must be clear, positive and
certain) ; Hafer v. Spaeth, 22 Wash. 2d 378, 156 P.2d 408 (1945) (a person
may sell at any price and if bona fide it can not be usurious) ; Indian Lake
Estates, Inc. v. Special Inv. Inc., 154 So. 2d 883 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1963)
(before there can be usury there must be a loan).
20220 Ark. 601, 249 S.W.2d 973 (1952).
11 175 Neb. 483, 122 N.W.2d 528 (1963). There is some doubt that the
Nebraska court actually vitiated the doctrine that a credit transaction is
exempt from usury law because it specifically refused to overrule Grand
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ity of attempting to distinguish between a credit sale and a loan or
forebearance of money and treat the two as identical for usury
purposes. Thus, any mark-up over the cash price will be treated as
interest in these jurisdictions.2"
The Commissioners on Uniform State Laws have recognized the
anomaly that exists in the application of the usury laws and have
undertaken an exhaustive study of the entire field of consumer credit
for the purpose of drafting comprehensive uniform or model state
legislation.' This study is at the request of the council of state
governments. Substantial impetus for the study was provided by the
bills entitled "Truth in Lending" introduced in Congress by Sena-
tor Douglas of Illinois. Creditors would, under this legislation, be
required to tell the consumer in terms that they can understand what
they are paying for credit.2 5 Generally speaking the Douglas Bill
would require all consumer credit suppliers to state their finance
charges in terms of an annual interest rate and in terms of a dollar
amount. The proposed benefit to the consumer rests on the theory
that there is an increasing amount of competition among creditors
for consumer credit and in order for the consumer to benefit from
this competition he must know which of two creditors offers the
better credit price.
Conceding that a party may set one price for a cash transaction
and a much higher price for the sale of the same goods on credit,
it would seem, under basic contract principals, that the higher price
must be agreed upon by both parties in order to consumate an en-
forceable contract. The decision in Hanner seems to be vulnerable
Island Fin. Co. v. Fowler, 124 Neb. 514, 247 N.W.2d 203 (1933) which
established the doctrine in Nebraska. In the later case of G.M.A.C. v.
Mackril, 175 Neb. 631, 122 N.W.2d 742 the Nebraska Court said: "Regard-
less of the term used this item is a charge for the loan of money or for the
forebearance of a debt. Disguise it by any name or title we will, it is and
remains interest." Id. at 636, 122 N.W.2d at 746.
22220 Ark. at 607; 175 Neb. at 496. Other states have adopted a very
strict view in regard to aggregation of interest which is contra to the North
Carolina view set forth in note 7 supra. These states allow a bank to charge
only the amount of interest which has been earned prior to the payment of
each installment payment. A statement by the court in Dowler v. Georgia
Enterprises, Inc., 162 Tenn. 59, 34 S.W.2d 445 (1930) is illustrative of this
view. It said: "Payments are first applied to the discharge of interest ac-
crued at the date of each partial payment." Id. at 62, 34 S.W.2d at 448.
2 Buerger, Project On Retail Installment Sales, Consumer Credit, Small
Loans and Usury, 18 PER. FiN. Q. 110 (1963).
2" S. 2275 89th Cong., 1st Sess. (1965).
2 S. 2275 § 4 89th Cong., 1st Sess. (1965).
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
on this point; but on closer examination, Hanner can probably be
justified on the theory that the use of the plane for two months
operated as an acceptance of the higher price.6 In this factual respect
Hanner differs from the practice indulged in by some retail stores.
Under this practice a purchase is made of an item at a certain price
and no mention is made of a credit price. The customer is then
charged interest at rates as high as one and one-half per cent on the
unpaid balance at the end of each month." This is interest at the
rate of eighteen per cent per annum. The legislation proposed by
Senator Douglas would require that a creditor in an open end credit
transaction (1) provide to the buyer a clear statement in writing,
setting forth the simple annual percentage rate at which a finance
charge will be imposed on the monthly balance and (2) furnish to
each person at the end of each month a statement setting forth the
simple annual percentage rate at which a finance charge has been
imposed on the monthly balance.Ys
Usury statutes have, since their inception, been considered a valid
exercise of the police power of the state.2" The traditional justifica-
tion rests in the theory that a needy borrower is compelled to accept
the terms of a merciless lender. Therefore, the legislature protected
the needy borrower against unconscionable rates of interest. It is
submitted that a needy consumer, buying a necessity of life, is just
as much at the mercy of the greedy merchant as a needy borrower
seeking a loan from a voracious lender.
In the modern world the volume of credit buying is much greater
than in the days of Beete v. Bidgood. 0 It has been estimated that
the total volume of consumer credit, exclusive of home mortgage
financing, approximates seventy billion dollars each year."- Con-
sumer products comprise the largest portion of the total credit buy-
ing today and most of these products fall in the category of "neces-
sities." The need seems apparent for some form of relief against
28 268 N.C. at 669. It should be noted that the appeal in Hanner was
taken from the trial court's striking of the defendant's counterclaim based on
usury; the enforceability of the original contract was probably not before
the court.2TThis charge is usually referred to as a carrying charge.
28 S. 2275 89th Cong., 1st Sess. (1965).
"' State ex rel Ornstine v. Cary, 126 Wis. 135, 140, 104 N.W. 792(1905), writ of error dismissed 204 U.S. 669 (1906).
20 See note 4 supra and accompanying text.
2 Buerger, Project On Retail Invest ent Sales, Consumer Credit, Small
Loans and Usury, 18 PnR. FIN. Q. 110, 111 (1963).
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the type of credit transaction discussed herein, either from the legis-
lature or from the courts. The statutes against usury should be
extended to include credit sale transactions. Until such statutory
protection is afforded, a more realistic application of the "true
nature of the transaction" rule would provide some degree of pro-
tection to the consumer.
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